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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
The struggle against Great Britain by the original
thirteen colonies in North America arrested the dominance
of the world by the British Empire and simultaneously in
troduced the new United States into world politics.

The

Revolution produced an immediate need for competent men to
negotiate with European countries in order to secure the
various forms of aid and the alliances that were essential
for the survival of this venture in republicanism.

Hence

the study of American foreign policy essentially begins
/

with revolutionary diplomacy and an awareness of its suc
cess and^airixires^.
The men and events involved in this initial era of
American diplomacy have been the subject of niunerous mono
graphs, biographies and articles.

This thesis will confine

itself to a study of American writings, with the exception
of Bernard Fay's well'^accepted volume on Franklin.

(Fay's

books, which Include Louis XVI of The End of the World and
The Revolutionary Spirit in France and America: A Study of
Moral and Intellectual Relations between France and America
at the End of the 18th Century, are well received on both
sides of the Atlantic for their content and scholarship.)

1
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This thesis will concentrate on historical evaluations of
the American diplomats and their political and private
activities in Europe»

It will point out the prevailing

scholarly opinions on these subjects, and then discuss
the authors who present new approaches.
The representatives of the United States were plunged
into the intricacies of European politics.

Certain problems

almost invariably confronted these first diplomats from the
United States,

Their instructions from Congress usually

proved unrealistic during the actual negotiations with Eu
ropean foreign ministers.

The men dispatched from the United

States discovered the difficulty in following the congres
sional instructions while trying to ingratiate themselves
and their country with a particular European nation.

Then,

among the original Paris commission, there were serious dis
agreements and, even with John Adams as a replacement for
Silas Deane, the quarrels continued.

The contradictions

between official and personal goals often contributed towards
the confusion and disagreements among the Americans and Eu
ropeans.

Defining the goals of the United States if inde

pendence were achieved often presented problems, especially
as the discussions of the terms of a peace treaty progressed.
Basically, historians who wrote in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries are quite enamored of the ef
forts of the American diplomats to secure recognition of Amer
ican independence, while more recent historians recognize the
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conflicts of allegiance^ and priorities experienced by some
of the American envoys.

Great Britain was determined to

retain control of the colonies, both to enhance her economic
structure and to sustain her strong position on the Conti
nent.

In addition, France and Spain were forced to make

adjustments in receiving representatives from a rebellious
United States, because the American envoys insisted that
European governments recognize the independence of the United
States before negotiations for alliances or treaties could
begin.

This required great flexibility on the part of the

European statesmen, since at least several realized that an
independent United States could possibly present a geograph
ical and political threat to any kind of power balance
Europe could try to maintain.

The American commissioners

had to adjust to the instinct of self-preservation that per
vaded the courts of Europe and Great Britain.
Four nineteenth-century historians have written or
edited books about Arthur Lee, Benjamin Franklin and John
Adams which emphasize their invaluable roles in American
diplomacy.

The two-volume work on Franklin by Edward Hale

and Edward Hale, Jr., is comprised of Franklin's writings,
and the editorial comments praise Franklin's contributions
to the revolutionary effort.

As controversial as Arthur

Lee's diplomatic and political career was, his grandnephew, Richard Henry Lee, endeavors to characterize him
as the epitome of wisdom in his decisions and a martyr
for having withstood personal attacks from Deane and Franklin.
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For authors who study Arthur Lee, this biography is the only
primary text available.

Because of the bias in these two

volumes, subsequent authors must attempt to substantiate or
discredit the opinions of this first writer. The account of
John Adams's life by John T. Morse is another nineteenthcentury biographical study which praises the abilities of
Adams and rarely alludes to any of the problems which re
sulted from his recalcitrance and pride.
In the nineteenth century, Francis Wharton compiled
six volumes of the diplomatic correspondence of the Amer
ican Revolution which provide material for a study of the
men of the Revolution and their diplomacy, their attitudes
and activities.

These volumes do not contain editorial re

marks attempting to shape the reader*s viewpoint, however.
The transition made by twentieth-century historians
in writing about the diplomacy of the American Revolution
points towards more objective analyses of the men and the
situations they encountered.

Although J. C. Hildt is writ

ing about a time period that extends beyond the Revolution,
he does attempt to

present

a

realistic

view

problems Francis Dana encountered in Russia.

of

the

In contrast,

George Clark seems to belong in the nineteenth-century
tradition as he praises all the efforts that Silas Deane
made towards securing the independence of the United States
and condemns those men who criticized Deane's activities in
Europe.

His flagrant disregard for the canons of historical

research and writing is exemplified by the absence of docu
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mentation and the obvious bias in favor of Deane.

E. S.

Corwin's book on the alliance with France critically eval
uates American policy in France, as he avoids a laudatory
interpretation of the negotiations surrounding the FrancoAmerican alliance.

W. P. Cresson and Frank Monaghan, two

biographers of early American political leaders, have
written useful accounts of the efforts of Francis Dana and
John Jay in American diplomacy.

Cresson carefully examines

Dana's career in Russia and attributes the failure of his
mission to the difficulty of fulfilling the congressional
instructions and coping with the unexpected turmoil in
Catherine's court.

Monaghan emphasizes the adverse circum

stances that John Jay faced in Spain and then extols his
achievements on the peace commission in Paris.

Moreover,

both these accounts are useful not only for the information
they provide about the lives and activities of these men in
the European courts but also for the material concerning the
machinations of European diplomacy.

Thomas Perkins Abernethy

has written two articles discussing the quarrels that de
veloped among the original representatives to Paris, Frank
lin, Lee and Deane.

In contrast to the eulogistic approach

of the nineteenth'Century authors and the rather one-sided
treatments by Cresson and Monaghan, Abernethy demonstrates
that there were legitimate reasons for Lee to doubt the
propriety of the activities of Deane and Franklin in Paris.
His argument that historians have overlooked evidence im
plicating Deane and Franklin in questionable financial
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activities and in relationships with Englishmen, merits
discussion in this historigraphical analysis.
According to many historians, the scholarly milestone
dealing with revolutionary diplomacy is Samuel Flagg Bemis's
The Diplomacy of the American Hevolutibn, which was published
in 1935.

From a combination of European and American docu

ments and printed sources, Bemis has achieved a rare combi
nation of scholarship and objectivity.

He avoids the pit

falls of psychological analysis of historical figures which
indulges in observations of personalities and personal
crises that might have influenced decision-making.

His

book discusses both American and European diplomacy, illus
trating the significant effects that negotiations among
European countries had upon the success or failure of Amer
ican diplomatic efforts.
Since the publication of Bemis's book, historiography
has shown the influence of its scholarship.

Carl Van Doren's

biography of Franklin is complimentary in its discussion of
Franklin's contributions to the Revolution, but he takes into
account Franklin's earlier political setbacks and does not
attempt to dismiss them as inconsequential.

Van Doren indi

cates, however, that Franklin's diplomatic achievements in
Paris are beyond reproach.

John C. Miller has undertaken

the enormous tasks of covering many aspects of the Revolu
tion and the effects which it had upon the formation of the
national government.

Arthur Darling writes of the diplo

matic activities of the nation from 1763 to 1803.

Miller
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deals with the American envoys in Europe, excluding Dana,
while Darling specifically emphasizes the roles of Frank
lin and Jay in the final negotiations for peace.

Both

avoid the perils of biases in defending the actions of the
American diplomats, but they generally commend their over
all achievements in Europe,

Van Doren, Darling and Miller

also use more extensive bibliographies than the authors
who precede Bemis.
In the 195Qs, authors discuss with greater sophistica
tion the men of the Revolution, their personalities, their
diplomacy, and their concepts of the goals of the Revolu
tion.

Felix Gilbert*s article on American foreign policy

is useful in explaining Adams's attitudes towards American
alliances with European powers.

Gerald Stourzh's analysis

of Franklin's foreign policies reveals the philosophical,
as well as the pragmatic reasons, which motivated Franklin's
actions in Europe,

Stourzh does not speculate about Frank

lin's intentions in Europe but rather explains them through
the use of his writings and those of his contemporaries.
Stourzh provides factual information which is useful in the
study of Franklin's diplomacy.

Helen Auger deals with the

clandestine activities, authorized by the United States
government, of the Americans in Europe, although obviously
impressed with Franklin's sagacity and Deane's ingenuity,
she avoids offending her readers with an overwhelming sense
of bias.

Instead, she relates the activities of the pri

vateering war with a certain sense of drama and action but
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consistently maintains the scholarship o£ her book with ex
tensive references to primary material.

Both Coy H. James

and Julian P. Boyd discuss the career of Silas Deane in
Europe.

In his unpublished dissertation, James writes

favvorably of Deanecontributions to revolutionary diplo

macy and defends his shortcomings and questionable associa
tions against his critics.

In Boyd's series of articles

en Silas Deane, he reveals that the accusations linking
Deane with Edward Bancroft, a man suspected of spying for
the British, are basically true.

These articles are schol

arly in approach and content and do not succumb to the
teimptations of sensationalism, although the title contains

a touch of drama.

Two other historians who have written

articles about the men of the Revolution have contributed
to an understanding of the personalities of Franklin and
Adams.

Max Beloff*s essay on Franklin as an international

statesman is useful, although not exceptionally original in
its content.

The enigmatic personality of John Adams re

ceives adequate treatment from Clinton Rossiter.

Adams was

a difficult person to evaluate as he was a man of extremes,
and Rossiter attempts to explain Adams*s eccentricities
which at the same time made him an outstanding patriot and
yet a questionable diplomatic representative.

E. James

Ferguson points out that although commercialism pervaded
the first American commission, this is not a reason to dis
miss the first diplomatic efforts as failures.
More recent historians generally follow the canons of
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research and scholarship established by Bemis in their mono
graphs written about revolutionary diplomacy.

Richard B.

Morris's book deals with the peace commission and provides
detailed examinations of the activities of Jay, Franklin,
and Adams, which led up to the final negotiations for peace.
Richard W. Van Alstyne does not limit his study to the dip
lomats who influenced the American Revolution, and the
reader is able to ascertain the interaction between domes
tic and foreign affairs which might have affected American
foreign policy.

William Stinchcombe's study of French

policy towards the American alliance creates the awareness
of the influence conditions within the United States gov
ernment had upon the successes or failures of its diplomacy.
The two articles by David M. Griffiths on Russian-American
foreign policy also exemplify modern scholarship in his use
of available Russian as well as American sources.

He is

critical of Francis Dana*s inability to discern that Russian
policy was based upon commercial gain rather than upon
diplomatic considerations.

Naturally, the criticism he

directs against Dana contradicts Cresson's earlier appraisal
of the reasons for Dana*s unsuccessful attempts at securing
an alliance with Russia,

H. James Henderson uses information

from the congressional debates as the basis for an interest
ing article on the factionalism that developed in Congress
during its attempt to recall Franklin.
Although Bernard Bailyn, Page Smith, Roger Burlingame,
and Donald C, Smith have concentrated upon specific individ
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uals in their writings, they have avoided imparting to the
reader offensive biases.

Page Smith's two-volume biography

of John Adams is detailed about his life and is informative
about his diplomatic endeavors in Paris, Holland, and then
again in Paris on the peace commission.

The sections con

cerned with Adams's diplomatic efforts are favorable, but
Smith has used the personal papers of Adams as his main
source, which is an explanation for the praise Smith extends
to Adams and his criticisms of Franklin.

Bernard Bailyn's

short article on Adams discusses many of the troublesome
and unusual character traits which L. H. Butterfield's
editions of Adams's diary and autobiography reveal.

From

Bailyn's discussion, it is easy to realize why Adams might
have encountered difficulties in his dealings with the
foreign ministers of France and Holland.

Although Donald

Smith's collection of John Jay's writings is brief, it does
indicate Jay's concept of American foreign policy.

Smith's

editorial remarks are favorably disposed towards Jay's
policies.

Roger Burlingame has also contributed to the

biographical studies on Franklin but has limited his work
to Franklin's experiences in Europe,

In some instances,

he is almost critical of Franklin's subservience to French
demands upon the United States.

The approach of these re

cent writers is distinctly different from that of the
nineteenth-century biographers who have heralded the early
diplomats as virtually faultless.
In a class separate from the previous historians is
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Cecil B. Currey, who has taken it upon himself to expose
Benjamin Franklin as a spy for the British.

The sensation

alism of his account arouses the skepticism of most know
ledgeable historians who would disregard Currey's sweeping
generalizations about Franklin*s dishonest activities.

Al

though some historians and reviewers might contend that
such a book adds a needed dimension to historical writing,
it would seem that the blatant charges he makes against
Franklin without substantial evidence have seriously weak
ened the credibility of his book.
An historiographical study of the diplomacy of the
American Revolution should trace the development of schol
arship and professional writing.

Although most of the

above-mentioned authors have contributed to our knowledge
about American foreign policy, some have demonstrated that
the techniques of scholarly historical writing have eluded
them.

However, the different books on diplomacy and the

men who formulated it are essential to a complete historio
graphical study of early American foreign policy.

CHAPTER II

SILAS DEANE IN PARIS
The Committee of Secret Correspondence decided that
the American war effort could easily meet with disaster
unless aid was obtained from a country with money and mili
tary supplies.

In 1776, the Committee appointed Silas

Deane, a Connecticut merchant, as its representative in
France for both diplomatic and commercial affairs.

Had

Deane persevered in an unblemished, loyal and patriotic
career, he would be praised as the founder of American
diplomacy in Europe.

However, Deane's diplomatic years

are controversial because of his involvement in extra
curricular commercial activities, which some historians
contend were detrimental to the struggling nation.

In

addition, historians argue about his commitment to the Amer
ican cause and the degree to which he, as well as Franklin,
transferred information vital to American success to the
British.

Edward Bancroft supposedly subverted Deane's

career, but there is disagreement as to Deane's suscepti
bility to his persuasions.

A hatred developed between

Deane and the Lee brothers, especially Arthur, because they
suspected him of placing his personal affairs and economic
gain above America*s best interests.
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Historians debate

13

whether Deane and Arthur Lee vere unable to place matters
of state above personalities and how this affected Deane's
service to his country.

Finally, Deane*s later life, after

the completion of an investigation into the justice of his
recall, added another dimension to his already complicated
career.

There is argument among historians as to whether

he renounced his allegiance to the United States and became
another Benedict Arnold in Europe.

His death aroused little

interest until printed conjectures suggested that Deane had
been murdered by his comrade in complicity, Edward Bancroft.
This chapter will pursue the issues pertaining to Deane's
service in the Revolution, according to the differing view
points of historians.
Silas Deane's career in Europe involved securing French
aid for the United States.

However, his outside financial

interests promote doubt with regard to his diligence in seek
ing this aid, according to Carl Van Doren and Thomas Perkins
Abernethy.

Carl Van Doren's Secret History of the American

Revolution C1941) intimates that because of Deane's outside
commercial activities, he was especially susceptible to the
attractive offers which Paul Wentworth, the chief British
spy, made in his efforts to direct the attention of the Amer
ican minister away from the cause of independence.^

Thomas

Perkins Abernethy's article, "Commercial Activities of Silas

^Carl Van Doren, Secret History of the American Revolu
tion (New York: The Viking Press, 1941}, p. 62. (Hereinafter
referred to as Van Doren, Secret Hi story.)
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Deane in France" C1934), criticizes Deane's acceptance of
Robert Morris's proposal that an organization be established
which would carry on trade among all nations regardless o£
their status as belligerents.

Members of this enterprise

included Thomas Walpole, Ferdinand Grand, a French banker,
M. le Ray de Chaumont, and a group of French merchants, in
addition to Morris and his associates.

To

facilitate their

operations, Caron de Beaumarchais-helped transfer the goods
arriving from British ports to French ships bound for America.
Abernethy even lists Vergennes as a participant in this
private business stating, ". . . it is not unlikely that

2

Vergennes got his share of the profits."

Silas Deane's career in Europe introduces the question
of the extent to which personal financial ventures influ
enced or interfered with his official purpose of securing
French aid.

John C. Miller and Helen Auger substantiate

the allegation that Deane endeavored to represent the United
States diplomatically, as well as assist the private finan
cial interests of domestic firms.

Both Miller and Auger

acknowledge that Deane was actually on a double mission.
In Miller's Triumph of Freedom (1948), he explains Deane's
efforts to attempt simultaneously to obtain loans and sup
plies from the French while he was representing the commer
cial interests of Willing, Morris and Company for a 5 percent

2Thomas Perkins Abernethy, "Commercial Activities of
Silas Deane in France," American Historical Review. XXXIX
(April, 1934), 478-479. (Hereinafter referred to as Aber
nethy, "Commercial Activities.")

15
commission.
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Auger's Secret War of Independence (1955) con

curs that, although Deane was instructed to investigate the
possibility of purchasing military supplies, he also repre
sented Morris's business venture for personal profit.

Sup

posedly Deane was also involved in the Vandalia operations,
an international trading company organized to sell land
between the Ohio and Mississippi rivers.

Throughout Deane's

mission in Europe, Robert Morris defended the legitimacy of
Deane's mercantile connections and supported his integrity,^
Although Deane is never disassociated from the commer
cialism that pervaded American negotiations in Europe, Gerald
Stourzh and Coy H. James relate his commercial activities to
his mercantile background.

Gerald Stourzh, in Benjamin

Franklin and American Foreign Policy (1954), states that
Deane attempted to avoid power politics by placing relations
with France on a commercial basis.

Despite Deane's pro-

French sentiments, he wrote to Charles William Frederick
Dumas in Holland,
It is my ultimate and early wish that America may
forever be unconnected with the politics or in
terests of Europe as it is by nature situated
distant from it, and that the friendly ties aris
ing from a free, friendly and independent commerce
may be the only ties between us.^

3

John C. Miller, Triumph of Freedom (Boston; Little,
Brown and Co., 1948), p. 369. (Hereinafter referred to as
Miller, Triumph.)
'^Helen Auger, Secret War of Independence (Boston: Little,
Brown and Co., 1955), pp. 101, 198, 314. (Hereinafter re
ferred to as Auger, Secret War.)
^Gerald Stourzh, Benjamin Franklin and American Foreign
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Stourzh received support from Coy H. James who, in his
unpublished dissertation on "The Revolutionary Career o£
Silas Deane" (1955), refers to Deane as a

. merchant

conscious of and apprehensive for the commercial future of
the colonies."

Apparently Deane planned to re-enter busi

ness when the war ended, and also believed that speculation
in western lands would be profitable with the return of

6

peace.

If Deane was involved in personal commercial ventures,
it was not detrimental to his mission, according to James.
This historian also believes that Deane's efforts were pri
marily directed towards securing independence; therefore,
he urged the French alliance mainly for this reason.

How

ever, from his point of view, the economic aspects of the
alliance were as important as the political.

James assumes

that the central problem in Deane's mission resulted from
the failure of Congress to distinguish between commercial
and diplomatic functions.

Deane and Franklin considered

that privateering and the sale of prizes were under their

Policy CChicago: University of Chicago Press, 19 54), p. 128.
CHereinafter referred to as Stourzh, Franklin. Foreign
Policy.) See also Francis Wharton, The Revolutionary Diplo
matic Correspondence of the United States C6 vols., Washing
ton: Government Printing Office, 1889), II, p. 138; Deane
wrote to Dumas, September 11, 1776, "If European power would
protect commerce, that would be all that would be necessary."
(Hereinafter referred to as Wharton, Diplomatic Correspon
dence.)
6Coy H. James, "Revolutionary Career of Silas Deane"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University,
1956), pp. 46, 193. (Hereinafter referred to as James,
"Revolutionary Career.")

17
7
jurisdiction, while Arthur Lee did not.
E. James Ferguson prefers to approach Deane's career
from the standpoint that Deane was typical of the* enter
prising merchants of his day.

His article in the William

and Mary Quarterly, "Business, Government and the Congres
sional Investigation in the Revolution" C1959), emphasizes
that Deane was like all small capitalists who aspired to
become more successful in an era of vast speculation.

His

political appointment allowed plenty of room for commercial
activity, as he was in charge of disposing of prizes taken
by American privateers, which he could easily sell to himO
self or his partners.
Considering the commercial atmo
sphere, Ferguson decides there was nothing unethical about
Deane's partnership with Robert Morris and his expectations
of playing a vital role in Morris's expanding empire,
Richard Van Alstyne implies that Deane combined com
merce and politics to insure massive support from France
and draw that country into the war,

Deane's commercial

schemes are enumerated by Van Alstyne in Empire and Indepen
dence (1965), but he indicates that Deane hoped that if
French merchants speculated in American trade, and the United
States employed influential Frenchmen in the American army,

^Ibid., p. 84.
8

E. James Ferguson, "Business, Government and the Con
gressional Investigation in the Revolution," William and
Mary Quarterly, XVI (July, 1959), 303-304. (Hereinafter
referred to as Ferguson, "Congressional Investigation.")
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the French government would be obligated to enter the war
to support the Americans.

Deane also emphasized the bene

fits which would accrue to France if she participated in
the privateering ventures and gave the United States aid.
Then France would be permanently secure from English threats
on the Continent or on the seas.

Q

Attempts by earlier historians to explain or justify
Deane's commercial activities are discredited by Cecil B.
Currey in his book. Code #72; Ben Franklin, Patriot or Spy
(1972).

He accuses Deane of establishing his own enter

prise "separate from his profiteering partnership with
Beaumarchais."

This business was, of course, the firm

which Abernethy mentions, and Deane's contribution was
to arrange and coordinate its operations.^®
Silas Deane's relationships with French officials and repre
se n t a t i v e s , e s p e c i a l l y C o m t e d e V e r g e n n e s a n d B e a u m a r c h a i s , c o n 
tributed to the controversy over his career.

Some histori

ans define Deane*s association with Beaumarchais through the
firm of Hortalez and Company as based strictly uppn govern
mental business; others contend that both sought personal
financial gain through the commercial activities of the
Revolution.
g
Richard W. Van Alstyne, Empire and Independence (New
York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), pp. 99, 101.
(Hereinafter referred to as Van Alstyne, Empire.)
^^Cecil B. Currey, Code #72; Ben Franklin. Patriot or
Spy (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey; Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1972), pp. 99-100. (Hereinafter referred to as Currey,
Code #72.)
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Hale, Bemis, Miller and Auger concur that their rela
tionship was based upon official business.

Edward Hale

and Edward Hale, Jr., in Franklin in France (1887) state
that from the letters exchanged between Beaumarchais and
Deane, it is evident that their relationship placed govern11
ment business first.

Samuel Flagg Bemis explains in his

book. The Diplomacy of the American Revolution (1935),
that France established the policy of secret assistance
before Deane's arrival.

12

Miller intimates that Deane and

Beaumarchais were honest in their activities.

Beaumarchais

regarded Deane as the only trustworthy member of the Amer
ican commission in Paris.

Deane was the one man who objected

to a separate peace between the United States and Great Brit
ain, and he also prevented Lee and Franklin
13
straying into the British camp."

. . from

Because of the confused

state of the accounts of Hortalez and Company, Auger insists
that there is insufficient evidence to prove that Deane and
Beaumarchais engaged in ventures for personal profit.

She

adds that Deane directed his attention first to the subject
of a commercial treaty with France, to which Vergennes was
receptive except for the American demand that France recog
nize the independence of the colonies.
l^Edward E. Hale, and Edward E. Hale, Jr., Franklin in
France (2 vols., Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1888), I, p. 45.
(Hereinafter referred to as Hale, Frank!in.)
12sarauel Flagg Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American
Revolution (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1935),
p"!! 39. [Hereinafter referred to as Bemis, Diplomacy.)
l^Miller, Triumph, p. 365.
l^Auger, Secret War, pp. 131, 139.
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Undeniably, there are questions involving Deane's
relations with the French, but James, Stourzh and Van
Alstyne regard none of them as critical enough to discredit
Deane's entire mission.

According to James, Beaumarchais

promised French aid to Arthur Lee, but there is proof that
he was not authorized to financially commit the French gov
ernment.

Then Vergennes came to support Beaumarchais's

plan for French aid.

Defending Deane and Beaumarchais,

James discounts accusations that the two had turned a gift
from the French into a commercial operation.Although
Stourzh recognizes that the French regarded Deane as the
most reliable and sympathetic to the French government,
he stresses Deane's hope that commerce would be the only
tie between the two countries.

1

Van Alstyne considers

the influence that Beaumarchais exerted over the French
court to have been minimal.

Historians have overestimated

the importance of the French playwright.

Deane regarded

him as a willing tool, and the French court considered him
expendable.

Nowhere does Van Alstyne indicate that Deane,

Vergennes and Beaumarchais pursued personal financial in
terests.

To Deane's credit, he never allowed the French

to know where his true sympathies lay.

In contrast to

Miller, Van Alstyne explains that Deane played upon the
fears and ambitions of the French, so that they would fear

15

James, "Revolutionary Career," pp. 30, 39.

16

Stourzh, Franklin, foreign Policy, p. 128.
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the possibility that a separate peace between the United
17
States and England might be negotiated.
According to Currey, historians have incorrectly cred
ited Deane with the honor of securing French aid when actu
ally France and Spain had been dispatching aid through
Beaumarchais before either Deane or Franklin arrived in
France.

The French considered it in their own best inter

ests to hurt Great Britain by sending aid to the United
^
18
States.
Another aspect of Silas Deane»s career which has
caused debate among historians is his friendship with
Benjamin Franklin.

The controversial issues relating to

their friendship concern the association of Deane and
Franklin with men suspected of being British agents, their
mutual dislike of Arthur Lee, and the degree of indepen
dence they exerted in negotiating with the French.

Frank

lin defended the integrity of their relationship until
1781 when Deane allowed the British to publish his letters
condemning the revolutionary effort.

Franklin wrote Deane

in 178 2 that the
. . . publication of those letters has done
great Prejudice to your Character there
[America], and necessarily diminished much
of the Regard your Friends had for you.l^

l^Van Alstyne, Empirg.^ pp. 97, 124.
l^currey. Code #7 2, pp. 91, 93.
l^Carl Van Doren, ed., Benjamin Franklin*s Autobiographr
ical Writings CNew York: The Viking Press, 1945), p. 513.
THereinafter referred to as Van Doren, ed.. Autobiographical
Writings.)
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The Hales and Bernard Fay agree that Franklin supported
Deane during frustrations of his mission which included
the feud with the Lees and the presence of British spies
in his entourage.

20

Fay adds in his book, Franklin, the

Apostle of Modern Times (1929), that Franklin even jeop
ardized his secure position in Prance by defending Deane
against the Adams--Lee faction.

21

There is agreement among Abernethy, Auger and James
that Franklin and Deane enjoyed a close association, but
they do not indicate that their relationship was dishonest.
Abernethy admits that Franklin and Deane were committed to
independence.

They attempted to carry on the work of the
«

commission without Arthur Lee's cooperation, because Lee
constantly endeavored to disrupt the harmony of the friendship between Franklin and Deane.

22

In addition, they sought

to prevent an agreement between Vergennes and Lord Stormont, the
British minister in Paris, by creating an open scandal about
French participation in American privateering raids.

Frank

lin was able to explain the privateering efforts to Con
gress, and Deane knew how to handle organizational details
for the privateering enterprise.

Both urged Congress and

the Committee to begin action on every sea on which Britain

20

Hale, Franklin. I, p, 49. See also Bernard Fay,
Franklin, the Apostle of Modern Times (Boston: Little,
Brown and Co., 1929), p. 443. (Hereinafter referred to as
Fay, Apostle.)
21
22

•
Fay, Apostle, p. 443,
Abernethy, "Commercial Activities," 483.
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carried on commerce.

Franklin definitely missed Deane

in the commercial work after his recall, as Adams and Lee
were of no help, but he rebuked Deane's later activities
when he learned of the "intercepted letters" which Deane
had written.Jamea corroborates the idea of a harmon
ious relationship between the two men and says the friend
ship continued after Deane*s recall to America
return in disgrace to Paris.

and his

Franklin believed that since

Deane had rendered valuable service to the Revolution, he
deserved a fair trial in the United States.

In writing to

James Lovell in 1777, Franklin repeated that any mistakes
Deane made earlier in his European career had long since
been rectified by his devoted service to the government.
However, Franklin admitted to Robert Livingston that by
178 2 Deane had changed.

His conversations had come to in

clude ". . . 'an open vindication of Arnold's conduct."'
An explanation for this change in Deane, Franklin thought,
was that Deane*s mental faculties had gradually begun to
decline.

Franklin continued to insist, however, that his

service to the United States had been commendable.

25

Currey criticizes their relationship, explaining that
both Franklin and Deane worked more for their own private
benefit than for the independence of their country.

23

It

Auger, Secret War, p. 163.

^^Ibid., pp. 298, 334.
^^James, "Revolutionary Career," pp. 141, 228-229.
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was Franklin who instructed Deane to see Bancroft upon his
arrival in France.

When Arthur Lee would leave Paris,

Deane and Franklin ignored their share of the diplomatic
workload to pursue their own private interests.

Their

main concern was to remove Arthur Lee from Paris and, when
he would return, neither Franklin nor Deane made an effort
to inform him of any developments during his absence.

26

When Lee*s notes were stolen in Prussia, Franklin and
Deane only increased their efforts to isolate him from
their activities.

Franklin and Deane participated in a

"multitude of private and clandestine matters," which in
cluded employing and defending British spies, allowing
those who should not have had it special access to state
information, arranging secret meetings with British agents
and misusing congressional funds.

27

One of the contributing factors to the controversy
surrounding Deane*s career was his association with men
regarded by some historians as being British spies.

The

names of Paul Wentworth and Edward Bancroft are particularly
associated with such nefarious activities.

Deane's affinity

towards Edward Bancroft unalterably links him to the British
spy network, according to some historians.

Other historians

are sympathetic towards Deane, like Bemis, Auger, and James,
and defend him as being unaware of Bancroft's devious char
acter.

They also claim that Deane rejected attractive mone-

26currey, Code #72, pp. 67, 126.
27lbid, , pp. 126, 211-212.
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tary offers made by Wentworth if Deane would agree to rec
onciliation.

Samuel Flagg Bemis emphasizes that, although

the British sought Deane out, Wentworth's attempt to persuade Deane to advocate reconciliation failed.
Deane about Bancroft's character.

28

Lee warned

But since he could produce

no proof, Deane discounted this information as he distrusted
Lee's continually suspicious temperament.

29

In his Secret

History of the American Revolution, Van Doren is more skep
tical of Deane's rejection of Wentworth's offer.

The oppor

tunities and the advantages promised by Wentworth might have
combined with Deane's interest in commercial activity to
form the basis of a kind of preliminary agreement reconcil
ing Britain and the United States.

North was able to inform

George III about goods purchased by the United States from
France through a list furnished to Bancroft by Deane.

Fur

thermore, Van Doren, in contrast to Van Alstyne, asserts
that the king was willing to trust Deane as one who would
30
bring the United States to an agreement on reconciliation.
Edward Bancroft is suspected by some historians of hav
ing been a British agent.

It was Deane's close association

with Bancroft which has caused much debate as to the sin-

28

Samuel Flagg Bemis, "British Secret Service and the
French-American Alliance," American Historical Review. XXXIX
(April, 1934), 486, (Hereinafter referred to as Bemis,
"British Secret Service.") "*See also Bemis, Diplomacy, p. 59.
^^Bemis, "British Secret Service," 476,
30

Van Doren, Secret History, pp. 62-63.
Alstyne, Empire, p. Ill,

See also Van
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cerity o£ Deane's commitment to independence.

Both Bernard

Fay and John C. Miller contend that Bancroft and William Carmichael
informed Lord North of all American transactions in Paris, thus
creating confusion in the American camp with everyone suspecting everyone else,

31

Edward Bancroft cleverly insured

that Deane would continue to supply him with information.
For example, on one of his visits to England, he had himself
arrested as an American agent.

After he was miraculously

released from prison, Deane never doubted that his friend
had fallen into the hands of the merciless Britons.

32

Although Auger and James recognize that Bancroft easily
influenced Deane, neither condemns Deane's patriotism but
rather explains that Bancroft easily dominated Deane, who had
a weaker character.

Whenever Deane began to hesitate with

regard to his association with Bancroft, the latter would
soothe Deajie with plans for new projects involving Wentworth,
North and George III.

33

Deane was conscious of being sur

rounded by British agents like Wentworth, and realized that
the French would resent frequent visits by Englishmen.

How

ever, early in Deane's mission, Bancroft had learned of its
aims and continuously reported his knowledge of Deane's

31

Fay, Apostle, p. 426. See also Wharton, Diplomatic
Correspondence, II, p. 170; Deane to Dumas, October 13,
1776, "Mr. Carmichael can give you the best intelligence
of present affairs in America."
Miller, Triumph, p. 282,
^^Auger, Secret War, p. 157.
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letters, progress on treaties and commercial transactions,
James admits that Deane's best friend and advisor during
his mission was fundamentally dishonest, but easily deceived
Deane because of his warm personality,

34

Edward Bancroft secured the dominant role in the rela
tionship between the two men, according to Julian P. Boyd's
article concerning the friendship between Deane and Ban
croft (1959).

Boyd recognizes that Bancroft's genius

enabled him to fit Deane to his own plans, which involved
schemes for gaining wealth from trade, purchasing supplies
for Congress, land speculations, spying and double-dealing.
William Eden's group of intelligence agents spied for vary
ing motives, and Bancroft " . . . moved to the center of
these flexible consciences, towering above all for deceit
and good fortune."

As a result of the information provided,

England was so well informed about Franco-American negotia
tions with regard to Deane's conversations with Vergennes
and Beaumarchais that Stormont knew far more about what
Deane was doing than did Congress,

However, if it served

the purposes of Bancroft and Deane to withhold information
from Stormont, they did so without qualms.

Eventually

their "lives had been welded together in deceit and dis
trust, and they possessed secrets about each other that made
alienation, to say the least, inadvisable."

34
35

35

Thus, he

James, "Revolutionary Career," p. 41,

Julian P. Boyd, "Silas Deane: Death by a Kindly
Teacher of Treason," William and Mary Quarterly, XVI
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agrees with the earlier interpretations o£ Bemis and Auger
and has influenced succeeding historians.
In his discussion of the Bancroft-Deane friendship,
Richard B. Morris concludes they had a close working rela
tion, but Van Alstyne dismisses the concept of a British
spy network as strictly conjecture.

In The Peacemakers,

the Great Powers and American Independence (1965), Morris
characterizes Bancroft as an amoral opportunist who leaked
news of the 1778 treaty with the French to promote his per
sonal interests on the London Stock Exchange.

However,

Bancroft's close association with Deane carries "sinister
overtones, and lends credence to, if it does not confirm
some of Arthur Lee's worst suspicions."

36

On the other

hand. Van Alstyne accuses historians, notably Samuel Flagg
Bemis, of creating legends concerning the machinations of
certain "British spies" who furnished the ministry with
"secret information" about French diplomacy.

He considers

this idea as ridiculous and explains that any "facts" the
British government might have received would have come from
merchants who were suffering from the depredations of Spain
and France.

37

Currey links Deane and Bancroft, explaining that Ban
croft recruited Deane into the British "silent force"

(April, July, October, 1959), 187, 320, 322, 336.
after referred to as Boyd, "Silas Deane.")

(Herein

^^Richard B. Morris, The Peacemakers, the Great Powers
and American Independence (New York: Harper and Row, 1965),
p. 10. (Hereinafter referred to as Morris, Peacemakers.)
^'^Van Alstyne, Empire, p. 118.
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through various inducements.

Deane's desire to satisfy

his personal interests allowed Bancroft to dominate his
life in Paris.

Currey adds, "His [Deane's] association

with Bancroft ultimately cost him the opportunity for ser
vice with a new nation, his reputation and eventually his
life."^^
One of the main reasons Silas Deane elicits discus
sion is because of his clash with Arthur Lee.

Lee was

certain that Deane was diverting congressional funds for
his own benefit, while justifying his actions with the
explanation that Beaumarchais had to be repaid.

If this

indiscretion was not enough, Lee also asserted that Deane
maintained secret relations with the British through Ban
croft.

In an undocumented yet favorable account of Deane's

career, George Clark, in his Silas Deane, A Connecticut
Leader in the Revolution (1913), blames Arthur Lee as the
political enemy of Beaumarchais and Deane, who was " . . .
determined to advance himself though he ruined every one
who stood in his way."

39

E. S. Corwin mentions the contro

versy between the two men in his book, French Policy and the
American Alliance of 1778.

He suggests that Lee was correct

in assuming the supplies had needlessly been purchased, as
they had been contributed by the Bourbon kings.

Still, Lee

^^Currey, Code #72, p. 96.
39

George Clark, Silas Deane, A Connecticut Leader in
the Revolution (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1913), p. 63.
(Hereinafter referred to as Clark, Silas Deane.)
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was unduly suspicious of Deane's financial motives.^®
Also contributing to the conflict between the two men
were Arthur Lee's objections to the authority assumed by
Deane in the American commission, and Deane's efforts to
discredit Lee.

Thomas Perkins Abernethy says that Frank

lin's appointment of Jonathan Williams to the commercial
agency at Nantes aroused Lee's wrath.

Not only was he ap

pointed while Lee was in Spain, but he also received his
orders only from Deane.

Then Deane recommended that Lee

employ John Thornton as his secretary.

Thornton was assumed

to be the British source of information on the FrancoAmerican treaty, and such accusations naturally implicated
Lee.

41

In Abernethy's later article, "The Origin of the

Franklin-Lee Imbroglio" (1938), he argues that the feud
occurred, because Franklin and Deane were intent on taking
the privateering business out of the hands of the official
agents and utilizing it for their own purposes.

He accuses

other historians of unjustly condemning the Lees, because
they opposed Franklin and Deane.

42

Bemis introduces a new element.

He contends the feud

arose from a misunderstanding concerning Deane's succession

40

E. S. Corwin, French Policy and the American Alliance
of 1778 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1916),
pT] 207. (Hereinafter referred to as Corwin, French Policy.)
41
42

Abernethy, "Commercial Activities," 483-484.

Thomas Perkins Abernethy, "The Origin of the FranklinLee Imbroglio," The North Carolina Historical Review, XV
(January, 1938), 51. (Hereinafter referred to as Abernethy,
"Franklin-Lee Imbroglio.")
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to Lee's role in dealing with Beaumarchais.

In 1776, the

Secret Committee on Correspondence sent Deane to seek French
support politically and to secure military supplies from the
French government.

Although Beaumarchais had already dealt

with Arthur Lee, he immediately turned to Deane as the man
43
with more authority.
Miller agrees with Corwin that Lee was unduly suspic
ious towards Deane.

Although Lee vociferously charged that

Deane was involved in a fraud with Beaumarchais, Miller
notes that there was no evidence of extreme irregularity except for exceptionally disorderly accounts.

44

James emphasizes that whenever Lee encountered a person
whom he could not dominate, he immediately became convinced
that the person was an adversary determined to destroy him.
Lee's constant suspicions of Deane's brazen manner in his
dealings with Beaumarchais eventually drove Franklin and
Deane to send him on pointless missions to Madrid and Berlin.
Lee complained to his brothers that, '"Mr. Deane, Dr. Ban
croft, and William Carmichael . . . have been practicing
against me, and what I do not know is how far it may ex
tend.'"

In addition, he surmised that important matters

were being concealed from him, because of Deane's midnight
visits to Versailles and, previous to that, the lack of any
official communications while he was journeying about.

As

^^Bemis, Diplomacy, pp. 35, 37. He states that there
is a lack of evidence to document exactly what happened
between Lee and Beaumarchais.
44

Miller, Triumph, pp. 369, 373.
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a result o£ his doubting and jealous tendencies, he wrote
to Richard Henry Lee, suggesting that he remain in France,
"'the center o£ commercial activity,'" while Franklin was
sent to Vienna and Deane to Holland.

45

Then, at the con

clusion of the treaty of amity and commerce in 1778, Ralph
Izard, William and Arthur Lee decided that Deane was favor
ing New England's commercial interests at southern expense
because of the prohibition of import duties on molasses
coming from the French West Indies.

46

(This objectionable

article was later struck out.)
According to Boyd and Ferguson, all of Lee's accusa
tions against Deane might not have been incorrect.

Boyd

holds that Lee's accusations might have had some validity
because of Deane's relations with Bancroft and his ques
tionable diversion of public funds.

Apparently, Deane ex

cluded Lee from his counsel immediately after meeting with
Bancroft.

He rejected Lee's warning that certain men were

to be avoided, and was indignant that Lee suggested he
should report such men to Congress.

From Deane's viewpoint,

such serious charges could not be made without proof.
Arthur Lee's doubts regarding Deane's honesty increased
about the time the alliance was signed when one of Deane's
remittances to Samuel Wharton became involved in the pub
lic accounts, thus confirming Lee's suspicion that Deane

4 "i

James, "Revolutionary Career," pp. 102-103, 105.

^^Ibid., p. 123.
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was using public money for private gain.^^

Ferguson also

recognizes that Lee had a possible basis for distrusting
Deane because of his commercial activities and questionable
personal associations.

Ferguson holds that Lee believed

from his conversations with Beaumarchais that the supplies
were a gift from France.

When Deane contracted for repay

ment, Lee perceived a conspiracy simply because he failed
to comprehend the personal commercialism that pervaded the
American commission.

48

Agreeing with Bemis's earlier premise, Morris and Van
Alstyne assert that the feud was a result of Beaumarchais's
preference for Deane over Lee.

Morris asserts that early

in the Lee-Beaumarchais association, Lee became convinced
that the French dramatist's supplies were a gift from the
French government, and he denounced Deane's agreement to
repay Beaumarchais.

49

Van Alstyne concurs that Beaumarchais's

choice of Deane over Lee was the beginning of the enmity be
tween Deane and Lee.^^
Currey combines the opinions of Boyd and Ferguson,
stating that Deane deliberately avoided Lee, despite his
instructions, and established an agreement with Beaumarchais.
Deane then ignored Lee's warnings concerning Bancroft's

^^Boyd, "Silas Deane," 186, 334.
48
49

Ferguson, "Congressional Investigation," 307.
Morris, Peacemakers, p. 9.

^^Van Alstyne, Empire, p. 96.
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character and Wentworth's dangerous influence.Lee's sus
picions and hostilities are, to Currey, a legitimate indica
tion of Deane's dishonesty.
The quarrel between Lee and Deane finally resulted in
Deane's official recall to the United States,

This effort

to resolve questions concerning Deane's public accounts met
with varying reactions from Americans and received strong
criticism from the French, who obviously preferred Deane
to Lee.

Some historians also question if Deane's efforts

to straighten out his financial complications were sincere,
intimating that Deane had something to hide after all.

Al

though Clark's book is of questionable historical value,
he does lend considerable support to Deane's defense in the
congressional recall.

He believes the whole scenario was

a plot Lee devised to increase his power.

Consequently,

Deane was only a tool Arthur used to strengthen his political machinery.

52

In contrast to Clark, Thomas Perkins

Abernethy claims that Deane intentionally left his papers
in France in an effort to get a settlement without an audit,
because he had failed to distinguish between public and
private use of money.

In addition, there was no account

of the cargoes forwarded for public use, with a designation
of the persons to whom they had been consigned.

^^Currey, Code #72, p. 94.
^^Clark, Silas Deane, p. 132.
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Abernethy, "Commercial Activities," 485.
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In Van
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Doren's opinion there is insufficient evidence to resolve
the accusations against Deane involving the misuse of con
gressional funds and the release of secret information to
the British.

It is also impossible to determine if Con

gress owed Deane a settlement for the financial trouble
and mental trauma it caused him.^^

The matter of evidence

became secondary as two opposing groups formed in Congress,
Silas Deane's fate was put aside as the question became
whether the businessmen or the people would run the coun
try, Miller c l a i m s . A u g e r concludes that incomplete
evidence made it impossible for Congress to substantiate
the charges against Deane.
Deane's recall received mixed reactions in America,
but greatly disturbed the French.

James details the ef

forts of the French to protect Deane and clear his reputa
tion.

Vergennes and his colleagues chose to regard Deane's

recall as a victory for the anti"Alliance members of Con
gress.

Thus, the French decided to bestow the highest

recommendations upon Deane.

Vergennes praised,"'. , , the

zeal, activity and intelligence with which he has conducted
the interests of the United States, by which he has merited
the esteem of the King.*"

Beaumarchais wrote a letter exon

erating Deane from any wrongdoing with regard to Hortalez

54

Van Doren, Secret History, p. 432.

^^Miller, Triumph, p. 373.
^^Auger, Secret War, p. 305.
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and Company.
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The French preference for Deane aroused

another conflict in Congress when Thomas Paine began pub
lishing information from the files of the Committee on
Secret Correspondence to implicate Deane.

Paine hoped that

this material would prove that the supplies Deane had con
tracted for with Beaumarchais were actually a gift of the
French government„

The French angrily denounced Paine's

misuse of Franco-American classified information, and Paine
was forced to resign from his relatively insignificant post
as clerk of the Committee for Foreign Affairs.

58

French support of Deane placed Congress in a dilemma
in attempting to resolve the issue of his guilt or innocence.
James states that out of the many charges against Deane,
only two are conspicuous enough to merit comments

The first

was that he was "in trade" and the second placed his ac
counts in a state of "studied confusion."

Congress refused

either to convict Deane or acquit him, and its inability to
rise above partisan strife contributed to this stalemate»
Deane was dismissed from further attendance at Congress with
neither censure nor approbation.

Thus, he reasoned that

since there were no charges, Congress must have approved his
conduct.

59

Even though Deane received no formal vindication,

Robert Morris, one of his sympathizers, wrote,
I consider Mr. Deane as a martyr in the cause
of America. But I have no doubt the day will
^^James, "Revolutionary Career," pp. 127, 130.
58ibid., p„ 177.
59Ibid., pp. 143, 181, 184.
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come when his merit shall be universally
acknowledged and the authors of these cal
umnies held in the detestation they de
served.60
E. James Ferguson does not excuse Deane's activities,
yet he indulges in no condemnation of Deane based upon un
founded prejudices.

He argues that accusations of Deane*s

speculating in British stocks are based upon hearsay testi
mony.

But since Deane financed a ship through Continental

funds for his own use, and shifted the loss of a privately
owned ship to the government by purchasing it in the gov
ernment's name, the questions surrounding his activity de
serve investigation.

Ferguson admits that Congress was

unjust in its treatment of Deane, listening to testimony
from his enemies and only allowing him to reply in writing.
The whole episode was inconclusive as only one or two
irregularities were proven against Deane,

However, the

division of Congress into two camps, one defending Deane
and the other attacking him, was demoralizing when Congress
most needed unity.
Page Smith, in his first volume on John Adams (1962),
sympathizes with the dilemma Congress faced.

Finding Deane

guilty would also implicate Franklin, and to acquit Deane
would indict Lee and Izard.

Deane's proposal that he return

to Europe for the necessary papers to clear himself seemed
a logical solution and was agreeable to Congress, but Deane's

^^Ibid., p. 191.
^^Ferguson, "Congressional Investigation," 317, 307,
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"impulse to self-destruction" caused him to turn to the
people, as he wrote and published attacks against his ac-

62

cusers.

Briefly, Morris supports Ferguson in criticizing con
gressional incompetency in handling the whole affair.

After

Congress heard all his accusers, Deane was allowed only
written replies.

When all the evidence was amassed, there

was only enough "to prove one or two irregularities, and to
suggest countless others."

On the other hand, the Lee

brothers were not innocent of speculation, as Arthur had
shipped personal merchandise on continental vessels; while
William simultaneously maintained his position as alderman
in London and worked for the American commission in Paris.
Morris indicts William Lee, stating that he was not above
trying to capitalize on his knowledge of the potential
alliance with France.
Both H. James Henderson and Cecil Currey imply that
Congress was justified in taking action against Deane.
Deane was more concerned with making money through the
Middle States*s merchants than with defending New England's
rights, according to Henderson's article, "Congressional
Factionalism and the Attempt to Recall Benjamin Franklin"
(1970).^'^

From Currey's viewpoint, Congress recognized the

62page Smith, John Adams (2 vols.; New York: Doubleday
and Co., 1962), I, p. 423.
OHlereinafter referred to as
Smith, Adams.)
63Morris, Peacemakers, p. 11.
64 h. James Henderson, "Congressional Factionalism and
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possibility that Beaumarchais and Deane were defrauding the
government, so it resolved to recall him.

Any effort by

Deane to bring order to his accounts was negligible, because
he and Franklin realized the implications if they were dis
closed.
After Deane was dismissed by Congress without either
censure or vindication, his attitude towards the Revolution
changed.

Historians debate whether he was intentionally

traitorous in deserting American honor, or emotionally un
balanced and insecure from the unjust treatment he had
received from Congress.

Miller acknowledges that Deane,

having lost faith in the American Revolution, went over to
the British as a propagandist, and was eventually classified
by the Americans with Benedict Arnold,

He adds that Deane's

service to his country was generally beneficial despite his
outside financial interests, as mixing profit and patriotism
was hardly unique among his countrymen.Helen Auger's
evaluation of Deane explains him as a man suffering from a
martyr psychosis.

By the time he returned to Paris, he was

drained of every emotion but resentment, thus taking on the
character others had chosen for him.

She insists that his

accomplishments during his service demonstrated incessant

the Attempt to Recall Benjamin Franklin,'* William and Mary
Quarterly. XXVII (April, 1970), 247. (Hereinafter referred
to as Henderson, "Congressional Factionalism.")
^^Currey, Code #72, pp. 205, 228.
^^Miller, Triumph, p. 37 5.
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resourcefulness in gaining French sympathy for the American
c a u s e . J a m e s also portrays him as a man whose services
remained unrecognizedo

Until the time of his death, he held

68
to the idea of returning to the United States,
which im

plies that he had not totally denied his allegiance to his
native country„
Although Boyd categorizes Deane as avaricious and a
fallen patriot, there is no evidence that he resorted to
blackmail in his relationship with Bancrofto

It was Ban

croft who was reluctant to have Deane return to the United
States in 1789, because Bancroft's secure monetary position
would be endangered if Deane should reveal the intimacies
of their relationship»

Therefore, Boyd hypothesizes that

69
Bancroft conveniently ended Deane*s life.

Deane's death

has previously been attributed to suicide because of his
depressed condition, which was a culmination of the treat
ment he had received from Congress, the discouraging second
trip to Europe, and his frustrated attempts to return to
America.
Although historians do not accord Silas Deane the
prestigious position in the annals of the United States as
some of the more dominant names in the diplomacy of the
American Revolution, like Franklin, Adams and Jay, his career

^^Auger, Secret War, pp» 318, 129.

68
James, "Revolutionary Career," p. 258o
^^Boyd, "Silas Deane," 530, 547-549.
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provides insight into the American diplomatic effort in
Europe.

Historians have found that primary sources con

tributed greatly to their knowledge of this man.

Yet, their

interpretations differ significantly in some respects, and
thus thdse varying viewpoints lend depth and interest to a
historiographical study of the literature written about
Silas Deane as an American diplomat.
Basically, the same primary sources were available
to even the earliest authors, although Deane's papers may
not have been as well organized for these first historians.
Naturally, those authors who have published more recently
also have the use of earlier monographs and biographies to
give additional detail to their discussions.

Two early

historians, E. S. Corwin and George Clark, represent the
dichotomy that may result from historical interpretations,
Corwin's extensive investigation of sources from French
archives and material from Henri Doniol, as well as French
printed sources and the writings of American revolutionary
figures, including Deane, results in a very useful work on
French policy during the Revolution.

In contrast, Clark's

biased and undocumented account of Silas Deane only serves
to discredit Deane further, as this favorable presentation
of Deane is dismissed as unreliable.

Bernard Fay, a French

author, is a necessary author to study in the historiography
of the Revolution.

Although he cites no footnotes, his ex

tensive bibliography includes primary materials from Europe
and America

and naturally, the papers of Franklin.

He is
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very complimentary to Franklin, as the French do have great
admiration for him; yet his account is not so biased as to
make it useless.

Carl Van Doren has investigated the Deane

papers, along with colonial and federal records of the com
mercial transactions of the Revolution,

He also adds that

the Letters of the Members of the Continental Congress were
invaluableo

John C. Miller's study includes many aspects

of the Revolution besides diplomatic, and his use of manu
scripts, historical collections, memoirs and letters, and
monographs is extensive.

Although he does not cite Deane's

personal papers, he investigated congressional journals and
related correspondence in evaluating Deane's contributions
to the Revolution.

Samuel Flagg Bemis does not deal exten

sively with Silas Deane, but his thorough investigation of
Doniol's documents, as well as the official correspondence
of the American Congress and officials as edited by Sparks
and Wharton, and the papers of Deane, Franklin and Arthur
Lee, negate any accusations that Bemis was cursory in his
study of Deane.

His article on the British secret service

primarily utilizes British correspondence, but he also uses
French and American sources to avoid a limited interpreta
tion that only one set of source material would provide,
Bemis represents the transition between early twentiethcentury authors and more modern ones, as he combines pri
mary and printed sources into an intelligent and objective
analysis of American diplomacy.

Helen Auger designates

personal correspondence, including Deane's papers as her
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most important sources.

Her study o£ the diplomacy is in

fluenced primarily by Bemis, Corwin and Stourzh, who have
contributed more to the specific understanding of diplomacy
than those authors whose subject matter includes all aspects
of the American Revolution.

From Gerald Strouzh, one gains

a philosophical analysis of primary source material, which
not only includes Franklin's papers, but also those of Adams,
Arthur Lee and Deane.

His interpretation represents a more

modern approach to the subject of diplomacy, as he deals with
personalities in diplomacy.

He explains that the American

envoys did not greatly influence France as she had decided
to secure an alliance with the United States, regardless of
who was the American representative.

It was strictly a mat

ter of how the American commissioners adapted to circumstances.
In Coy H. James's unpublished dissertation, he concentrates
upon the papers of Deane, Franklin, Lee and Adams, as well as
those official correspondence pertinent to his discussion of
Deane.

This work is surprisingly objective and introduces

Silas Deane as a historical character of many complicated
facets which merit thorough investigation.

Richard B. Morris

writes mainly from personal papers about the men of the Revo
lution.

His narrative style expresses the opinion that men

and not events make history, and yet, he is not overly lauda
tory in his account of the American negotiators in Europe.
Differing from Morris's approach is Richard W. Van Alstyne.
Van Alstyne's source material is similar to that of previous
authors, but he concentrates more on the information avail
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able from European and American government documents.

His

short monograph highlights the important events contribut
ing to independence, concentrating upon the maneuvering for
reconciliation by the British, the Franco-American negotia
tions for a treaty, and eventually the peace discussions and
their effect in America and Europe.

Cecil Currey has pub

lished a recent interpretation of the same material that
previous authors have used.

However, he has misread and

twisted these original sources to fit his thesis that Frank
lin was a British spy, which also implicates Deane.

The bias

makes this account more of a popularization of old material.
Valuable information is available from articles.
Abernethy's two articles concentrate on primary sources,
including the papers on Franklin, Arthur Lee and Deane, and
government documents from England and the United States.
His article on the Franklin-Lee imbroglio takes the unique
position of defending Arthur Lee and supporting his accusa
tions against Franklin and Deane.

Julian P. Boyd's three-

part study of Deane is based on another extensive investiga
tion of Deane's papers along with those of Franklin, Arthur
Lee and Adams, and government correspondence.

This series

is valuable because of its in-depth study of the transition
in Deane's personality as Edward Bancroft came to control
completely his life.

Henderson and Ferguson rely upon the

records of Congress to state the facts involving the congres
sional efforts to have Franklin recalled and its investiga
tion of the business conducted by the Americans in Paris.
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Both men studiously avoid evaluating the personalities in
volved and make a sincere effort to record the facts for
their readers.
Silas Deane's career ended ignominiously, filled with
controversy and doubts about his patriotism.

Historians

recognize Deane's penchant for commercial gain.

However,

the consensus among them is that commercialism during the
Revolution was not abnormal, and that his roles as merchant
and diplomat did not necessarily detract from the benefits
he provided the United States in establishing the basis for
French aid and the alliance.

Both Van Alstyne and Currey

dissent from this viewpoint, accusing Deane of deliberately
setting up outside commercial activities which would be bene
ficial to him.

The idea that he and Beaumarchais established

a thriving business with the assistance of congressional
funds enrages authors like Currey, but is denied by Auger,
James and Van Alstyne.

Admittedly, Deane was pro-French;

yet he refused to become beholden to any of his French
associates.

The purpose of his efforts, authors agree, was

to ship goods to America,

Both Deane and Beaumarchais were

only continuing a policy the French had already established,
as French aid, according to Van Alstyne and Currey, had been
arriving in America

before Deane and Beaumarchais met.

Deane's association with Franklin receives attention to
the degree that Franklin supported Deane's activities.

There

is general agreement that they worked well together, while
Arthur Lee's naturally suspicious nature excluded him from
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much of their negotiations.

Hale and James state that

Franklin did not extend his support to Deane when he pub
lished the unpatriotic letters in England.

Currey main

tains they worked in close conjunction to insure the suc
cess of their perfidious activities, although Franklin
was finally forced to admit that he could defend Deane
only on the basis of past performance=
Deane's most questionable associations were those he
established with Edward Bancroft and other British agents,
Bemis, Auger, James and Miller realize the negative aspects
of the friendship between him and Bancroft, but assume that
Deane did not suspect Bancroft's dishonest and selfish mo
tives.

Currey promotes the idea that Deane was fully aware

of Bancroft's dishonest character, and willingly joined him
to enhance his personal fortune.

Julian P. Boyd's article

never condones their association, nor assumes that Deane was
an innocent victim.

Rather he explains that Deane succumbed

to Bancroft's persuasive tactics in gaining Deane's coopera
tion in supplying information to the British.

Eventually,

they became partners in deceit and Deane was never strong
enough in character to extricate himself from this associa
tion.

Van Alstyne summarily dismisses the whole concept of

a British spy network as ridiculous and unsubstantiated.

He

mentions, however, that Deane talked freely with Bancroft,
which enabled him to report to London that Deane was bidding
for an alliance and would quite possibly get it.
The argument between Arthur Lee and Silas Deane over his
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request for congressional repayments to Beaumarchais and
Deane's friendship with Bancroft expanded into a vicious
verbal and written battle.

Corwin and Abernethy recognize

Lee's justification in protesting Deane's private commercial
activities.

Corwin feels Lee overstated his suspicions,

while Abernathy states that Deane and Franklin were guilty
of the accusations Lee made.
basis for condemning Deane.

Boyd agrees that Lee had a
On the other hand, James, Bemis

and Ferguson realize that Lee failed to understand the com
mercialism that pervaded the commission in Europe and thus
assumed there was nothing honest about Deane.

Currey justi

fies Lee's vituperative campaign, because Deane flatly ig
nored his warnings concerning the activities of Wentworth
and Bancroft.
Generally, historians agree that congressional efforts
to investigate Deane's European ventures failed dismally
because of the sectional self-interest that arose.

Deane's

attempts to clear his reputation were ignored, and when he
returned to Paris, he was rightfully embittered.

No his

torian defends Deane's efforts to disgrace the Revolution
by publishing the critical letters in Great Britain.

Per

haps his unstable and trusting temperament gave rise to his
efforts to gain personal friendships and monetary security
in Europe, which led to his diplomatic decline and destruc
tion.

CHAPTER III

WILLIAM AND ARTHUR LEE AS DIPLOMATS

The entry of the Lee brothers into the diplomatic
arena produced new obstacles and controversies in the Amer
ican quest for independence.

The basic tactlessness of

Arthur and William Lee towards France, Spain and Prussia,
and their antagonism against Silas Deane and Benjamin
Franklin have aroused the criticisms of some historians„
Other authors have defended their diplomatic abilities and
emphasized their adamant stand against any shady dealings
in the American commission.

The distrust that developed

between the Lees and Franklin and Deane, argue some his
torians, detracted from the success of American diplomacy
in Europe.

Other historians contend that, without their

devotion to duty, the American commission might have dis
integrated into a commercial venture for Franklin and Deane.
Militia diplomacy and the Lees's willingness to migrate from
court to court in Europe in search of alliances and support
of American independence are also the subjects of contro
versy among historians.

The congressional battle that

ensued after the recalls of Deane and Lee has resulted in
historical discussions as to the validity of the congres
sional actions.
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Because of Arthur Lee's dogmatic approach to diplomacy
and his unpredictable character traits, historians have dis
cussed his fitness for diplomatic negotiations.

The grand-

nephew of Arthur Lee, Richard Henry Lee, wrote a filiopietistic biography of him in 1829.

The Lees traditionally

supported each other, so the bias in this two-volume work
is not unexpected.

Richard Henry Lee counters disparaging

remarks against Arthur's character by defending his patrio
tism and stating that even great persons in history cannot
escape malicious accusations.

Arthur's constant fidelity

to the cause of independence enabled him to forgive the con
gressional failure to offer him commissions to either Spain
or Great Britain.

He was so devoted to his country that he

never allowed the hostile congressional factions, even dur
ing the time of his recall, to alter his pro-American senti
ments.

John Adams's defense of Lee's actions towards Deane

and his associates also strengthens Richard Henry Lee's
argument that Lee was properly motivated in defending his
country's cause.^

In a brief but succinct appraisal of

Arthur Lee, Edward Hale's Franklin in France (1887) cate
gorizes him as a man who longed to do something great, but
who proved by his impatience and wrongheadedness that he
could hardly have succeeded.

2

Cecil Currey's recent book,

^Richard Henry Lee, Life of Arthur Lee (2 vols., Bostor:
Wells and Lilly, Court Street, 1829), I, pp. 152-155„
(Herein
after referred to as Lee, Arthur Lee.)
2

Hale, Franklin, I, pp. 43-44.
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Code #72: Ben Franklin, Patriot or Spy (1972), defends
Arthur Lee against historians who have been unjust in their
judgment of his character.

Arthur's American associates in

Paris created an atmosphere where he was constantly victi
mized and suspected for uncooperative activity which naturally caused him to be bitter.

3

While William Lee's role in diplomacy is considerably
less prominent than his brother's. Auger views his tempera
ment critically, while Currey states he was well-suited for
his appointment to Nantes.

Helen Auger's Secret War for

Independence (1954) touches lightly on William to the extent
that she brings out his selfish tendencies.

A quotation

from an article in the Morning Post in London, seems to sum
marize her thoughts on William:

'". . ^ His character . . .

is well known to be tinctured with avarice, parsimony, selfishness and meanness.'"

4

Currey maintains that William Lee

was very capable as his work at the commercial agency at
Nantes demonstrated.
Arthur Lee began his career in Europe in the spring of
1776, as a colonial agent seeking monetary assistance for
the rebellious colonies from European countries.

He was

first associated with Caron de Beaumarchais, the creator
of The Marriage of Figaro.

Beaumarchais's subsequent pre

ference for Silas Deane, who was formally charged by Congress
with securing French aid, aroused Lee's indignation.

^Currey, Code #72, p. 156.
^Auger, Secret War, p. 267.

Because
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of his intense pride, Lee coveted the success and the fame
that supplying the colonies with the much needed military
and monetary aid might provide.

A controversy that developed

from Lee's displacement in the commercial realm was over
whether Congress was obligated to repay Beaumarchais or if
France intended the aid to be a gift.

Hale's assessment of

the repayment controversy is unclear, although his informa
tion is derived from primary sources.

From the viewpoint of

this nineteenth-century historian, the whole issue arose
from Lee's proclivity for confusing the truth, especially
when there was an opportunity to discredit Deane, Franklin
and Beaumarchais.

Hale adds that Lee eventually convinced

himself that the King of France never expected repayment
from the United States^ and Lee wrote Congress that Vergennes
had assured him that no repayment was expected for the cargoes
dispatched by Beaumarchais.^
Samuel Flagg Bemis's monograph on The Diplomacy of the
American Revolution (1935) finds no clear evidence that
Beaumarchais assured Lee that only nominal payments in Amer
ican produce would be required in order to disguise the aid
as a commercial transaction.

When Beaumarchais realized that

Deane had congressional instructions to purchase military
stores, payable in American produce, he did not hesitate to
demand repayment.

Congress willingly agreed with Lee, who

^Hale, Franklin, I, pp. 42, 43, 50. See also Wharton,
Diplomatic Correspondence. I, p. 353. Vergennes in 1783
affirms that the aid was granted with no repayment expectedo
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pointed out that the French government had given Beaumarchais
the supplies, hence he had no right to charge anything for
them.

It was not so much Lee as it was Congress which had

made an agreement and then repudiated it, even when Congress
realized that French supplies were responsible for the vic
tory at Saratoga.^
Lee's objection to the United States repaying Beau
marchais is criticized by John Miller, Helen Auger and Coy
James.

In his book, Triumph of Freedom (1948), Miller con

tradicts earlier attempts to prove Lee had valid arguments
in objecting to the repayment.

He attributed Lee's attack

on Beaumarchais and Deane to Lee's inability to forget that
he had been replaced by Deane.

Miller understands that

Beaumarchais, never considering his shipments as a gift,
fully expected to be paid.

7

Both Auger and James agree with

Miller's contention that aid was not given to America without
thought of repayment.

According to Auger, Congress preferred

to believe no repayment was necessary, but an audit of con
gressional accounts by Alexander Hamilton showed that
Beaumarchais was owed 2,280,000 francs.

g

James states that

Beaumarchais was unaware that Lee had written his brothers
that the French government expected no repayment.

In addi

tion, Lee's letters impugned the personal motives of

^Bemis, Diplomacy, pp. 35, 37, 38-39.
^Miller, Triumph, pp. 366, 368, 327.
^Auger, Secret War, p. 327.
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Beaumarchais and Deane.

9

Some historians assert that the undeviating support o£
American independence that Arthur Lee displayed is admirable,
yet other scholars disagree with this verdict.

The patriotic

zeal with which Richard Henry Lee credited Arthur Lee is also
acclaimed by Bemis, who notes Lee's uncompromising opposition
towards the British proposal of reconciliation.^^

Although

James is critical of many aspects of Arthur Lee's career, he

commends both Lees

for their loyalty to the revolutionary

c a u s e . I n contrast, Richard Van Alstyne, in his 1965 study
entitled The Empire and Independence, places Arthur Lee in a
more equivocal role, as he was plotting with Beaumarchais on
one hand and making speeches in London recommending the
restoration of imperial unity on the other.

12

Currey ex-

pectedly supports Bemis's praise of Arthur Lee's consistent
affirmation of American independence.^^
The appointment of Arthur Lee as an agent by the Secret
Committee on Correspondence and the subsequent arrangement
that his brother, William, be the commercial agent at Nantes,
caused diplomatic and personal controversies that jeopardized
the success of the Franco-American treaties, according to

9

James, "Revolutionary Career," p. 34.

^^Bemis, Diplomacy, p. 59.
^^James, "Revolutionary Career," p. 71.

12

Van Alstyne, Empire, p. 70.

^^Currey, Code #72, p. 61.
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some authors.

Yet others contend that Arthur, and to a lesser

degree William, contributed to the beneficial agreements ar
rived at betwen France and America.

Richard Henry Lee credits

Arthur's " . . . earnestness and ability. .

for establishing

the receptive atmosphere that Deane and Franklin enjoyed in
Paris.

Lee frequently sought advice from Vergennes regarding

the most practical ways to obtain Franco-American treaties.
In reference to Lee's objection to Article Twelve, which
allowed the French to export molasses tax-free from the French
West Indies to America, Richard Henry Lee presents Arthur as
much more flexible on reaching a solution than do succeeding
authors.

Lee conceded that he would agree to this section

14
if it were the only way to insure French coopeartion.

E. S.

Corwin's French Policy and the American Alliance (1916) con
firms Lee's willingness to cooperate with France.

Lee claimed

to understand the Spanish-French relationship and never openly
criticized French support of Spanish land claims in America..
Corwin censures those who discredit Lee's loyalty to the alli
ance and does not comment upon Lee's objections to Article
Twelve.
More recent evaluations of Lee are more critical of his
attitudes and diplomatic activities in France.

Miller tersely

categorizes him as the least popular of the three commission
ers, because Lee behaved as though he had never known an

14

Lee, Arthur Lee, pp. 55, 139, 126.

^^Corwin, French Policy, pp. 205, 166, 208.

honest man.^^

Lee fell into increasing disfavor with the

French until Conrad Alexandre Gerard finally requested his
recall, Auger claims.

She continues that the moment Lee re

turned to Congress, he began fighting with Gerard, who he
believed to be responsible for the criticism of his missions
to Spain and Prussia.

17

William Stinchcombe, The American

Revolution and the French Alliance (1969), also emphasizes
the suspicion of the French court towards Lee, although it
was based upon a mistaken belief that Lee had leaked news of
the alliance to Lord Shelburne.

18

Although the French were

rather devious in their relations with the American, they
disliked Lee because they distrusted him.

H. James Hender

son's article, "Congressional Factionalism and the Recall
of Franklin" (1970), mentions that Lee was in disfavor at
19
the French court.
Among recent historians, Currey defends Arthur Lee, stat
ing that his recalcitrance should not be considered "c . . o f
ficious interference as Franklin's biographers have main
tained. . . ."

Lee was more concerned with American sover

eignty, and believed that the molasses clause in the commer
cial treaty violated rights of reciprocity.

Therefore, the

l^Miller, Triumph, p. 361,
^^Auger, Secret War, p, 327.
1R

William C. Stinchcombe, The American Revolution and
the French Alliance (Syracuse: University Press, 1969), p, 41.
(Hereinafter referred to as Stinchcombe, French Alliance.)
19

Henderson, "Congressional Factionalism," 251; see
also Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence. I, p. 525; Vergennes informed Gerard that Lee had the confidence of neither
France nor Spain,
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French considered him an obstacle to the success of the
I T
20
alliance«

While Arthur was appointed in an official capacityj
William waited in Paris for the congressional notice that
would send him to the commercial agency at Nantes,

James

assumes that William's presence in the capital only confirmed
his querulousness, as he complained about not being consulted
by the commissioners and offered unsolicited advice about the
proper administration of congressional affairs.

21

Although William's previous experience justified his
position at the commercial agency at Nantes^ his loyalty
was questionable, due to his lingering British political
associations.

Because of his experience as a London mer

chant, Auger believes his appointment to Nantes was not
unreasonable. . Upon arriving at Nantes, William discovered
that Thomas Morris had been replaced as head of the commer
cial agency by Jonathan Williams, Franklin's nephew.

Thus,

he complained bitterly that Deane and Williams had virtually
taken over his job, and he agreed with the antagonism his
brother held for them.

His political connections with Eng

land made the wisdom of his appointment doubtful.

Both

Auger and James point out that he retained his British
citizenship and his position of alderman until 1780, which
possibly indicated that his service to America was still

^^Currey, Code #72, pp. 194-195.
21

James, "Revolutionary Career," p. 86.
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subject to loyalty to Great Britain.

22

Both James and

Currey agree, however, that Lee's services at Nantes were
useful in bringing order out o£ chaos.

Currey adds that

the entire task rested upon his abilities, as he received
only minimal cooperation from Franklin, Deane and Wil-

23
liamsc^^
The Lees consistently supported "militia diplomacy,"
or as Franklin called it "suitoring after alliances," and
this has caused controversy among historians.

Richard Henry

Lee is reluctant to commend Arthur Lee's policy in Spain, as
he terms Lee's approach towards Spain as "slow and cautious."
He appealed to Spanish sympathies by pointing out that
should America lose, war would be inevitable in Europe.
Aid to the United States would give Spain the opportunity
to disable England forever.

Although Lee formally accom

plished nothing significant, his public service was good,
and he exercised foresight in seeking more responsive
countries like Prussia.

24

Bemis is inclined to agree that

the financial assistance from Spain, although in ". . .
secret and small sums . . .

made Lee's efforts worth-

, .T
25
while.
Helen Auger designates this method of militia diplomacy
as especially suited to the Lees, since their brother,
^^Auger, Secret War, pp. 173-174, 276, 175; see also
James, "Revolutionary Career," p. 85.
23james, "Revolutionary Career," p. 87; see also
Currey, Code #72, pp. 152-153,
^^Lee, Arthur Lee, pp. 130, 83-84, 85.
^^Bemis, Diplomacy, p. 91.
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Francis, was in Congress and would support their efforts to
bestow ministerial posts upon themselves and their friends.
She adds that the only benefit of militia diplomacy was that
it removed the Lees, especially Arthur, from Paris so Frank
lin and Deane could continue the maritime war without inter
ference.

To emphasize the ineffectiveness of Arthur Lee's

search for European alliances, Auger states that Lee's pri
mary motive for negotiations with Spain was to satisfy his
hunger for personal diplomatic triumphs.

He was angered

because the Spanish government prevented him from entering
Madrid immediately, but the Spanish were displeased at the
news of his visit, since the British ambassador would surely
discover him, incognito or not.

He contributed to Spain's

annoyance with him by informing Charles III that Britain
had no objection to the American commission in Paris; then
he bluntly demanded a substantial loan.

Auger appropriately

calls these methods of suitoring after alliances "caveman
style."

It was only because of Spain's hatred of Britain

that Jeronimo Grimaldi agreed to any aid at all.

9 f\

Arthur Lee's Spanish diplomacy received favorable com
ment from Van Alstyne, and naturally Currey is enthusiastic.
Van Alstyne evaluates the establishment of a line of credit
with Spanish bankers in Holland as noteworthy, even acclaimed
by Silas Deane.

27

The ultimate praise is bestowed by Currey,

Lee's indefatigable supporter.

He claims that Lee distin-

26Auger, Secret War, pp. 126, 168, 160-161.
27van Alstyne, Empire, p. 125.
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guished himself by engineering the first major diplomatic
breakthrough of the war in gaining four hundred thousand
livres from the Spanish king and a promise of additional
payments.

28

From Spain, Lee journeyed to Prussia which was another
futile exercise in diplomacy.

According to Richard Henry

Lee, it would have taken an extraordinary man to achieve
the objectives of commercial intercourse, prevention of aid
to Great Britain, and the purchase of war materials, because
Prussia was obligated to Britain by certain treaties.

Lee's

viewpoint of the itinerant diplomat once again assumed posi
tive tones.

He adds that Arthur left Prussia only after

duly impressing King Frederick and Baron de Schulenburg and
receiving assurances that

. . Prussia would not be the

last power to acknowledge the independency of his country.'"

29

Lee indicates that the theft of important state documents in
Lee's possession was only a minor setback in comparison to
the progress he gained towards recognition.
Miller and Auger critically evaluate Lee's negotiations
in Prussia, while Currey blames Franklin and Deane for exag
gerating the failure of his mission.

Frederick's evasiveness

failed to discourage Arthur, according to Miller,

Disguising

himself as a private citizen, Lee tactlessly pursued the
emperor even after Frederick informed Lee that he would

^^Currey, Code #72, pp. 116-117.

29

Lee, Arthur Lee, pp. 86, 89, 98.
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tolerate no more demands for recognition.

Despite all his

maneuvering and persistence, all Lee gained was permission
to buy clothing and arms, which Miller discounts as insignificant.

30

Auger dismisses the mission as a failure, with

the theft of Arthur's papers by the British as its outstand
ing event.

Arthur failed to take advantage of Frederick's

intense resentment of Great Britain.

31

Currey mentions the

theft of the official papers, but blames Franklin and Deane
for exploiting the event in order to discredit Lee,

32

As if Arthur's failure in Prussia was not enough, William
embarked upon a journey to Berlin to gain concessions from
Frederick.

Schulenburg explained that the mission was futile

from the outset, as the king was unwilling to agree to any
kind of commercial relations.

33

From Miller's viewpoint,

Arthur and William were totally misplaced in Prussia as they
were " . . . crotchety, hot-tempered and overzealous diplo
mats. . .
From Prussia, William's peripatetic route led him to
Vienna where he found the emperor as reluctant to see him
as Frederick.
Holland.

Bemis explains his activities from Vienna to

William attributed his rebuff in Vienna to the

30

Miller, Triumph, pp. 363-364; see also Wharton, Dip
lomatic Correspondence, I, p. 524,
^^Auger, Secret War, pp, 214-215.
^^Currey, Code #72, p. 127,
33

Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence, I, p. 293,

^^Miller, Triumph, p. 363,
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Emperor's preoccupation with the War o£ the Bavarian Succession„

The penultimate stage of William's diplomatic

career occurred in Holland where he and one Jean de Neufville drew up an absolutely pointless treaty^
no such official power and

William had

„ everybody knew the burgo

masters of Amsterdam had no authority to draw up treaties
with foreign p o w e r s T h e text of the treaty followed the
Franco-American treaty of commerce, but the American com
missioners in Paris never considered it binding, and neither
did the burgomasters»

35

Returning again to William's first venture in Prussia,
Auger agrees that his effort was insignificant, while Currey's
dissenting voice argues that William has not been properly
recognized for his achievements.

According to Auger, William

was in a disadvantageous position before he arrived because
of Arthur's impertinence in directing Frederick as how to
run his country better.

Therefore, William was ignored in

his attempts to increase the paltry concessions for the
United States to buy clothing and arms from private merchants.

36

Although Currey believes that William's achieve

ments in Prussia have never been properly recognized, he
fails to enumerate them,

Currey is convinced that Franklin

assumed that he was responsible for obtaining recognition
from as many countries as possible, and therefore he ignored

^^Bemis, Diplomacy, pp, 157-159,
A
Auger, Secret War, p, 216,

62

any attempt by William to gain recognition from Prussiao

37

The suspicious and proud attitudes of the Lees were
manifested in the feud which developed between them and
Deane and Franklin.

Most historians have blamed Arthur's

unreasonable accusations and his antipathy against Deane,
who had replaced him in dealing with Beaumarchais, for the
magnitude

of this feud,

Thomas Perkins Abernethy, in his

article, "The Origin of the Franklin-Lee Imbroglio" (1938),
deviates from this traditional approach and supports Arthur's
contention that Franklin and Deane were intent on taking the
privateering business out of the hands of the agents ap
pointed by Congress and retaining control of it for their
own purposes.

Although William Lee was officially appointed

to oversee the commercial agency at Nantes, Deane and Frank
lin ignored him, entrusting the business to Jonathan Williams.
They had no authority for this act,

„ but the prize

business was profitable and important, and they could not
afford to let it fall into the hands of a man who would not
cooperate with them„"

Because of the control Franklin and

Deane exercised over the privateering enterprise, Congress
never derived any advantage from it.

Abernethy is convinced

that the only mistake committed by the Lees was that they
attempted to obtain an account of public moneys, and thus
came into conflict with Franklin and Deane.

The one offense

of the Lee brothers overlooked by historians was that William

^^Currey, Code #72, p. 190.
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speculated on the London Stock Exchange while acting as a
commercial agent, but then Deane and his associates did the
same,

38
In contrast to Abernethy's defense o f the accusations

o£ the Lee brothers against Deane and Franklin, Miller, James
and Auger find many of Arthur Lee's charges invalid and un
substantiated,

The dispute began with Arthur's assertions

that Deane was involved in a fraud against the United States
with Beaumarchais and Robert Morris.

Miller denies that any

substantial evidence of irregularity was produced.

Lee dis

trusted most men with whom he associated, but he was partic
ularly suspicious of Deane and Beaumarchais, accusing them
of traitorous activities.
ing Deane's honesty.

Franklin irritated Lee by defend

Lee finally ended his own diplomatic

career, and returned to Congress with an intense antipathy
towards Deane and Franklin, as well as France, which had
taken extraordinary precautions to insure that the Congress
did not injure Deane.

39

Auger agrees that Lee's attempts to

prove Deane was involved in stockjobbing were based purely
upon circumstantial evidence.

Because of his unfounded

accusations involving Beaumarchais and Deane, Lee incurred
the dislike of Beaumarchais, which probably influenced French
sentiments against him.

The power of the Lee family made it

impossible to ignore these unsubstantiated charges against
Deane and Franklin, however.

James views the Lee brothers

^^Abernethy, "Franklin-Lee Imbroglio," 51, 45, 52.
^^Miller, Triumph, pp. 369, 371, 376.
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as being motivated by their own selfishness, as Arthur
devised a plan by which he would be the only commissioner
in Pariso

William suffered from frustration, because he

believed that he was being denied a commercial opportunity,
since Deane already controlled Nantes„

According to James,

Arthur's paranoia eventually caused him to conclude that he
was being victimized by a cabal formed by Deane and Frank,. 40
lin.
Analyses of Arthur Lee's attitude towards Deane often
deal with the personality conflict between them.

E, James

Ferguson in "Business, Government and the Congressional In
vestigation in the Revolution" (1959), believes that Lee
was simply shocked by the commercialism and self-promotion
of the trading world and diplomacy.

However, the United

States benefitted from the recall of Deane and Lee, which
enabled the mission to be represented by more adroit diplomats like Adams and Jay.

41

Morris and Currey compare the honor of the Lees and
Deane.

Morris states that the Lees were not without guilt

in participating in the commercial and political opportun
ities afforded by the Revolution.

Arthur had shipped per

sonal merchandise on the Continental ship Alliance, and
William is credited with the dubious distinction of being
the only American to hold the post of alderman in London.

40

James, "Revolutionary Career," pp. 105, 97, 134.

41

Ferguson, "Congressional Investigation," 318.
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He, too, was not above trying to capitalize on his advance
knowledge o£ the French alliance.

42

Currey admits that the

constant trouble among the commissioners was disgraceful, ^ut
he blames Franklin and Deane for the quarrel, since they were
responsible for the economic discrepancies that appeared in
the financial records.

Lee's solution for alleviating such

mishandling of public funds was to place himself in sole
charge of the Paris mission.

43

Although Silas Deane was more victimized by Arthur
Lee's accusations, Benjamin Franklin did not completely
escape Arthur's attempts to discredit him.

Because of his

established reputation and his popularity in Europe, he was
less vulnerable, however.

Richard Henry Lee criticizes

Franklin's aggravating temperament and inclination towards
frivolity in France.

44

Carl Van Doren's biography of Frank

lin (1941) refutes the idea that Arthur enjoyed a position
in the virtuous majority.

Van Doren maintains that Lee

would remain in the minority as Franklin would always be
supported by the majority and would not be affected by his
shrill accusations.

Lee bred trouble where he could not

find it, and Franklin summarily commented on the recall of
both Lees and Izard that

. . n o soul regrets their de-

45

parture. . . . "

42Morris, Peacemakers, p. 11.
^^Currey, Code #72, pp. 210-211.
^^Lee, Arthur Lee, p. 171.
45carl Van Doren, Benjamin Franklin (New York: Garden
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Franklin's personal business and his associations also
aroused Lee's suspicions.

Auger acknowledges Franklin's

involvement in the Vandalia operation but charges that Lee
was bitter, because the Ohio Company, with which he had
been associated, had been displaced by the more successful
Vandalia„
Another question associated with Lee's career was his
relationship with John Thornton.

Originally Thornton gained

Lee's confidence by supplying the information that Deane had
sent Bancroft to London to gamble on stocks, but soon Lee be
came the main source of information for the British spy.
H. James Henderson's article on the congressional faction
alism and the efforts to recall Franklin (1970) states that
47
Lee also charged Franklin with stockjobbing.
Whatever doubts earlier historians have concerning the
validity of Lee's accusations, Currey believes that Frank
lin's activities with regard to Lee amply demonstrate his
perfidy.

According to Currey, Franklin's nefarious plans

are best demonstrated by the plot to place Thornton in Lee's
employ which would hopefully ruin his credibility.

Lee had

come dangerously close to recognizing the working relation
ship Bancroft enjoyed with Franklin as well as Deane, and

City Publishing Co., 1941), pp. 584, 609,
ferred to as Van Doren, Franklin.)

(Hereinafter re

46Auger, Secret War, pp. 197, 272-273; see also Van
Doren, Franklin, p. 382. Because Lee was not always in the
confidence of Franklin and Deane, Thornton could not learn
much.
^^Henderson, "Congressional Factionalism," 249.
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Franklin conceived of this plot to discredit Lee.

Lee

also charged that Franklin was stealing from public funds.
However, Vergennes discounted Lee's charges because of his
association with Thornton, and Congress placed little
credence in his attack on Franklin,

Thus, Lee's importance

has been diminished in historical perspective.

48

Although Lee remained in Paris working with Adams and
Franklin, he, too, was eventually recalled by Congress,
Deane's charges against him of revealing information to
Shelburne, of sponsoring Dr. Berkenhout while he was a
British agent in America, and of dragging out the French
negotiations to give England time for a counter-proposal
proved too critical for Congress to overlook.

Lee considered

his recall a form of censure, but in 1789 an investigating
congressional committee concluded that his conduct while in
Europe had been creditable.
The only significant result of the recall of the two
feuding diplomats was the sectional feelings that surfaced,
Richard Henry Lee verifies the sectional interests in Europe,
saying that Arthur worked to import supplies to Virginia,
while Franklin and Deane favored northern i n t e r e s t s . O n
the subject of the sectional split over the recall, James
states that the Lee brothers and Ralph Izard were convinced

48currey, Code #72, pp. 191-192.
49james, "Revolutionary Career," pp, 164-165,
^^Currey, Code #72, p. 235.
SlLee, Arthur Lee, p. 101.
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that Franklin \^{jiproved of Deane's favoring New England's
commercial interests over southern agriculture.

52

Franklin

was fortunate to remain untouched by the condemnation of the
Lees, while Deane was more vulnerable.
The French interference in the congressional dispute
only widened the breach between New England and the South.
Gerard's campaign against Lee did nothing to heal the dis
pute, according to Stinchcombe.

Gerard emerged victorious

from the congressional and personal battles, as he was suc
cessful in replacing Lee with Jay who the French assumed
would not insist on all the American claims for fishing
rights.

53

Henderson also discusses the French cabal against

Lee, pointing out that Gerard was able to secure southern
support for his cause.

Gerard emphasized Lee's unfavorable

position in Paris, and he persuaded a significant number of
southerners to reject Lee in favor of a strong FrancoAmerican alliance.

54

The major contribution of the Lee brothers to American
diplomacy seems to be their undaunted persistence in attempt
ing to gain recognition of American independence from Euro
pean countries.

Arthur was the more controversial of the

two brothers as he endeavored to direct the commission at
Paris, to travel to other European courts seeking recogni
tion of American independence, and to curtail the extraneous

52
53

James, "Revolutionary Career," p. 123.
Stinchcombe, French Alliance, p. 66.

^^Henderson, "Congressional Factionalism," 250-251.
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financial activities in which he suspected Franklin and
Deane of indulging.

Despite the discussions of Arthur's

diplomatic career, Samuel Flagg Bemis describes him " . . .
as an historical mystery, who may never be satisfactorily
known. . . . "
Arthur Lee's papers have never been systematically
arranged.

They were randomly divided in three parts and

placed in the libraries of the University of Virginia, Har
vard College and the American Philosophical Society.
Richard Henry Lee's account of the life of Arthur Lee is
the only printed source using most of these papers.

Thus

this two-volume work has become the main point of reference
based on primary material on Lee.

However, the outstanding

bias in favor of Arthur is indicated by his editorial com
ments.

Therefore, historians are without biographies of

Arthur Lee that would be more objective.

Two of the best

primary sources are the volumes of diplomatic correspondence
edited by either Sparks or Wharton, as they explain the con
troversies surrounding both Lee brothers.

Historians also

gain background on the activities of the Lees in Europe from
the papers and correspondence of Franklin and Deane.
The diverse interpretations which historians provide
demonstrate

that there are no definite answers as to whether

Arthur and William Lee's diplomatic behavior actually bene
fitted the United States.

Those authors who deal with Arthur

^^Bemis, Diplomacy, p. 268.
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Lee to any extent, like Bemis, Miller, Auger and James, rely
upon the primary sources mentioned above.

Bemis is once

again outstanding from the standpoint o£ his sources as
he also derives information from the official documents of
the countries where the Lees journeyed.

Diametrically oppos

ing the informative studies by Miller and Bemis is Cecil B„
Currey's sensational account of Franklin's activities in
Paris which lead Currey to assume he was sympathetic to and
spying for the British Empire.

Since Franklin and the Lees

were constantly feuding, they, and especially Arthur, enjoy
high commendation from Currey for their efforts to control
Franklin and Deane.

Thomas Perkins Abernethy's article con

trasts significantly with Currey's vindictive account, al
though he also is attempting to demonstrate that history has
unjustly condemned the Lees.

However, his approach is more

subdued and scholarly than Currey's, and thus lends more
credence to his defense of the Lees's charges against Frank
lin,
The controversies concerning the diplomatic careers of
Arthur and William Lee arise primarily from Arthur's sus
picious and stubborn temperament.

The feud over the repay

ments to Beaumarchais creates disagreement among historians»
Because Beaumarchais switched from Lee to Deane in negotiat
ing for French aid to America, Hale, Miller, Auger and James
all agree that Lee contrived the notion that French aid was
given gratis to America.

Bemis states a different opinion^

He assumes that Congress was at fault for supporting Lee's
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arguments, because it should have realized that Deane had
been officially authorized to buy supplies.
In other discussions, Bemis, Currey and even James agree
that Arthur's support of America was undeviating, and Richard
Henry Lee credits him for establishing the basis for FrenchAmerican negotiations upon which Franklin and Deane would
later capitalize.

Corwin also defends Lee's patriotism and

success in dealing with the French.

Currey's anti-Franklin

bias is emphasized by his praise of Lee's concern for Amer
ican sovereignty.

Once again. Miller and Auger concur that

Lee actually was only a minor figure in the Franco-American
negotiations, because he incurred the dislike of both Vergennes and Gerard, who launched a campaign against Lee in
the United States.

Most of the historians attempt to pre

sent both the positive and negative aspects of Lee's career
in Europe, while Currey makes no pretense at disguising his
sentiments that Lee was the only honest member of the Paris
commission.
Most historians agree that Arthur's diplomatic ventures
to foreign courts to seek recognition of American indepen
dence were ineffective.

Auger is especially critical of the

policy of "militia diplomacy," as it was only a method con
jured up by the Lees to satisfy their personal egos.
Richard Henry Lee is forced to acknowledge that Lee's Spanish
mission was inconsequential, at best, and served only to em
phasize his willingness for public service.

The Prussian

venture was a formidable task, and it was no discredit to
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Lee that nothing was accomplished.

Auger and Miller dispel

any illusions that Lee achieved anything of significance in
Prussia, and even Currey considers the theft of the impor
tant state papers as the outstanding event of this mission.
Both Lees were involved in the feud with Franklin and
DeanCo

Characteristically, Currey defends Arthur's posi

tion in attempting to halt the dishonest activities of
Franklin and Deane.

In a more objective and informative

study, Thomas Perkins Abernethy explains in detail the
origins of the hostilities among the men, and criticizes
other historians for ignoring obvious evidence that would
implicate Franklin and Deane for diverting public money for
their private use.

In contrast, Miller, James and Auger

find many of Arthur's charges against Deane and Franklin
lacking in evidence.

Carl Van Doren dismisses Arthur's

charges against Franklin as unbelievable.

The outcome of

this serious dispute was the recall of both Arthur Lee and
Silas Deane.

Ferguson represents the majority opinion stat

ing that the United States gained more strength diplomatically
after their recall as it could deppnd upon Jay and Adams who
were less concerned with personal gain.
Defending the Lees is a difficult task, and thus even
historians who support their moti.es do not always commend
the way in which they executed their plans to make indepen
dence possible.

The temperaments of the Lees have made them

controversial in a study of American diplomacy, but they un
deniably added another dimension of interest to American
diplomacy.

CHAPTER IV

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN'S CAREER IN EUROPE

The early foreign policy of the United States combined
varying degrees of pleading, pressure and tact, and history
has traditionally praised Benjamin Franklin for his unique
ability in applying these qualities to help achieve American
independence.

His perceptive approach in dealing with the

French and his general dedication to the American cause were
not the only factors contributing to the winning of indepen
dence, but some historians credit his abilities as guaran
teeing the success of American foreign policy.

Other his

torians reject his role as a hero and criticize his actions
as a diplomat.

The debate over Franklin's career in Europe

encompasses many aspects of diplomacy, but this chapter will
not attempt to discuss the details of his diplomatic efforts„
Rather it shall explain the situations he encountered in
Paris and the conduct of his career there.

Historians dis

agree on Franklin's attitudes towards the purpose of diplo
macy.

Also, his friendly approach towards France, its of

ficials and its people have made some authors skeptical that
he might have been less inclined while negotiating to keep
American interests foremost.

However, the "pressure diplo

macy" that he applied to Vergennes implies to other historians

74

that he was more committed to American interests than to
French desires.

According to critics, Franklin maintained

an interest in land speculation which diverted his attention
from diplomacy to personal financial concerns.

This activ

ity, along with Franklin's association with Edward Bancroft
and other Englishmen suspected of spying, aroused the wrath
of the Lee clan, especially Arthur.

Naturally, historians

have argued over the validity of the Lees's attacks on Frank
lin, and the effects they had on the American commission in
Paris.

Although Congress believed it had alleviated the

problem of personality conflicts when it appointed John
Adams to succeed Silas Deane, the conflicts over life styles
and diplomatic tactics between Franklin and Adams have caused
historical controversy.

Franklin and John Jay were compat

ible on the peace commission, yet their differences over
procedures during the peace negotiations with England stimu
late an historical debate.

Historians disagree whether Jay

induced Franklin to support separate negotiations with the
English, or whether Franklin suggested the idea himself out
of dedication to American independence.
Franklin had formulated opinions concerning diplomacy
and its purposes before he left the United States for his
official mission in Paris.

Historians encounter problems

in defining precisely what these opinions were and how Frank
lin planned to execute his diplomacy.

Franklin generally

opposed the idea of seeking recognition from European coun
tries, which he characterized as "militia diplomacy."

75

However, his instructions from John Hancock stipulated that
Franklin should seek recognition and aid from France and
Francis Wharton, a nineteenth-century editor and

Spain.^

author, explains in his first volume, which introduces an
extensive collection of revolutionary diplomatic correspon
dence, that militia diplomacy caused the United States prob
lems since Congress sent unqualified men drifting about
Europe seeking aid and recognition.

Franklin differed from

these inexperienced men because of previous assignments in
England beginning in 1757 as a pre-revolutionary colonial
agent.

According to Wharton, he demonstrated exceptional

diplomatic ability.

2

A group of distinguished twentieth-century historians,
Samuel Flagg Bemis, Gerald Stourzh and Richard B. Morris,
agree that Franklin was humiliated by the prospect of run
ning from court to court '"begging for money and friendship.*"

3

Stourzh's Benjamin Franklin and American Foreign

Policy (1954), which is an excellent study of Franklin's
attitudes toward foreign policy, claims that from the incep
tion of militia diplomacy in 1776, Franklin maintained a
consistent opposition to it.

4

Morris, in The Peacemakers,

the Great Powers and American Independence (1965), also

^Hale, Franklin, I, pp. 63-64.

2

Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence, I, pp. 294, 487-

488.
3
4

Bemis, Diplomacy, p. 114.
Stourzh, Franklin, Foreign Policy, p. 126.
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emphasizes Franklin's continued dislike of militia diplomacy
as he criticized Adams's mission to Holland as another humil
iating experience of begging for money.^
Franklin's opposition to militia diplomacy did not mean
that he objected to any form of relations with Europe.

Felix

Gilbert's article on new American diplomacy in World Politics
(1951) states that Franklin devised his own formula for the
direction America should take in establishing a role in world
He explains that Franklin believed commerce would

affairs.

be the basis for diplomatic relations between France and the
United States.

Franklin separated cooperation at sea from

cooperation on land.

While he preferred that no member of

the French army should ever place foot in America, he would
commit America to a monopolistic commercial agreement with
France.

Stourzh agrees that Franklin desired only commercial

relationships in Europe while avoiding any entanglements in
European feuds and negotiating only from a position of
strength.

Franklin concluded that American diplomacy should

be based upon security as one of the natural rights of man,
rather than upon power politics.

Franklin's vision of world

peace and security is demonstrated in a conversation he had
with a young Englishman.

In speaking of nations of the

world, he said,
But, if they would have patience, I think
they might accomplish it . . . agree upon
an alliance against all aggressors, and
agree to refer all disputes between each

^Morris, Peacemakers, p. 190.
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other to some third person, or set o£ men,
or power. Other nations, seeing the advan
tage of this, would gradually accede; and
perhaps in one hundred years, all Europe
would be included.6
However, Franklin's love o£ peace never implied that he
would neglect precautions which a "world of power politics
required."

He urged that the United States guard her posi

tion in the world by maintaining fidelity to the treaties
agreed upon, and avoiding being lulled into a false sense
of security.

Critics complain that Franklin failed to dis

tinguish between French aid and the intention of the French
government to surround the new nation with certain checks
to prevent her from becoming entirely independent.

Frank

lin always intended that the United States would be independent, a point his critics often ignore.

7

In Coy Hilton James's unpublished dissertation. Frank
lin is presented as a commercial diplomat, but James realizes
that his economic plan for the United States included ships
from all countries, not only from France.

One of the conse

quences of American independence from England would be the
exclusion of the United States from the British mercantile
system.

Therefore, she would have to establish her own trad

ing enterprises.

Franklin reasoned that a non-aggressive

policy towards France was feasible, because he believed
France realized that it was in the best interests of her

^Stourzh, Franklin, Foreign Policy, pp. 134, 223.
^Ibid., pp. 246, 180.
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commerce that the United States break away from England.
James's analysis of Franklin's diplomacy emphasizes the
importance Franklin placed on winning the affection of the
French people, and then the government.

Still the most

important guide to Franklin's attitude towards diplomacy
was his dictum that,'", . . a virgin state should not go
suitoring after alliances, but wait with a degree of digg

nity for the application of others.'"
In contrast to earlier authors, Max Beloff's article,
"Benjamin Franklin: International Statesman" (1955), pri
marily considers Franklin's desire for imperial unity.
Beloff perceives that Franklin sought a commercial policy
equally beneficial to both the United States and Great
Britain.

Franklin then began to consider how the United

States could take advantage of the desire of France and
Spain to weaken the British Empire without falling into
dependency upon Britain's enemies.

Beloff's evaluation

concludes that Franklin meant to achieve an early form of
manifest destiny, since he believed it was the future of
the United States to expand without any entangling alliances.

9

Stourzh's thorough treatment of Franklin's diplomacy
lessens the importance of the remarks of other historians.
O
James, "Revolutionary Career," pp. 62, 109, 68.
q
Max Beloff, "Benjamin Franklin: International States
man," Memoirs and Proceedings of the Manchester Literary
and Philosophical Society. XCVII (1955-56), 16, TT, 30.
(Hereinafter referred to as Beloff, "International Statesmano")
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However, Julian P. Boyd's article on Silas Deane (1959)
does comment briefly on Franklin's fitness for diplomacy.
The diplomatic success of Franklin was commendable, because
he was able to ignore the narrow suspicions of the Lees and
Izard and transcend the charges of disloyalty.
Page Smith, in his biography of John Adams (1962),
discredits Franklin by calling him indolent.

However, he

maintains that Franklin's personality was ideal for a
diplomat, because he had a style with which everyone could
identify, while Adams in comparison seemed austere and
self-righteous.
Some historians commend Franklin's influence in forming
the French-American treaties of 1778, while a few authors
have criticized his self-interest and his general indiffer
ence to their success.

Franklin's autobiographical writings

talk very little about the negotiating procedures.

However,

his tactic with Louis XVI was to emphasize America's sole
reliance upon French power.

Franklin states that the king's

friendship for the United States was demonstrated through
the fairness of the treaties, and France's refusal to claim
any special privileges in commerce with America.

12

A question which arises from historical interpretations
of Franklin's policy towards the French relates to his use
of pressure tactics or pressure diplomacy in urging the

lOBoyd, "Silas Deane," 228.
^^Smith, Adams, I, p. 281.

12

Van Doren, ed.. Autobiographical Writings, pp. 434-435.
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French to negotiate a treaty.

Samuel Flagg Bemis's "British

Secret Service and the French-American Alliance" (1934)
first introduces the concept that Franklin was willing to
coerce France into the alliance with the United Stateso

For

instance, he made sure that Vergennes knew about his talks
with Paul Wentworth, in order that the French foreign minister would fear American reconciliation with Britain,

13

However, Bernard Fay indicates that Franklin was sympathetic
with Vergennes's hesitency in making a formal agreement with
the Americans.

He briefly mentions that Franklin employed

some pressure on Vergennes but does not explain if it was
successful.

Fay does not attempt to discredit Franklin's

importance in dealing with Vergennes, as he emphasizes that
the envoy had considerable influence over Vergennes.

How

ever, France entered the war not only for America's benefit
but also to teach Britain a lesson and to gain " . . . only
a few commercial advantages."

14

Franklin, too, considered

his country's welfare as he appealed to the American people
to support the cause of independence, thus showing potential
European supporters that they were sincere in their efforts.
In his book, Triumph of Freedom (1948), John C. Miller
agrees with Bemis that Franklin was primarily concerned with
securing the alliance and would resort to devious means to
achieve it.

1

When he found Vergennes hesitating, he purposely

Bemis, "British Secret Service," 489-490.

^"^Fay, Apostle, pp. 443, 444-445.
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spoke with Benjamin Vaughan in a Paris bathhouse, hoping
to frighten Vergennes into believing that reconciliation
with Britain was possible.

He deliberately tried to make

the French anxious by spreading the rumor that he would soon
leave for England in the role of a peacemaker.

Miller agrees

that Franklin's tactics were successful, but he also praises
France for demonstrating enlightened thought in agreeing to
the text of the treaty.

15

Once again, Gerald Stourzh's analysis of Franklin's
policy towards France is objective and informative.

It

was not Franklin alone who was responsible for the success
ful negotiations of the treaties; rather a history of the
French alliance indicates that her national interests, not
personalities, decided the issue.

However, Franklin's

prestige served to influence public opinion in France to
support Vergennes's policy.

Franklin understood the French

desire to re-establish their prestige, yet he cared more
for the honor of the United States in Europe and was reluctant
to beg for financial help.^^
According to Helen Auger's book. The Secret War of
Independence (1954), both Franklin and Vergennes understood
each other's motives.

Vergennes wanted an alliance to weaken

Britain rather than to emancipate the United States, and
Franklin was willing to play the game of power politics in

^^Miller, Triumph, pp. 295, 301, 306.
^^Stourzh, Franklin, Foreign Policy, pp. 253-254, 140,
162.
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order to keep France as an ally.

17

Therefore, they played

a game of delicate manipulation to see where their interests
could merge.

The statement that no separate peace would he

concluded was the point where their interests coincided, as
France could relax from the fear of an Anglo-American recon
ciliation, and the United States could receive much needed
aid.
Considering the possibility of Franklin's use of pres
sure diplomacy, Max Beloff denies the entire concept, while
James, Boyd and Roger Burlingame, Benjamin Franklin: Envoy
Extraordinary (1967), agree that it was used with success.
Beloff argues that Franklin's affection for France prevented
him from employing such tactics.

18

James, Boyd and Burlingame

point out that Franklin met with Wentworth in an effort to
frighten France into thinking that Anglo-American reconcilia19
tion was near.

Burlingame considers Franklin's plan of

meeting with Wentworth to intimidate France into supplying
aid as an adroit demonstration of diplomacy.

20

Franklin's major critic, Cecil Currey, in Code #72,
Ben Franklin: Patriot or Spy (1972), contends that Franklin
went to Paris to satisfy personal motives.

If the American

cause succeeded, he would receive great acclaim for negotial^Auger, Secret War, p. 150.
l^Beloff, "International Statesman," 26-27.
l^james, "Revolutionary Career," p. 117; see also Boyd,
"Silas Deane," 329.
20Roger Burlingame, Benjamin Franklin: Envoy Extra
ordinary (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1967), pp. 146147
(Hereinafter referred to as Burlingame, Envoy.)
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tions with France=

I£ it failed, he would be safer in Paris

than in the United States.

Edmund Burke, a close friend of

Franklin's during his previous residence in England, argued
that Franklin would never end a long life with '"so foul and
dishonourable a fights'"

21

Currey believes that Franklin's

strongest attachments were with Great Britain, rather than
with either France or the United States.
While historians argue about Franklin's intentions in
dealing with the French government, they generally agree
that Franklin's relationship with the French people had a
positive effect in securing the allianceo

Hale indicates

that the French generated their enthusiasm for the United
States because of Franklin's example in France.

22

Accord

ing to Corwin, Franklin could demand that terms of equality
be incorporated into the treaty, because the French greatly
respected him.

23

Auger's statement that the French were

enthusiastic about Franklin to the point of hysteria seems
a bit exaggerated, yet fits into the rather dramatic tone
of her book.

24

Changing his analysis from his earlier

article, Bemis concludes in The Diplomacy of the American
Revolution (1935) that Franklin, rather than the commission,
personified the Americian cause in 1777, and that his flair
\

^^Currey, Code #72, pp. 75-76, 78.
^^Hale, Franklin, I, p« 69.
23

Corwin, French Policy, p. 93„
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Auger, Secret War, p. 148.
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for public opinion made him the "American virtuoso" in
Paris.

25

More recently, Claude Anne Lopez states that

Franklin's arrival in France had a vital effect in stimulat
ing the French war effort because of his favorable reception
by French officials, as well as by influential members of
French society and the common man.

26

Any agreement that historians arrived at concerning
Franklin's favorable impression on the French ceases as
they discuss his outside financial interests in relation
to his commitment to his diplomatic duties.

The main issue

centers around Franklin's involvement in the Vandalia
operation, which had been organized for large-scale specula
tion in western lands.

Stourzh denies that Franklin had

any personal interest in western lands.

Primarily, Franklin

considered these lands as possessions of the United States,
and did not mention them in his plan of confederation or the
peace treaty.

He deemed it inappropriate to speak about the

western lands as they were not his immediate concern.

27

Al

though Auger recognizes Franklin's connection with The Van
dalia Company, she insists that during the Revolution, he
was one of the few men without any private business inter^

ests.

28

Julian P. Boyd and Richard B. Morris maintain that
^^Bemis, Diplomacy, pp. 48-49.
26ciaude-Anne Lopez, Mon Cher Papa. Franklin and the
Ladies of Paris (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
1967), p. 13. (Hereafter referred to as Lopez, Mon Cher Papa.)
^^stourzh. Franklin, Foreign Policy, p. 204.
28Auger, Secret War, p. 198.
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Franklin retained his association with Vandalia during the
Revolution, which Burlingame denies.

According to Boyd,

Franklin's statement withdrawing his name from the list o£
Vandalia associates was a mere formality, since he retained
his shares in the company.

Franklin hoped that "'when the

troubles of America are over my posterity will reap the
benefits of them.'"

29

Such involvement ran counter to pub

lic policy and not only involved him but also Bancroft and
Deane in correspondence with the enemy.

Richard B. Morris

agrees that Franklin created a conflict between public ser
vice and private interest, by maintaining secret holdings
in the Vandalia Company.

However, he concludes that Frank

lin's speculative interests seem not to have affected his
patriotism.

30

Burlingame denies that Franklin indulged in

any questionable financial activities while in France by
pointing out that Franklin disapproved of the privateering
war as it offered too many personal advantages for the commissioners,

31

Currey is unalterably convinced that Franklin was in
volved in some form of commercial enterprise.

Currey is

inclined to make such accusations, and without any qualifi
cations, he places Franklin in the midst of private financial
operations, although he lacks evidence.

^^Boyd, "Silas Deane," 534-535.
30
31

Morris, Peacemakers, p. 249.
Burlingame, Envoy, p. 17 5.

Supposedly Franklin

86

utilized the eleven months before the treaty was ratified
for commercial ventures of his own.

In addition, Franklin

received written information via Edward Bancroft from
Thomas Walpole, the English banker, relating to Walpole's
efforts to purchase shares of stock in the land enterprise
from other men.
the profits.

Walpole also enclosed Franklin's share of

Finally, he and Deane regularly purchased

captured prizes at a low price, only to sell them at consid
erable profit.
Franklin's friendship with Silas Deane, a man whom
many historians suspect of dishonest intentions in the
Revolution, also raises questions as to his loyalty.

In

1782 Franklin finally qualified his support of Silas Deane,
explaining to Deane that the respect held for him in the
United States had diminished after the publication of his
letters condemning the Revolution,

It appeared to many

Americans that Deane had abandoned his country's cause, as
Benedict Arnold had done.

33

Hale's account of Franklin's

career in France indicates that Franklin might have been
made cognizant of Deane's commercial business with the French
from Beaumarchais, Vergennes, or Deane himself, but probably
deemed it none of his business.
Although some historians implicate Deane, Fay, Auger

^^Currey, Code #72, pp. 114-115, 144, 148.
33
34

Van Doren, ed.. Autobiographical Writings, p. 513.
Hale, Franklin, I, p. 51.
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and James state that Franklin readily defended Deane from
Arthur Lee's charges, thereby risking the wrath of the Lee
family.

35

Franklin and Deane found relief from Lee's ha

ranguing by sending Lee on diplomatic missions to Spain and
Prussia^

Auger sympathizes with this action and with Frank

lin's defense of Deane.

Although Deane might have been in

volved in questionable financial transactions. Franklin
missed him after his recall by Congress, since Adams and Lee
were not helpful in running the commercial aspects of the war„
Also, James suggests that their compatibility during the mis
sion in Paris induced Franklin to defend Deane against Arthur
Lee.^^
In contrast to the preceding opinions, Boyd and Currey
are most suspicious of the friendship between Franklin and
Deane.

Franklin was concerned with protecting his personal

interests, and thus recommended that Congress settle its
accounts with Deane,

Remaining out of the controversy.

Franklin managed to emerge as an impartial witness, while
Deane was accused of spying for the British.

37

Currey

criticizes historians who have dismissed the idea that
Franklin knew of Deane's treachery.

Franklin's virtual

escape from historical condemnation further infuriates
^
38
Currey.

35Fay, Apostle, p. 443.
36james, "Revolutionary Career," p. 41.
37Boyd, "Silas Deane," 532.
^^Currey, Code #72, p„ 142.
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Franklin's acquaintance with men known to be associated
with the British Secret Service arouses additional criti
cisms about his conduct in Europe,

His eminent biographer,

Carl Van Doren, explains that Franklin trusted most men,
including Edward Bancroft»

39

Miller agrees that Franklin

and Deane implicitly trusted Bancroft, sharing secrets with
him that they withheld from other American diplomats in
Europe,

40

Auger does not indicate that Franklin and Bancroft

enjoyed a particularly close relationship, and any associa
tion was a result of a failing in Franklin's usually shrewd
analysis of character.

41

Continuing the theme of Franklin's

curious gullibility about the innate goodness of mankind,
Burlingame hesitates to accuse Franklin of deliberately
passing information to the British, although Franklin was
exceedingly casual in his disregard of the warning that
British spies surrounded him.

His reply to the advice that

he should be more cautious with his papers was that he had
nothing to hide.

42

In contrast to authors who defend Franklin's involve
ment with Bancroft as innocent. Van Alstyne and Currey dis
close that he was aware of Bancroft's association with the
British,

Van Alstyne states that Eden, knowing of Bancroft's

close friendship with Franklin and Deane, paid him to keep

Van Doren, Franklin, p, 580,
4n
41
42

Miller, Triumph, p, 283,
Auger, Secret War, p, 136.
Burlingame, Envoy, p, 141,
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the British government informed about their activities„
According to Van Alstyne, Bancroft's importance has been
exaggerated by historians, who have failed to observe that
Stormont had no dealings with Bancroft since his sources
43
of intelligence were superior to those of Bancroft.
This theory is quickly discounted by Currey who places
Franklin in the center of the spy network.

The only reason

Bancroft even associated with Deane was because Bancroft
realized that he would then be closer to Franklin.

Frank

lin accepted Bancroft's frequent travels across the channel,
because he returned with information supposedly valuable to
American efforts, although it happened to be false.

Currey

provides considerable detail regarding Franklin's associations
with Bancroft, Deane, Carraichael, Captain Joseph Hynson, and Samuel
Wharton.

Currey absolves Franklin only on the charge that

he carried on regular conversations with Wentworth, because
it appeared that Franklin was adamant for independence when
he did talk with Wentworth.

44

The man who has caused historians to argue about Frank
lin's character was one of the original commissioners, Arthur
Lee.

Although Franklin rebutted the charges of secrecy and

dishonesty that Lee made against him with the succinct reply
that he was responsibile only to the public and Congress,
Lee was relentless in his campaign against Franklin.

45

When-

43van Alstyne, Empire, p. 134,
''^^Currey, Code #72, pp. 67, 88, 187.
45

Van Doren, ed., Autobiographical Writings, pp. 440-442.
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ever Lee was in Paris, the commission was torn with strife,
as he went about Paris "whispering whatever suspicion oc
curred to him at the moment."

Only when Lee was gone was

Franklin free from his intrigues, according to the Hales.

46

Although the Lees have generally been considered as
the instigators of the quarrels involving themselves.
Franklin and Deane, some historians have defended their
actions.

Thomas Perkins Abernethy of the University of

Virginia criticizes the historical practice of hero-worship
that tends to discard evidence that Franklin was not alto
gether upright in his actions.

His short article, based

upon the correspondence of the ministers and their associates,
emphasizes that the argument between Deane and Franklin and
the Lees arose, because the first two were intent on taking
the privateering business out of the hands of the agents
appointed by Congress and obtaining control of it for their
own purposes.

Thus Congress was deprived of a source of con

siderable profit, which outraged Arthur Lee's pure sense of
honesty.

These historians who have condemned the Lees have

used general accusations, while Abernethy feels that the
evidence of Franklin's commercial activity and his concerted
efforts to withhold records from public accounting is more
concrete.

47

Other historians condemn Lee's tirades against Franklin
and commend the latter's unusual calmness in coping with

'^^Hale, Franklin, I, p. 140.
^Abernethy, "Franklin-Lee Imbroglio," 52.
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Lee's hysteria.

Van Doren justifies Franklin's efforts to

exclude the Virginian from the commission's confidence, be
cause he knew that Lee's own secretary was a spy.

Assur

ances from Lord North that Franklin was not engaged in stockjobbing

48

failed to convince Lee that Franklin was an honor

able person.

Throughout Lee's verbal accusations, Franklin

remained the master of the serenity which has come to
personify his character.

However, Franklin's calmness

eventually became disturbed by Lee's activities, especially
when he masterminded a plan to remove all the commissioners
49
but himself from Paris.
Gf course, Currey sympathizes with Lee's efforts to
again make the commission honest.

Franklin angrily denied

Lee's accusations, because he wanted to protect himself.
His concern about the commission was only secondary.

Currey

adds that every time Lee left Paris, the two remaining com
missioners virtually forgot about diplomacy.

Whenever Lee

returned. Franklin did his best to ignore him, and finally
embarked upon a plan to discredit him by arranging to install
the Britisher, John Thornton, as Lee's personal secretary and
then openly proclaim Lee's insanity.^®
Because of Lee's ambitious project to have Franklin as

48

Van Doren, ed., Autobiographical Writings, pp. 282,
598-599.
49

James, "Revolutionary Career," p. 105; see also.
Auger, Secret War, p. 217.
^^Currey, Code #72, pp. 156, 191-192.
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well as Deane recalled, the controversy that arose in Con
gress must be mentioned.

H. James Henderson's article on

the recall of Franklin (1970) aptly illustrates the section
alism o£ the country as demonstrated in Congress.

Although

some members o£ Congress felt a wholesale revamping of the
diplomatic service was needed, any efforts in that direction
only caused a battle over personal and sectional interests.
Robert Morris felt that, in order that he might obtain one
of the diplomatic posts in Europe, Franklin must be re
called.

Gerard was not adverse to this, as he would have

been able to manipulate the ministers with greater ease.^^
Ultimately Franklin was able to maintain a neutral position
in Congress which gained his reappointment.
If Franklin anticipated that the congressional recall
of Silas Deane would result in a replacement who would bring
harmony among the commissioners, he was to be disappointed
with the appointment of John Adams.
another antagonist of Franklin's.

Adams turned out to be
In view of Adams's dis

gust over Franklin's obvious enjoyment of French society,
and his direct antagonism against Vergennes, some authors
contend that Adams made it difficult to secure aid from the
French.

On the other hand, proponents of Adams's hard-line

diplomacy applaud it as necessary in stabilizing the turbulent
commission.

Although Adams had no specific reason to be

critical of Franklin, his Autobiography and Diary (1777-

^^Henderson, "Congressional Factionalism," 265-266=
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1780) states that upon his arrival in Paris, he realized
that he was destined to mediate between Franklin and Lee,
and that his voice would be the deciding opinion.

52

Hale's

primary sources reveal that Adams regarded Franklin as sus
ceptible to flattery by the French, but Adams failed to gain
respect on the commission by arguing with Vergennes over the
American desire to seek aid from Holland and particularly
over the currency issue.

Briefly the dispute over currency

involved a congressional decision to pay off a French loan
according to the value of the United States money at the
time the loan-office certificates were issued.

To Vergennes,

it appeared that Congress was reducing the two hundred million
dollars which it owed to five million, which would mean a
considerable loss to French creditors.

Adams reacted

strongly against Vergennes's accusation that Congress de
preciated its paper money in order to finance the Revolution
and to avoid repaying the full amount due.

53

Mutual distrust

developed between Franklin and Adams, as Adams verbally fought
with Vergennes over the currency problems,

Adams's indiscreet

and independent approach to Vergennes regarding currency
depreciation intensified Franklin's dislike of Adams,

52

54

L, H. Butterfield, ed, , Diary and Auto)3iography of John
Adams, 1777-1780, (4 vols., Cambridge, Massachusetts: The
Belknap Press, 1961), IV, pp. 118-119. (Hereafter referred
to as Butterfield, ed,, Diary and Autobiography,)
53
Smith, Adams, I, p. 475.
^^Hale, Franklin, I. p, 380.
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In his book, John Adams (1894), John T. Morse denies
Franklin's charges that Adams interferred in the diplomacy
with the French, especially with regards to the currency
issue, which Franklin believed was his responsibility,

Adams

feared that Franklin was neglecting his duty by not estab
lishing a basis for repayment of this Continental loan, and
Adams felt obligated to clarify the issue with VergenneSo

55

Adams's desire for recognition motivated him to dis
credit Franklin, who was regarded with high esteem in Paris
Fay explains that Adams was irritated when he was relegated
to a role subordinate to Franklin's, and thus he was impelled
to believe the accusations which linked Franklin to British
s p i e s , W . P, Cresson, in Francis Dana, a Puritan Diplomat
at the Court of Catherine the Great (1930), quotes at length
Adams's criticisms of Franklin.

In Adams's mind Franklin had

to be watched because in .French hands he was "'submission it57

self.

Van Doren and Miller agree that the two men were not
compatible, but Van Doren insists that the antipathy between
them did not exist until the peace negotiations began.

He

^^John T. Morse, Jr., John Adams (Boston: Houghton,
Mifflin and Co., 1894), p, 182. (Hereinafter referr^ed.-tjo as
Morse, Adams.) See also Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence.
I, p. 508, where Adams states his objections to Franklin,
^^Fay, Apostle, p, 442,
57

W, P. Cresson, Francis Dana, A Puritan Diplomat at
the Court of Catherine the Great (New York: The Dial Press,
1930), p. 256. (Hereinafter r;.§f'erred to as Cresson, Puritan
Diplomat.)
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says that Adams respected Franklin and that Franklin recip
rocated the feeling, although they disagreed fundamentally
on how to deal with the French.

By the time of the peace

negotiations Adams had developed such an aversion to Franklin
that he supported John Jay without reserve.

58

Miller ob

serves, however, that Adams led the fight in Congress against
commissioning Franklin to seek an alliance with France„

Upon

his arrival in Paris, Adams was outraged at Franklin's in
dulgence in frivolities.

Adams's chief rival for the posi

tion of "Number One Diplomat" was stealing the limelight
despite Adams's efforts to lessen the French admiration for
Franklin.

Miller explains the irony in Adams's efforts to

be recognized in history, as he seemed to be destined to be
mentioned as "also being present."

59

Adams's accusations

that Franklin was deceitful and received orders from Vergennes
were exaggerated, according to Miller.
There was a basic difference between Adams's blunt
treatment of the French, which has been characterized as
"shirtsleeves diplomacy," and Franklin's praise of France's
generosity in negotiating the treaties.

Thus, Stourzh ex

plains that the disagreement between Franklin and Adams was
over diplomatic tactics rather than basic policy.

Although

Adams criticized Franklin's "diplomacy of gratitude," at the
conclusion of the peace negotiations, Adams agreed with
Franklin that France's friendship was essential so long as

^^Van Doren, Franklin, pp. 607, 667, 688-689.
5Q

Miller, Triumph, pp. 273, 358-359.
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Britain held Canada.^®

James agrees that both men viewed

the present in terms of how it would affect the future.
Page Smith, the talented biographer of John Adams,
argues that Franklin enjoyed a life of dissipation in France
while still receiving credit for his diplomatic accomplish
ments.

Adams's constant criticism of Franklin included

assertions that Franklin intentionally promoted his own
fame and was overly conciliatory in his attitude towards
France.

Although Adams suggested that Franklin be made the

sole minister plenipotentiary, Smith regards him as a more
profound student of diplomacy than Franklin in spite of the
latter's experience.

However, Adams generously acknowledged,

at the end of the peace negotiations, that Franklin had contributed to their success.

62

Basically Adams objected to Franklin's proclivity for
indolence, as Morris and Van Alstyne agree, but they realize
that Adams was tactless, which made working with him diffi
cult.

Morris maintains that Adams's treatment of Vergennes

was too argumentative, whereas Franklin knew how to handle
the French foreign minister.

Morris indicates that Adams

only gave credit to Franklin's efforts after the peace treaty
was completed, and for him, this was "an enormous concession."

63

Van Alstyne is inclined to defend Franklin against

^^Stourzh, Franklin, Foreign Policy, pp. 153, 183.
61
James, "Revolutionary Career," p. 62.
^^Smith, Adams, I, pp. 377-381, 479, 523, 548.
fl >7

Morris, Peacemakers, pp. 196, 380.
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Adams's criticism of his conduct in French society and in
the circle o£ statesmen.

Adams admitted that the French

had no confidence in him, and Van Alstyne states that Adams
had been offensive in his "indiscreet speeches,"

Adams's

blunt policy led Franklin to refer to him as a "'mischievous
madman,'" intent on forcing apart the Franco-American alli
ance upon which the United States depended and in which
Franklin believed.

64

The most adamant critic of Franklin is Cecil B, Currey,
who supports Adams's negative comments about the venerable
diplomat.

Of course, Adams regretted the diplomatic dispute

which had arisen out of Franklin's alleged duplicity, and
Adams had the courage to try to control the wily doctor.

Ac

cording to Currey, Franklin demonstrated his consistent oppo
sition to alliances and friendships with European countries
in his attempts to block Adams's diplomatic trip to Holland.
Fortunately for the peace effort. Franklin's relationship
with John Jay was much less tempestuous.

They were in accord

about the goals of Jay's mission to Spain and of the peace
negotiations, although Jay was skeptical of the French role
in the peace talks.

They reached an agreement on separate

negotiations, which allowed the talks to procede harmoniously.
Also, according to Franklin, Frank Monaghan, Jay's biographer,
and Richard B. Morris, they decided that any concessions to
the Spanish concerning navigation on the Mississippi River

6'^Van Alstyne, Empire, pp. 380, 164, 228.
^^Currey, Code #72, pp. 217, 235.
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were inadvisableo
Roger Burlingame, Richard W. Van Alstyne and Cecil
Currey indicate, however, that there was disagreement be
tween Franklin and Jay after Jay arrived in Paris and the
informal peace negotiations began.

Jay disapproved of

Franklin's informal conversations with the temporary peace
commissioners from Britain,

In,addition, Jay suspected that

a secret agreement between France and Spain had been rati
fied, and he began to press Franklin to cease including
France in the peace discussion, a prospect that horrified
Franklin.

67

Since Jay and Adams were close friends. Van

Alstyne states that they regarded themselves as having per
formed a rescue operation for the United States against
French wiles and Franklin's p l i a n c y . C u r r e y commends
Jay's independence and foresight in urging negotiations
independently of France, despite Franklj.n's efforts to per
suade Jay that France and Spain had not collaborated on a
secret agreement.

He intimates that Jay was reluctant to

compliment Franklin's service in Paris.

Currey points out

that when Franklin requested that Jay write a letter to Con
gress supporting him, Jay's commendation was reserved at best

66van Doren, ed., Autobiographical Writings, p, 483;
Frank Monaghan, John Jay [New York and Indianapolis: The
Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1935), p. 186. (Hereinafter referred
to as Monaghan, Jay); Morris, Peacemakers, pp. 245-246,
343.
7

6R

Burlingame, Envoy, pp, 191-192,
Van Alstyne, Empire, p. 214,

^^Currey, Code #72. pp, 253, 259,
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The last controversial activity engaged in by Franklin
in Paris involves his efforts in the peace negotiations.
Questions arise concerning his commitment to independence
in contrast to his desire for reconciliation with Britain.
Moreover, historians debate Franklin's actions regarding
the congressional instructions which stipulated that France
must be included in the proceedings, and his agreement with
Adams and Jay to exclude the French.

Franklin personally

believed that a sincere reconciliation would be more bene
ficial than mere peace, because it would indicate that there
was a mutual good will between the United States and England.
When he began to negotiate officially with England, his per
sonal comments show his resolve to abide by the congressional
instructions stipulating that France be included in the
peace talks, as he was positive that Spain, Holland and
France would not negotiate separately.

70

In his interpreta

tion of Franklin's attitude towards reconciliation, Hale
explains that Franklin assured Vergennes that he had re
jected Hartley's proposal for reconciliation.

Furthermore,

he told Vergennes that he would avoid future interviews
with Hartley in order that no breach might occur in the
71
Franco-American alliance.
In Fay's opinion. Franklin's
commitment to peace and independence was so strong that
Franklin was able to receive British envoys in the name of
peace, and still maintain his position that no Loyalist in

^^Van Doren, ed., Autobiographical Writings, pp. 521,
582.

^^Hale, Franklin, I, p. 224; II, p. 50.

100

the United States would ever benefit from her victory,

72

Fianklin's primary consideration was American indepen
dence, according to Frank Monaghan, Samuel Flagg Bemis,
Arthur B. Darling (Our Rising Empire, 1763-1805, 1940), and
Carl Van Doren,

However, their views differ in discussing

Franklin's opinion of the French alliance.

His "necessary

and advisable articles" in 1782 indicate that reconcilia
tion was not a part of his plan for the United States,

At

the same time, Franklin distinctly stated that once indepen
dence was granted,
an end.'"

73

, . the Franco-American treaty was at

Bemis commends the entire commission for break

ing away from rigid congressional instructions and taking
advantage of European quarrels to make a successful treaty.

74

Darling disagrees that Franklin intended to forget the French
alliance, since Franklin rebuffed Hartley's proposal of a
separate treaty, because no man in America would desert a
"generous friend" for the sake of a truce with the enemy.
However, Darling continues by explaining that Vergennes had
no objection to separate negotiations, although he had no
intention of supporting the land claims of the United States,
since France recognized that it would make America more
cautious if she knew Spain still held land adjacent to the
new nation.

Darling observes that Franklin never seems to

have recognized Vergennes's intentions to impede the negotia-

72Fay, Apostle, pp. 475-477,
^^Monaghan, Jay, p. 192.
^^Bemis, Diplomacy, p. 255.
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tions, or i£ he did, he did not deem his motives harmful.
Franklin genuinely believed that French interest in American

75
independence lay at the heart o£ French policy.
agrees that Franklin was committed to independence.

Van Doren
More

over, Franklin understood that there was a certain amount o£
bartering over agreeable settlements going on among the three
countries, so he went to Richard Oswald to use Canada as a
bargaining point.

According to Van Doren, Franklin regarded

the cession o£ Canada as necessary to obtain a durable peace,
and Franklin also reiterated that he would talk about nothing
seriously until England empowered her agents to go beyond
,- .
.
76
preliminaries.
Miller, Auger and Stourzh agree that Franklin's pri
mary consideration was obtaining independence £or the United
States,

Despite the rigid congressional instructions that

the American commissioners were not to make a separate peace.
Franklin violated these instructions, indicating a willing
ness to conduct peace talks in secret.

The British were

hopeful that he would then be willing to go all the way and
make a separate peace.

That Franklin would have jeopardized

the French alliance is extremely unlikely, however.

77

Auger

emphasizes that Franklin distrusted British motives when they

^^Arthur Burr Darling, Our Rising Empire, 1765-1801
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940), pp. 46-47, 66,
89. (Hereinafter referred to as Darling, Rising Empire.)
7

Van Doren, Franklin, pp. 673, 368.

^^Miller, Triumph, pp. 632-634,
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offered him free passage to Britain to discuss a settlemento
Because he held to his plan of independence. Auger claims
that the peace treaty was a major accomplishment for revolutionary America and the future of the nation.

78

According

to Stourzh, Franklin's constant assurances of good will and
his wishes for peace have occasioned an erroneous interpreta
tion of his desire for peace with Great Britain.

Actually,

he was referring to the general happiness of mankind, while
the British assumed he meant reconciliation with Great
Britain.

79

Morris states that Franklin's decision to approach the
peace negotiations independently of France proved that he
realized the need to present a solid front to the British
negotiators for the sake of independence, and thus he joined
in supporting his two colleagues in negotiating without the
French.

Morris continues that Franklin played upon the divi

sions between Oswald and Thomas- Grenville, hoping that Shelburne would send Oswald back to Paris, since his moderation
and sound judgment appealed to Franklin.

In addition, the

demand for Canada was only a technique Franklin employed to
bring England around to his way of thinking on other aspects
of the negotiations, and he never realistically thought the
United States could obtain Canada.

After the negotiations

were completed, Franklin defended the failure of the commis
sioners to include France, assuring Vergennes that none of

78

79

Auger, Secret War, p. 340.
Stourzh, Franklin, Foreign Policy, p. 187.
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the peace articles was detrimental to France.

80

He managed

to retain Vergennes's support o£ the United States by ask
ing Vergennes if he would give the British the satisfaction
of knowing that they had broken the Franco-American alliance.
Van Alstyne credits Franklin with being the first to violate
openly the congressional instructions of maintaining confi
dence in France.

He goes further, saying that separate

negotiations were agreeable to Vergennes, who was trying to
extricate himself from pursuing both American interests and
Spanish desires in America and Gibraltar.

81

Concluding the discussion of Franklin and the peace
treaty, Currey intimates that Franklin worked against it.

82

But Currey needs factual evidence to verify his allegations,
which are conspicuously undocumented throughout his book.
In writing about Benjamin Franklin, historians have had
access to his personal papers and correspondence, but the
context in which this information is applied provides vary
ing interpretations which make a historiographical discussion
of these books possible.

Those authors who focus on Frank

lin's career tend to present a more favorable impression of
his diplomatic career than those who include the many aspects
and complications of diplomacy in Europe and discuss the
methods by which the American commissioners, individually

^^Morris, Peacemakers, pp. 357, 276, 384.
81

Van Alstyne, Empire, p. 216.

^^Currey, Code #72, p. 256.
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and collectively, approached the problems o£ negotiating
for recognition and alliances in Europe.

To illustrate

this comparison, Bernard Fay, Carl Van Doren, Gerald Stourzh
and Roger Burlingame praise Franklin's insight and tact in
his diplomacy.

Bernard Fay is useful because of his exten

sive use of French sources dealing with Franklin and his
activities and associations in Paris.

In addition, his

French interpretation of American sources, especially Frank
lin's personal papers, serves to emphasize the twentiethcentury viewpoint that Benjamin Franklin was vital to the
success of American diplomacy in Europe.

From the evidence

offered through Franklin's autobiography, writings, and
correspondence. Van Doren obviously believes that Franklin
directed the success of the American commission in Europe.
However, he does not limit his investigation only to Frank
lin's writings, as he includes English manuscript sources
and monographs that deal with Franklin and life in America
and Europe.

This biography of Franklin is valuable for the

insight it gives to the development of Franklin's career and
philosophy, as well as for the information it furnishes about
life in eighteenth-century America and Franklin's adaptation
to the Parisian life-style.

Gerald Stourzh's study about

Franklin and his foreign policy also relies heavily on Frank
lin's personal writings and correspondence, but combines them
with some European manuscripts and numerous monographs and
articles dealing with Franklin's philosophy as it related to
his foreign policy.

Not only is this book necessary for an
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understanding of Franklin's foreign policy, but it also pro
vides useful comments about other secondary material written
about Franklin as Stourzh compares his own interpretations
to those of other historians.

In comparison to the preceding

authors, Roger Burlingame's more recent book on Franklin's
years in Europe is more elementary in its approach.

However,

he provides a bibliography for each chapter which indicates
that his scholarship is commendable.

His major sources of

information are the volumes on Franklin edited by Smyth, in
addition to English and American revolutionary correspondenceo
The last chapter of Burlingame's book is a superficial analy
sis of Franklin in relationship to the United States in the
1960s,

which only serves to weaken his somewhat interesting

investigation of Franklin's European career.
Cecil Currey expends much effort in finding minute flaws
in Franklin's diplomatic career and then expanding them into
crimes of the highest magnitude, and one finds it difficult
to believe that he has read the same sources as Stourzh and
Van Doren.

Although some recent historians believe that

Currey's work is a necessary addition to provide historical
perspective about Franklin, it does seem that Currey could
have exercised better judgment than to base his hypotheses
upon nebulous conjecture.
Naturally, those authors whose topics circumscribe the
larger issue of the entire Revolution are unable to deal in
specifics like those who concentrate on Franklin alone.

How

ever, Bemis, Miller and Darling ably discuss the important
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aspects o£ Franklin's career in Europe.

Once again, Bemis

represents the transition to modern historical writing in
his study of the beginning of American diplomatic history.
Although most of his documentation is from official govern
mental transcripts from the United States and Europe, he
also uses the personal papers of Franklin.

He claims the

best biography on Franklin up to the date of publication of
his book is Fay's 1929 biography, and that is the only
secondary source he uses in speaking of Franklin.
Arthur Darling's first chapters deal with the diplo
matic activities of Jay and Franklin in Europe and their
efforts on the peace commission.

He includes primary

sources such as the journals from the Continental Congress,
Wharton's and Franklin's papers.
lin's efforts in Europe is useful.

His explanation of Frank
However, he obviously

believes that John Jay was more crucial to the negotiations
for a fair peace, so the section on Jay is more extensive.
John C. Miller's bibliography includes such an extensive
listing of manuscript sources, memoirs and letters, histori
cal collections, newspapers, monographs, and biographies
that it would be impossible to mention them all.

His use

of Franklin's manuscripts from the American Philosophical
Society constitute his major source on Franklin, which is
supplemented by Van Doren's biography and numerous other
primary sources from England and the United States.

This

book is an informed study of the men and events of the
Revolution, internationally as well as nationally.
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Richard Van Alstyne's short monograph concentrates more
on the events of the Revolution, yet he does not ignore the
men o£ importance in the diplomatic area.

From Franklin's

letters, personal papers and writings and numerous official
reports and personal papers from England and France, Van
Alstyne compiles an informative study that deals with Frank
lin's work in Europe and other selected aspects of diplomacy»
Other authors who contribute interpretations of American
diplomacy and Franklin's participation in this phase of the
American Revolution include James, Corwin, Morse, Cresson,
Monaghan, and Smith.

James's unpublished dissertation on

Silas Deane uses extensively memoirs and personal papers of
revolutionary leaders, including those of Franklin.

He

also has included biographies and other secondary sources,
some of which are especially useful in dealing with Frank
lin, his association with Deane and Lee, and his contribu
tions to diplomacy.

Corwin's rather old but reliable book

on French policy towards the American alliance relies mainly
upon Doniol.

Bemis commends this book as invaluable to his

study of American diplomacy.

It is easy to dismiss Morse's

biography as of little historical value because of his com
plete lack of documentation and obvious prejudice in favor
of John Adams.

However, as a source of reference for Adams's

career and his relations with the men on the American commis
sion, it must be mentioned in a historiographical study.
Cresson and Monaghan have written about figures in revolu
tionary diplomacy.

Their use of collections of personal
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papers and correspondence from the men on the commission in
Paris enabled them to write biographies that are useful in
studying Franklin's role in diplomacy.

Smith concentrates

his investigation on John Adams by using his personal papers
and only briefly mentions Franklin,

Finally, Hale's two

volumes on Franklin, based entirely upon primary material,
present insights into Franklin's public and private life
in Paris.
The articles from periodicals relating to Franklin and
his career in Europe are informative.

Felix Gilbert's

treatment of diplomacy in the eighteenth century is unique
because of his sources.

He combines extensive use of French

works on political philosophy with primary material taken
from the journals of Adams and Lee, as well as autobiogra
phies of revolutionary leaders like Franklin.

Max Beloff

utilizes mainly the secondary sources by Stourzh, Bemis and
Darling but does not ignore Franklin's papers or his corre
spondence,

This article is very similar in viewpoint to

Stourzh and Darling, and also attempts to compare the chal
lenges facing Franklin in eighteenth-century diplomacy with
those of twentieth-century diplomacy.

Abernethy deviates

from the traditionally laudatory approach to Franklin's
activities in Paris, and emphasizes Lee's charges that Frank
lin and Deane conspired to take advantage of their positions
in Paris for their own financial betterment.

However, he

states that historians have ignored evidence that implicates
Franklin which he found investigating the papers of Deane,
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Franklin and Lee.

This unusual interpretation must be

considered in a study of Franklin's diplomatic career»
Julian P. Boyd's articles concentrating upon Silas Deane
include his relationship with Franklin.

Therefore, with

characteristic scholarship, Boyd includes in his list of
primary sources the papers and correspondence of Franklin,
Historians have debated the issues which have been
discussed in this chapter.

Although many times they are

in agreement, there are points of conflict among their in
terpretations of historical data.

Franklin's opposition

to militia diplomacy is an accepted concept.

However, the

idea that he intended diplomacy to be based upon commerce
is supported by Gilbert, Stourzh and James.
pecially emphasizes that Franklin

Stourzh es

based his concept of

commercial diplomacy upon the hope that the United States
would always remain independent.

Some authors maintain

that Franklin believed an alliance with France was so impor
tant that he resorted to pressure tactics to persuade
Vergennes that reconciliation with England was possible if
France refused to give the United States formal support,
Bemis, Miller, James, Boyd and Burlingame all agree that
"pressure diplomacy" was part of Franklin's plan for secur
ing the alliance.

However, Beloff and Fay agree that per

haps the motivating force in the French agreement to an
alliance with the United States was her desire to subvert
England's power in Europe.

Stourzh basically agrees that

the French desire to reestablish her prestige, not the
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activity of individuals, motivated her to conclude an agree
ment with the United States,
Franklin's activities in Europe possibly extended
beyond the realm of official diplomacy.

According to

Currey and Morris, his interest in personal financial gain
created a conflict with his official duties.

On the other

hand, Stourzh, Auger and Burlingame deny that he engaged in
any outside financial affiliations detrimental to the alli
ance ,
Because of Franklin's financial interests, his friend
ship with Silas Deane and associations with the British in
Paris, Arthur and William Lee engaged in a plot to discredit
Franklin as well as Deane,

Fay, Auger, James, Hale, and

Franklin himself, agree that he was fully aware of Deane's
faults but wished to protect Deane from Lee's venomous in
vectives and efforts to have him recalled.

Van Doren, Auger

and Burlingame agree that Franklin trusted the goodness of
mankind which was the major reason for his failure to recog
nize Bancroft's evil motives.

Van Alstyne claims that Ban

croft's role in American revolutionary diplomacy has been
exaggerated.

But Currey and Abernethy point out that there

is a basis for Lee's suspicions of Franklin,

Abernethy's

less dramatic account of the disagreement between Franklin
and Lee emphasizes that he intends to defend Lee against the
many historical criticisms of his career in Europe rather
than to persecute Franklin.
Franklin's association with the other two peace com

Ill

missioners, especially with John Adams, is another area of
Franklin's career in Paris which historians discuss.

Miller,

Morris and Van Alstyne agree that Adams was unalterably
jealous of Franklin's superior reception and position in
Pariso

Then Smith and Currey agree to some extent that

Franklin and Adams were in opposition to each other because
Adams feared that Franklin opposed any alliances with Euro
pean countries which would further separate America from
England.

Except for Burlingame and Van Alstyne, historians

generally agree that Jay and Franklin were compatible,
Burlingame and Van Alstyne state that Jay was more willing
to negotiate for peace without French assistance than was
Franklin.
With regard to the peace commission, most historians
agree that Franklin's first consideration was American inde
pendence.

Darling, Bemis and Miller explain that Franklin's

eventual willingness to negotiate separately with Great
Britain indicate his dedication to independence,

Morris

studies the peace negotiations extensively and concludes
that Franklin's efforts, along with those of Adams and Jay,
were unjustly condemned by Congress which tried to appease
France's anger over the separate treaty,

Stourzh explains

that some historians have mistakenly construed Franklin's
determination for peace as a desire for reconciliation with
England,
Franklin's diplomatic career involves criticism and
praise for his efforts in Europe.

His activity in Paris
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is worthy o£ thorough investigation in the study of the
development of American diplomacy.

Although there are

controversies involving his career as a diplomat, they
do not seriously detract from his significance in American
revolutionary diplomacy.

CHAPTER V

THE DIPLOMACY OF JOHN ADAMS IN EUROPE
The Adams family includes some of the most prominent
and revered names in American history, and John Adams, as
one of the major figures in the American Revolution, has
been discussed extensively by historians.

This chapter

will investigate his diplomatic career during the Revolu
tion, which included two trips to Europe.

During the first

he unsuccessfully negotiated with Vergennes for approval of
a British-American trade agreement.

Later he returned to

negotiate a successful treaty with Holland and participated
in the American peace negotiations with England along with
Benjamin Franklin and John Jay.

According to some histo

rians, many of Adams's problems in Europe stemmed from his
suspicions and his contentious approach to European offic
ials.

Other historians disagree with this criticism and

praise his unwavering devotion to independence, regardless
of how much it irritated European governments.

Adams did

not escape the unfortunate fight between Deane and Arthur
Lee.

Some historians argue that the Lee clan influenced

him to support its side of the imbroglio, while other
authors explain that Adams attempted to maintain his neu
trality by refusing to enter into any of the investigations
conducted against Deane.

In addition, his relationship
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with the French foreign minister, Vergennes, was far from
harmonious, and historians debate if his obstinancy in re
fusing to follow Vergennes's advice about negotiating com
mercial treaties with England and Holland was detrimental
to Franco-American relations.

The difficulties Adams

encountered in Holland while negotiating for an alliance
causes some authors to question Adams's fitness for diplo
macy, while others defend his tenacity in surmounting the
endless delays of the Dutch government and achieving a commerical treaty beneficial to the United States,

Adams's

hostility towards Benjamin Franklin hindered the progress
of the peace negotiations, according to some historians,
Adams disagreed with Franklin's insistence that France be
included in all the peace negotiations.

He believed that

Franklin's enjoyment of Parisian society and his affable
relations with Vergennes proved his preference for the
French over the United States.

The varying interpretations

of historians continue to make John Adams a controversial
character in American diplomatic history.
One of Adams's principal supporters, John T, Morse, re
gards Adams as a competent diplomatic representative of the
United States,

Although Morse acknowledges in his book-

length essay on John Adams (1899) that Adams was outspoken
and incapable of concealing his dislike for certain people,
he considers him to have been the right man in the right
place.

In comparison to Adams, Franklin was less capable
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in the field of diplomacy.^

Since historical documentation

is lacking in Morse's book, his personal prejudice for Adams
is obvious.
Frank Monaghan, John Jay's biographer (1935), disagrees
with Morse's support of Adams, and John C, Miller questions
Adams's ability as a diplomat.

Monaghan discusses Adams's

patriotism but feels that his extreme devotion to the United
States did not enhance his competency as an agent in Paris
and adds that

. . h e was the complete egotist who sus

pected himself to be a universal genius,"

With his strict

view of American isolationism, he divided the world into
Americans and foreigners.

Miller wonders how he could

have exerted any significant influence in Europe, since
he never lost the haughtiness and contentiousness which
continually offended people.

3

Clinton Ross iter and Bernard Bailyn explain Adams's
rather untraditional attitudes in Europe, while Richard B,
Morris declines to criticize his unusual character traits.
Rossiter's article, "The Legacy of John Adams" (1957), is
an analysis of Adams's personality, including both positive

^Morse, Adams. pp. 165-166, 168. See Collections of
the Massachusetts Historical Society. Warren Papers (7 0
volumes, Boston: The Massachusetts Historical Society, 1878),
IV, po 2400
Adams was misplaced in the French Court be
cause of his plain habits and unpolished manners, (Herein
after referred to as Warren Papers.)

2

Monaghan, Jayg p, 170.

^Miller, Triumph, pp. 573-574,
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and negative character traits.

The core of Adams's politi

cal thought was an austere view o£ the nature o£ mankind,
compounded by skepticism, distrust, pity and charityo

How

ever, he was not overbearing or conceited, but rather suf
fered from a lively sense of persecution which developed
into a penchant for self-debasement,
of him,

o

Franklin once said

o always an honest man, often a wise one,

but sometimes, in some things, absolutely out of his
senses,"'

If he deprecated himself, he compensated for

this by maintaining courage and independence from outside
influences in double portion,^
Rossiter's more understanding view of Adams's nature
influences opinions expressed in later studies on Adams,
Bernard Bailyn's short article on "Butterfield's Adams"
(1962) also emphasizes Adams's insecurity.

Adams never

overcame his sensitivity to slights and ridicule, and his
distrust of others was demonstrated by his suspicion that
Franklin had hired a secretary to spy on him„^

Even Morris,

who is enthusiastic about Franklin's role in diplomacy,
seems almost sympathetic towards Adams's very touchy nature
which, Morris says, resulted in inconsistency and an in
ability to ever make up his mind,^
^Clinton Rossiter, "The Legacy of John Adams," The Yale
Review, XLVI (June, 1957), 534. (Hereinafter referred to as
Rossiter, "Legacy,")
^Bernard Bailyn, "Butterfield's Adams: Notes for a
Sketch." William and Mary Quarterly. IX (April, 1962), 252,
(Hereinafter^ referred to as Bailyn, "Butterf ield's Adams ,")
^Morris, Peacemakers. p, 207, See his example about
Adams first wanting to go to Vienna, then noting its im
propriety, then suggesting that he go.
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This New England diplomat began his career in Paris,
because Silas Deane had been recalled to America,

Just how

much Adams sympathized with the Lee family, with whom his
name has been unalterably linked, has received varying de
grees of affirmation and denial.

His own account of the

recall in his Diary and Autobiography agrees that Deane
had spent sums of money which had remained unaccounted for,
and had authorized contracts which had almost ruined the
military and thoroughly embarrassed Congress,

Because he

believed that Deane and Franklin had been reluctant to
supply information that might have cleared up questions
about the accounts, he wrote to Samuel Adams that the min
isters were living too high at the expense of the country
7

and perhaps one minister would be sufficient,

Adams does

not mention that he urged that Franklin be appointed the
sole minister in Paris,
According to Coy James and Page Smith, Adams refused
to become involved in the Deane-Lee imbroglio.

In a letter

written in 1778, Adams explained that he had never concealed
his sentiments against men whom he had opposed in public
life, but that Deane

. , is not and never was a man of

enough importance to make me deviate from a rule I have ob
served all my life, when obliged to be a Man's Enemy, to be
open and generously so,'"

8

Page Smith's biography of Adams

7

Butterfield, ed,, Diary and Autobiography, pp, 88,
106-108„
g

James, "Revolutionary Career," p, 136,
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(1962) substantiates the view that Adams did not want to
become involved in the controversy and refused to investi
gate Deane himself.

However, he definitely sympathized

with Arthur Lee's accusation that Deane conducted a per
sonal business enterprise while in Paris,

Smith commends

Adams's initiative to proceed with the negotiations and
overlook the Deane~Lee feud.

g

Evidence that Adams remained free of the feud and its
implications is provided by

James Henderson's article

on the recall of Benjamin Franklin (1970).

The congres

sional investigation of the activities of the Paris com
mission implicated all the envoys except Adams.
Hale, Bemis and Miller deny the suggestion that Adams
adamantly opposed any alliances with European countries.
Hale argues that Adams preferred strictly commercial treaties
with no political or military c l a u s e s . B e m i s mentions
Adams's sympathy towards the alliance, stating that both
he and Franklin agreed that alliances would facilitate in12
dependence as well as trade with all nations.

Miller

traces Adams's changing attitude towards the French alliance
from his fight against the congressional commission instruct
ing Franklin to make an alliance with France to his later
Q
Smith, Adams, I, pp= 381, 376o
^^Henderson, "Congressional Factionalism," 258„
^^Hale, Franklin, I, p. 179o
12

Bemis, Diplomacy, p. 36,
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declaration that it was "'a Rock upon which we may safely
build,'"

Regardless of his support of the French alliance,

he strongly opposed any French interference in the internal
13
affairs of the United States,
One of the best analyses of Adams's sentiments towards
the French alliance is Felix Gilbert's article on "The New
Diplomacy of the 18th Century" (1951),

Its second section

deals with American diplomacy, and Gilbert utilizes journals,
diaries and autobiographies to substantiate his interpreta
tions,

From these sources and secondary studies on American

isolationism and foreign policy, Gilbert explains that Adams
did not oppose the French alliance but rather wanted to
avoid all obligations and temptations to take part in future
European wars,

Adams considered the only common interest

the United States and Europe would share would be in the
realm of commerce,

Adams's step-by-step outline as to what

an alliance should entail never implied a political bond.
After Adams returned from The Hague, he was more convinced
of the validity of establishing commercial relations with
Europe, because peace was only a "delusive dream,
According to William Stinchcombe in The American Revolu
tion and the French Alliance (1969), John Adams intended to
"strengthen independence" with the model treaty he drafted

^^Miller, Triumph, pp, 381, 575,
^^Felix Gilbert, "The New Diplomacy of the 18th Cen
tury," World Politics, IV (October, 1951), 19, 24, 30,
(Hereinafter referred to as Gilbert, "New Diplomacy,")
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in 1776o

This formed the basis for the instructions to

the newly appointed commissioners to France,

At this time,

the questions of commerce and trade relations were secondary ones to Adams.
Although most historians agree that Adams anticipated
that the United States would benefit from the alliance,
his personal relationship with Vergennes arouses much more
controversy.

Historians generally acknowledge that he was

basically unable to get along with the foreign minister,
but exactly who was responsible for the disagreements be
tween them remains a controversial and unanswered question,
Adams believed the arguments began when Vergennes imperti
nently refused to discuss the possibility of Adams's negot
iating a treaty of commerce with England similar to that
concluded with France until Gerard arrived with Adams's
instructions from Philadelphia.^^

Adams was offended by

this insult to his authority and also concluded that Ver
gennes planned to extend the war to achieve a French advan
tage in the final settlement,

Adams resolved to do his best

to cooperate with Vergennes as he submitted to Vergennes his
official instructions, although he informed Vergennes that
this was not a particularly satisfactory solution to the
issue.

17

In the collection of personal letters between John

^^Stinchcombe, French Alliance, p, 8,
^^Butterfield, ed., Diary and Autobiography. IV, pp
244-245, See also Hale, FranklilT] I, p. 3/9 ,
1 '7 *0* «

^
^
^ "J
^ Ji
Butterfield,
ed,. Diary and Autobiography, IV, p, 253,

121

Adams and Mercy Warren, Adams argues that Vergennes attempted
to deny Adams's authority, because he had discovered that
Vergennes was not entirely honorable in his intentions towards America„

18

Morse explains Adams's justification for

his dislike of Vergennes„

Vergennes dreaded and would at

tempt to prevent any commercial relationships between the
United States and Great Britain.

In addition, he desired

control over the peace negotiations in order that France
might first secure her interests,

Morse is obviously sym

pathetic with Adams's anger towards Vergennes, and he makes
only a minimal attempt to conceal his bias in favor of
Adams.
In contrast to Morse's defense of Adams's attitude
towards Vergennes, E, S. Corwin and W, P, Cresson criti
cize Adams's suspicions of Vergennes, which were exaggerated
by his blunt and tactless diplomacy.

In Corwin's book,

French Policy and the American Alliance of 1778 (1916), he
believes that Adams was true to his obstinate form in refus
ing to consider Vergennes's simile that appealing for a com
mercial treaty with England was like
house before the foundation is laid,'"

, furnishing a
With an amazing

lack of tact, Adams pressed the French government by refer
ring to an English circular which blamed France for intending
to exhaust the

, . strength and resources of this country

[England] and of depressing the rising power of America,'"
1O
Warren Papers, p, 414,
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Corwin enumerates Adams's offenses against Vergennes^, but
Vergennes's toleration ended when Adams accused the French
king of abandoning the United States»

Finally, Vergennes

bluntly announced that he would limit his negotiations to
19
Franklin,

Wo P„ Cresson assumes in his book, Francis

Dana; A Puritan Diplomat at the Court of Catherine the Great
(1930), that had Adams been the sole minister in France, he
could have easily broken up the alliance,

Adams believed

the United States was dangerously close to becoming a French
protectorate and was determined to place America's interests
first.

However, Cresson does not claim that Adams's declara

tions signified total devotion to his country, but instead
suspects him of thinking that his close connection with Con
gress placed him in a superior and supervisory position on
the commission.,

Adams also exercised "tactless diplomacy"

as he insisted on talking to the British Ministry, ignoring
Vergennes's

advice that this was not the proper time„

20

John Adams's irascible temper did nothing to ingratiate
himself with Vergennes, but Bemis argues that Adams deserves
better treatment from historians than they have been willing
to give himo

Vergennes associated Adams with the members of

Congress who opposed the principles of the French alliance
and who were eager to undertake separate negotiations with
Englando

Adams's insistence that he should at least give

1q
Corwin, French Policy, pp, 274-278,
Monaghan, Jay, p= 171,
7n

See also

Cresson, Puritan Diplomat, pp, 65, 87-88„
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England the chance to accept America's terms for peace in
creased Vergennes's suspicions of Adams, because Vergennes
believed such an overture would only demonstrate to England
a rift in the Franco-American alliance.

21

Gerald Stourzh argues that Adams tried to demonstrate
American power through his own capabilities.

The determi

nation of Adams to conclude a commercial treaty with Britain
preceded the opposition of Vergennes to any of Adams's sub
sequent activities.

Stourzh emphasizes that Adams inten

tionally set about to prove that his negotiating power was
independent of French advice.

To exemplify this sentiment,

in 1780 he purposefully delayed his first meeting with
Vergennes for several weeks.

When he finally met with the

French minister, Adams informed Vergennes that he was
authorized to negotiate peace and a commercial treaty with
Great Britain.

22

In contrast to Adams's critics. Page Smith defends his
perception in realizing French motives with regard to Ameri
can independence.

At first, Adams was grateful to the French

for negotiating such liberal and generous treaties, but
eventually he realized that the Gallic crown was using Amer
ica's struggle for independence to advance its own interests.
Apparently, Adams was prepared to ignore Vergennes's lack of
candor, but the intent of the foreign minister to hinder the

^^Bemis, Diplomacy, pp. 176-177.
22

Stourzh, Franklin, Foreign Policy, pp. 155-157.
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peace effort and their argument over the currency issue
23
aroused the famous Adams temper.
The debate over Adams's relations with Vergennes is con
tinued by Morris and Stinchcombe who basically agree that it
was Vergennes who instigated the quarrel between them.

Be

cause Adams had expressed his disapproval of Franklin to
Chevalier de La Luzerne and had cautioned him that the French
alliance would be endangered if the French minister became
involved in the internal party alignments of Congress, La
Luzerne presented an unfavorable picture of him to Vergennes,
Therefore, Morris contends that Vergennes was exceptionally
rude to Adams and determined to have his powers to negotiate
with England curtailed.

Naturally, Adams had no patience

with Vergennes's attempts to control his activities by de
manding full knowledge of his instructions,

Vergennes argued

with Adams over the congressional decision to redeem its de
preciated currency at forty to one, instead of speaking with
Franklin, who was the accredited minister of Congress to
France,

Actually, Adams bore no official responsibility

for Franco-American relations,

24

Stinchcombe also claims

that Vergennes should have taken his grievance about the
congressional decision to depreciate the currency to Frank
lin instead of Adams,

Vergennes decided to restrain Adams,

who considered himself to be defending the United States, by
urging Congress to place in Franklin's jurisdiction the pro2^
24

Smith, Adams, I, pp, 426, 475-477,
Morris, Peacemakers, pp, 194-196.
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posed mediation conference at Vienna.

Vergennes would have

been satisfied had Congress limited Adams's power or placed
him under the direct control of the French government.

25

When John Adams was appointed to the mission to Holland,
he was given the opportunity to demonstrate his diplomatic
prowess.

Most authors agree that Adams's perseverence in

Holland resulted in a successful agreement with the Dutcho
Franklin reveals that, at first, Adams was reluctant about
9A
going because of the gloomy prospects for a loan.
Morse,
who is usually very complimentary towards Adams, says little
about his mission to the United Provinces to negotiate a
treaty of alliance.

27

Both Cresson and Bemis realize that Adams's mission to
Holland was difficult, because Vergennes disliked the trucu
lent Adams, and the French foreign minister also objected to
the United States competing with France for loans from Am
sterdam.

Despite Vergennes's opposition, the Dutch recog

nized Adams as a minister plenipotentiary in 1782, which
enabled him to negotiate a successful treaty of commerce
and friendship.

28

Cresson agrees that Adams represented a

threat to Vergennes's desire to maintain Dutch neutrality
because the Anglo-Dutch alliance was no longer binding.
at least Adams was free from Franklin's influence, and he

25
Stinchcombe, French Alliance, pp. 155, 156,

26
27
28

Van Doren, ed.. Autobiographical Writings, p. 529,
Morse, Adams, p, 191,
Bemis, Diplomacy, p. 169,

But
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was able to put his diplomatic talents to use as he employed
journalistic propaganda to persuade Hollanders of British
cruelties.

Cresson adds that the success of Adams's nego

tiations focused Catherine's attention on completing her
mediation policy, because she desired a reconciliation between the Stadtholder and King George,

29

Cecil Currey lacks the intellectual sophistication to
delve into details of Adams's mission to Holland.

His main

purpose is to discredit Franklin's activities in Europe, and
he is delighted to support anyone who disagreed with Frank
lin.

Therefore, he unhesitatingly commends Adams's
. extremely successful mission in Holland,"

30

Cresson and Bemis discuss Adams's misconception of the
goals of Catherine's mediation policy, while Morris commends
his understanding of the empress's foreign policy.

While

Adams was in Holland, the plans of the Russian empress for
a League of Armed Neutrality aroused his interest, according
to Cresson.

Adams believed that the United States should

naturally be a participant in this confederation, which
proved his misunderstanding of the Czarina's foreign policy.
She had no intention of allowing a belligerent into the
League,

31

Bemis further demonstrates Adams's ignorance of

Russian foreign policy, since he believed that he could

2Q

Cresson, Puritan Diplomat, pp. 125, 131-132, 233,

^^Currey, Code #72, p. 247.
31

Cresson, Puritan Diplomat, p, 226.
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persuade Catherine to his sentiments with the same firm
diplomacy he employed in Holland.

Bemis concludes that

Adams ultimately opposed the mediation plan, because he
thought that it was designed by Vergennes to control the
United States bid for independence,

32

Morris credits Adams

with exceptional insight, because he discerned that the
League members placed their own desires above American
interest.

Thus, Adams insisted that they acknowledge a

minister from the United States as the

, . representa-

tive of a free and independent power.'"

33

Adams's critical and opinionated judgments were not
limited to European officials since he regarded Franklin
with varying degrees of hostility, according to most his
torians,

Adams defined their relationship as a "friendship

commonly felt between two members of the same public assem
bly,"

He held no high regard for Franklin, as Deane was

well liked by Franklin, an association of which Adams dis
approved.
Early historians argue about Adams's association with
Franklin,

Hale and Morse disagree on whether Adams inter

fered with Franklin's diplomacy with Vergennes, especially
concerning the currency controversy.

Hale feels that Adams

overstepped his authority in arguing with Vergennes about

32

Bemis, Diplomacy, p. 186,

^^Morris, Peacemakers, pp. 205, 208-209.
34
p. 118,

Butterfield, ed.. Diary and Autobiography, IV,
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the congressional decision, while Morse defends Adams for
taking the responsibility of informing Vergennes of the
repayment schedule, as Franklin had neglected his duty to
inform Vergennes.

35

In the points of view of Cresson and Fay, Adams was
jealous of Franklin, which contributed to their conflict.
Adams scorned Franklin's urbane sophistication in diplomacy,
resented his success in dealing with Vergennes, and criti
cized Franklin's popularity within French social circles.
Cresson adds that Adams was sure that Franklin supported
Vergennes's negotiations with the Russian court regarding
mediation.

On this subject, he was justified in his appre-

hension of Vergennes's motives.

Fay assumed that Adams

was insulted when he realized that he was merely a reflec
tion of Franklin in Paris.

The antipathy he felt towards

Franklin was manifested by his support of Lee's charges
that Franklin worked closely with Bancroft and Carmichael,

37

Van Doren and Miller explain Adams's dislike of Frank
lin because of Franklin's congeniality with the French, as
well as his successful approach to Vergennes.

It was par

ticularly distressing to Adams that Vergennes would not
properly recognize him.

Adams assumed that Vergennes pre

ferred Franklin, because he was more pliable in Vergennes's

35

Hale, Franklin, I, pp. 380-381; see also, Morse,
Adams, p. 184.
'Z f.

Cresson, Puritan Diplomat, pp. 92-93, 169.
^''pay. Apostle, p. 442.
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hands.

38

Franklin did not respond to Adams's antagonism,

39
maintaining that he was basically very capable.

Miller

also states that Adams considered Franklin to have bungled
matters badly in France, because of his policy of subservi
ence to French ministers,

Adams resolved to establish a

new approach of independence and boldness towards the French
government, especially Vergennes,

However, Franklin's repu

tation was superior, which frustrated Adams's continual
efforts to discredit him.^^
Stourzh's analysis of the Franklin-Adams relationship
stresses that their basic disagreement was over tactics,
not policy.

Adams preferred to approach the French alliance

with emphasis on the strength of America, and failed to
understand that Franklin's overt gratitude towards and
friendship with Vergennes were politically more expedient
than offending Vergennes.
Both Auger and Smith agree that Adams was suspicious of
Franklin's pro-French sentiments.

However, Auger does men

tion that Adams suggested that Franklin be retained as the

38

Van Doren, Franklin. p. 621. See also, Wharton,
Diplomatic Correspondence. I, p. 568. (Adams could not
tolerate it when French and British ministers turned to
Franklin.)
39

Van Doren, Franklin, p. 667.

40

Miller, Triumph. pp. 574, 578. See also. Darling,
Rising Empire, p. 89. (Darling states that Adams's appraisal of Franklin was mistaken.)
41

Stourzh, Franklin, Foreign Policy, pp. 158-159.
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only minister plenipotentiary.

42

On the other hand, Smith

explains that Adams's suspicions of Franklin's loyalties
included his sympathy with the English as well as the French,
Adams saw Franklin being seduced by the British proposals
for breaking the American alliance with France and agreeing
to a separate "accommodation" with England,

When the peace

negotiations began, Adams's suspicions of Franklin lessened,
because they both disagreed with congressional instructions
43
to follow France's lead in the peace negotiations.
The idea that Franklin would consider unofficial pre
liminary peace talks with the English upset Adams.

Morris

adds that Adams accused Franklin of allowing William Alexander,
his Passy neighbor, to spread the word in England

. , that

no such acknowledgment of our independence would be insisted
on.'"

Franklin's choice of the double-talking Alexander for

the mission of extending peace feelers convinced Adams that
the doctor ignored ordinary "prudence and discrimination in
his choice of agents,"

Throughout the peace negotiations,

Adams was inclined to berate Franklin and praise Jay,

44

Richard Van Alstyne briefly mentions the Franklin-Adams
disagreements, and he agrees with Miller that Adams was ap
parently jealous of Franklin in Paris.
Franklin

, , is not a sufficient statesman for all the

business he is in,'"
42

Adams complained that

But he finally acknowledged that only

Auger, Secret War, p. 385,

^^Smith, Adams, I, pp, 393, 539-540,
44
Morris, Peacemakers, pp. 304, 357.
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Franklin combined the qualities that satisfied French soci
ety and French statesmen.

The main problem with Franklin,

Adams thought, was that he had spread his abilities in too
many areas and was insufficiently informed about any,^^
The general antagonism between Adams and Franklin could
have precluded a successful peace treaty, except for John
Jay's rather moderate character, according to Frank Monaghan,
Towards Jay, Adams exhibited a rare trust and affection that
overshadowed any disagreement he might have had with Jay
over policy towards the French, the British and Franklin,
Adams especially admired men who shared his views, and when
he found Jay's similar to his own, their relationship was
46
all "eulogy and friendship."

Monaghan denies, however,

that Jay shared Adams's venomous distrust of Franklin.
According to Morris, both Franklin and Adams commended
Jay's role in the peace negotiations.

For Adams, Jay's

direct approach to explicit independence was a pleasant con
trast to Franklin's murky course.

Morris agrees that there

was no real controversy between Franklin and Jay, and he also
explains how well they got along, indicating that Adams and
Jay were not exactly similar in their attitudes towards
Franklin,

47

Discounting any respect either Jay or Adams might have
held for Franklin, Currey's analysis places Jay and Adams
45
46
47

Van Alstyne, Empire, p. 164,
Monaghan, Jay, p. 171,
Morris, Peacemakers, pp. 339, 286-287,
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in a consensus about Franklin's dangerous vulnerability to
Vergennes.

Both were concerned that Franklin was unaware

o£ the French conniving in the peace negotiations,

Currey

assumes that there were at least two honest men in Paris
to control Franklin, but to a less biased author, the ques
tion might arise as to who needed the controlling--Franklin
Aj
48
or Adams,
John Adams's moment o£ glory came with the peace nego
tiations, and his righteous fight for the United States
right to the fisheries.

La Luzerne had finally succeeded

in having his powers to negotiate a commercial treaty with
England revoked,

49

and Adams's last opportunity for histori

cal fame seemingly rested upon affixing his name to an out
standing peace.

Although Arthur Darling criticizes Adams's

unfounded skepticism about Franklin, he maintains that
Adams's contributions to the peace settlement were bene
ficial.

Adams realized the need of New England fishermen

to utilize the fishing grounds in Newfoundland and pursued
that issue in the negotiations.

According to Darling, his

major flaw was his lack of diplomatic tact.^®
The most strenuous objection Adams raised during the
peace discussions was over the congressional instructions

48

Currey, Code #72, p. 250.

49

Morse, Adams. p. 208. See Butterfield, ed,, Diary
and Autobiography, IV, pp. 175-176, (Adams flattered La
Luzerne, emphasizing his continuing high opinion of the
French minister.)
^^Darling, Rising Empire, p. 88.

133

that France be included throughout the negotiations,

Morse

sympathizes with Adams's anger at these instructions, as
Morse recognizes that his negotiating procedures would only
be hindered by French influence,

Adams also insisted that

all European quarrels must be settled before a treaty was
signed,
Although E. S. Corwin briefly criticizes Adams's
policy, he does not mention Adams's feelings against the
French.

Instead he believes Adams was partial to his native

Massachusetts, since he particularly insisted on fishing
privileges off the Grand Banks.

52

Corwin implies that Adams

was chiefly concerned about the area where his domestic
attachments lay.
The issue of separate negotiations is important to
Miller's analysis of Adams's work on the peace commission.
Both he and Jay were confident that they could handle the
British without French aid.

Although France did not appear

to be seeking undue advantages in the peace, her support
of Spain's"extravagant" land claims effectively placed her
in a position opposing American efforts.

To Adams and Jay,

the congressional instructions offended their fierce patri
otism, because they believed that taking France into their
confidence during the negotiations was comparable to surren
dering American independence.

Adams maintained that by

^^Morse, Adams, pp. 204-205.
52

Corwin, French Policy, pp. 345-346.
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disregarding the congressional instructions the commission
had saved the United States from a French-dictated peace
which

. , would have made Us long the miserable Satel-

53
lites o£ some great European Planet."*
Page Smith states that the negotiations began with Adams
considering the French and American to be
equals in theory, i£ not in fact."

, allies and

He did not condemn Ver-

gennes's efforts to guide and influence Anglo-American
negotiations, because he recognized that the French foreign
minister was only acting in accordance with the requirements
of his responsibilities to his country.

However, he did ob

ject to those members of Congress who advocated that the
commissioners rely upon French advice, because he considered
this a threat to American honor and independence»

Smith

considers the congressional reprimand to the commissioners
as unjust and praises Adams's determination that Americans
must above all be independent.

54

Morris, in his investigation of Adams's efforts on the
peace commission, commends as his finest moments his nego
tiations for the fishing rights in Newfoundland,

However,

Adams also demonstrated his skill in framing an ambiguous
clause, stipulating that individual states legally settle
the Tory claims, which mollified the British and left the

53

Miller, Triumph, pp. 632, 646, See also, Bemis,
Diplomacy, p, 174. (Tie indicates that the congressional
instructions allowed the commissioners leeway in using
their own discretion in securing American goals,)
"^4

Smith, Adams, I, pp^ 446, 548, 554,
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actual situation unchanged.

Morris adds that neither Adams

nor Jay forgave Congress for criticizing their efforts which
not only included separate negotiations but also the secret
article concerning West Florida,

Morris, at this point,

substantiates Adams's suspicion of Franklin by recognizing
that Franklin was unwilling to assume the consequences of
the actions of the commission.

55

Stinchcombe explains that congressional instructions
to the commission were an effort by southern delegates to
prevent Adams from seeking the fisheries for his region at
the expense of other sections of the nations.

He continues

that the United States voluntarily placed the fate of the
negotiations in the hands of a few men by agreeing to hold
them in Europe,

Although Congress would set the broad poli

cies, the individual ministers would actually make the
majority of the decisions
Adams's attitude towards the French during the negotia
tions is attributed to the way his thoughts evolved the
longer he stayed in Europe,

Van Alstyne claims that Adams

never really defined his sentiments towards either France
or England,

At first, he regarded England as a

, , nat

ural and habitual enemy,'" which forced the United States to
seek help from France,

It seems only logical that France

and Spain would desire to punish Great Britain, and thus

^^Morris, Peacemakers, pp, 376-378, 380, 444-445.
^^Stinchcombe, French Alliance, pp, 168, 76,
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France was a '"'natural ally.'"

However, by 1783, his senti

ments had changed so that he became eager for a commercial
treaty with England and for the exchange of ministers between the United States and Great Britain.

57

Therefore,

if Van Alstyne is correct, it was not so much his antipathy
against France, but his anticipation of commercial advan
tages from England which influenced his policy during the
peace negotiations.
John Adams's contributions to American foreign policy
receive no general consensus of praise or condemnation.
Although his temperament might not have been suited for
tactful diplomacy, his devotion to the ideas of American
independence defines his role in Europe as patriotic and
possibly even beneficial to the American cause.

Adams's

personal papers and correspondence as well as those of his
compatriots have been available to twentieth-century authorso
Lo

Butterfield edited a four-volume edition of Adams's

autobiography and diary which contributes additional insight
into Adams's diplomatic career and personal attitudes towards
his associates.

John T. Morse's study of John Adams is sus

pect on account of its complete lack of documentation.

How

ever, his lengthy essay on John Adams is valuable for his
toriography as it attempts to explain Adams's personality
traits and his efforts to secure independence for the United
States.

1^7

Monaghan, as John Jay's biographer, necessarily

Van Alstyne, Empire, pp. 180, 229.
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included information on Adams to complete thorough study of
Jay,

The major primary source Monaghan uses with regard to

Adams are the ten volumes of his works, edited by Charles
Francis Adams.

Monaghan includes such traditional editors

and authors as Wharton, Bemis, Hale, Doniol, and Corwin,
all of whom speak to the question of Adams's character and
actions in Europe.

John C, Miller adds helpful insight

into the personality of John Adams with the information
from Adams's works, Doniol, Sparks and the papers, journals
and correspondence of other men who were associated with
Adams, both in Europe and America.

Also, Adams's collection

of papers from the Massachusetts Histor .cal Society provides
useful background on Adams before he departed for Europe.
One of the most thorough and readable accounts of Adams's
diplomatic career is by Richard B. Morris.

His extensive

use of the journals and correspondence of the three peace
commissioners, and archival material from Europe and the
United States, provides invaluable information about Adams's
career in Europe,

He also includes secondary works which

have been previously mentioned.

The two-volume biography

of Adams, written by Page Smith, relies almost solely upon
Adams's writings and correspondence.

The first volume,

which includes his diplomatic career in Paris and Holland,
is complimentary of his abilities and achievements.

This

book needs to be balanced by other accounts of Adams which
are more critical in order to achieve a somewhat realistic
picture of Adams.

Samuel Flagg Bemis discusses Adams in
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relation to his contributions to the peace negotiations.
Along with the ten volumes of Adams's works, he incorporates
significant information from Jay's diary, the Hales®s vol
umes and English primary materials pertinent to the peace
negotiations.

His belief that the work of the peace com

missioners was exceptional coincides with other accounts
of this aspect of Adams's diplomacy,

Gerald Stourzh adds

additional useful interpretations of Adams in comparison
to Franklin, using basically the same primary sources as
other authors.

As has been previously stated, however,

his comments on secondary sources are also helpful and in
teresting,

William Stinchcombe does not concentrate on one

particular man in his study of the Franco-American alliance,
but he compares source material from Adams's works to French
studies of the alliance for a useful interpretation of
Adams's attitudes towards the French alliance.
The articles dealing with Adams also examine his per
sonal traits and diplomacy.

Both Rossiter and Bailyn

examine his rather unique and complex characteristics which
made him so sensitive and determined to adhere to his con
cept of independence regardless of the influences from
others.

They both rely upon Butterfield's editions of

Adams's autobiography and his correspondence,

Felix Gil

bert's study of Adams's diplomacy is based upon Adams's
works, biographical accounts and an extensive study of French
philosophical writings concerned with foreign policy.

This

article provides an interesting and unique interpretation
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of Adams's theories on American foreign policy.
The authors who have studied Adams have disagreed over
his diplomatic tactics, but most of them concur that he was
a devout American patriot.

John Adams, as a diplomat in

Europe, arouses differing opinions with regards to his
abilities,

Morse, in his favorable account of Adams, ac

knowledges his outspoken manner but asserts that he was the
right man in the right place.
a one-sided opinion.

No other author suggests such

Monaghan and Miller examine his ten

dency continually to offend the French especially in his
efforts to place American independence foremost.

They

interpret his actions as indications of his fear that he
would not receive the credit and acclaim for negotiating
American independence which Franklin would.

Rossiter and

Bailyn realize that his touchy and sensitive nature possibly

hindered his negotiating ability as he was constantly aware of
personal slights.

Morris agrees that Adams's personality

hindered his ability as a diplomat.
Another early controversy in Adams's diplomatic career
relates to the feud between Deane and Lee,

According to

his own diary, he remained convinced that Deane and Frank
lin were enjoying Parisian life at the expense of Congress,
but apparently he remained detached from direct involvement
in the controversies.

Page Smith reaches the same conclu

sion as Coy James, who states that Adams purposely remained
uninvolved in the controversy.

The congressional journals

furnish further proof that Adams was absolved from all
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charges arising from the imbroglio, according to H„ James
Henderson,
Two of the most controversial aspects of Adams's career
was his attitude towards the French alliance and his rela
tionship with the French officials, especially Vergennes,
Hale, Miller and Bemis state that he was never opposed to
the French alliance, because he considered it a matter of
necessity,

Felix Gilbert is much more articulate in explain

ing Adams's attitude towards the alliance.

He introduces

the idea that Adams believed the alliance to be the begin
ning of a future commercial relationship without entangle
ments necessitating further American irvolvement in European
affairs,

Stinchcombe refutes this concept and states that

Adams's thoughts were centered on independence.

Unfortu

nately, Adams encountered difficulties with Vergennes, who
insisted that Adams conduct his negotiations in accordance
with the provisions of the Franco-American alliance.

Re

gardless of Adams's personal accounts of his suspicions of
Vergennes's motives, both Corwin and Cresson conclude that
Adams was unduly suspicious of Vergennes, and thus was blunt
and tactless in defying Vergennes's requests.

On the other

hand, Bemis and Stourzh indicate that critics have been un
fair in condemning Adams's basic policy,

Stourzh emphasizes

that his tactics with Vergennes were different from Frank
lin's, but essentially they both considered the needs of
the United States first,

Bemis indicates that Adams wished

to open negotiations for a commercial treaty with England
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with the hope that it would eventually lead to peace.

Page

Smith defends Adams's perception in realizing Vergennes's
duplicity in dealing with the American commissionerso

Both

Morris and Stinchcombe, through their extensive use of
Adams's personal correspondence, decide that Vergennes was
unnecessarily rude to Adams»
Generally, historians agree that Adams's mission to
Holland was successful, but both Bemis and Cresson maintain
that Vergennes also controlled Dutch policy; yet Adams suc
cessfully overcame his influence.

Cecil Currey simply ac

claims Adams's success in Holland in an effort to support
one of Franklin's antagonists, without objectively inter
preting his sources.
The subject of Adams's relationship with Franklin is
extensively discussed, and most authors agree that the
enmity between them arose because of Adams's jealousy of
Franklin's official and personal successes in France,

How

ever, Smith is convinced that Franklin's suspicious activities with both the French and English justified Adams's
doubt of Franklin's priorities.
In contrast to the conflict between Adams and Franklin,
he and Jay were compatible, although Currey's rather biased
and unprofessional investigation concludes that Adams and
Jay equally distrusted Franklin,

Currey's interpretation

of the same sources used by previous authors, who reached
much different conclusions, is questionable at best,
John Adams's contribution toward the peace negotiations
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is generally commended by historians because of his undeviating commitment to independence.

Arthur Darling, whose source

material is extensively drawn from journals and correspon
dence, agrees that while Adams's judgment of Franklin was
incorrect, his work on the peace negotiations was highly
commendable 0

Adams's disregard for the congressional in

structions that France must be included in the negotiations
with England is not criticized by historians, who recognize
that Adams saw this procedure as the only way to negotiate
efficiently for American independence without contending with
French demands.

Both Smith and Morris maintain that the

congressional rebuke for this action waj unjustified.
Most historians rely upon the information supplied by
official European and American government documents, the
papers of Jay and Franklin, and Adams's own diary and let
ters to reach a conclusion as to his success or failure as
a diplomat.

There is no definite judgment on his abi lity

in the diplomatic negotiations in Europe,

However, most

historians state that, regardless of his petulant and sensi
tive personaltiy, his commitment towards American indepen
dence was commendable.

Thus, he endeavored to work for the

establishment of his country's role as a new and expanding
nation in a world dominated by European powers.

CHAPTER VI
THE MISSIONS OF JOHN JAY
John Jay began his diplomatic career in Spain, and al
though it was a disappointing experience, he then moved to
Paris where he gained a measure o£ fame for his role in the
negotiations for the treaty of peace between Great Britain
and the United States.

He was commissioned to Spain late in

1779 for the purpose of securing an alliance similar to the
one between France and the United States, but he was unsuccess
ful.

The mission to Spain frustrated him, because the harder

he tried to gain recognition and aid for his country, the
more obstacles he encountered.

Some historians stress Jay's

inability to adapt to the inscrutable tendencies of Conde de
Floridablanca, the Spanish foreign minister, while others
commend Jay's efforts to avoid the United States submission
to unreasonable Spanish demands involving" land claims and
navigation rights.

Jay faced a dilemma:

whether to abide

by the congressional instructions, while realizing that his
personal judgments on obtaining the most beneficial results
for his country sometimes contradicted these instructions.
Another controversial aspect of his experience in Spain
which extended to the negotiations in Paris, was the animos
ity he developed against the French, presumably because of
the dubious advice Gerard and Comte de Montmorin offered
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to him regarding the most successful ways to deal with the
Spanisho

Then, after Congress decided that Jay would serve

his country better in Paris negotiating for peace, he was
dispatched there only to encounter new difficulties which
also merit historical comment.

The very diverse personal

ities of Franklin and Adams placed Jay in the position of
a mediator, according to some historians.

Yet, a few authors

maintain that Jay was more compatible with one over the
other.,

The peace treaty and Jay's efforts to insure its

successful completion inspire debate among historians, as
they evaluate the degree to which Jay contributed to or
hindered the progress of the peace negotiations.

Although

Congress ratified the peace treaty, it reprimanded the
three commissioners for violating their instructions and
negotiating without France.

The justice of the congressional

action involves historians in still another unresolved de
bate „
John Jay's appointment to Spain came after Deane, Lee
and Franklin had laid the groundwork for American negotia
tions with other European countries.

His instructions were

specific, in that he was to secure recognition of American
independence and an alliance with Spain while also obtain
ing a financial loan from Spain.
Bemis criticizes Jay's irresolute approach to the Spanish
since he maintained, apart from his instructions, that an
American guarantee to Spain of free navigation of the Missis
sippi River to and from the sea was contingent upon an imme
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diate Spanish acceptance of American proposals for a treaty
and loan.

But in Bemis's opinion, Jay faced too many adverse

circumstances for one to characterize him as a personal
failure.

Hence, it was no discredit to Jay that the two

most important dates of his mission were those of his ar
rival and departure.^
Jay encountered difficulties in his negotiations with
the Spanish government.

Initially, he considered that the

United States, as a sovereign nation, was free to borrow
money on the same principle of repayment of principal with
interest, as E. S. Corwin points out.

The congressional

instructions concerning the Mississippi also presented a
dilemma for Jay.

Although he personally was somewhat am

bivalent in his sentiments, actually the congressional in
structions made his own opinion irrelevant.

Eventually,

Jay disregarded the orders of Congress and adopted the opin
ion that free navigation should be granted only upon Spanish
insistence.

Corwin denies that Jay was disgruntled and

disillusioned when he left Spain, pointing out that Jay
fully expected to renew negotiations with the Conde de
Aranda, who was the head of the Consejo de Castilla, the
supreme governing body for all Spain.

3

This plan proved

^Samuel Flagg Bemis, ed,, American Secretaries of State
(10 volSo, New York: Alfred A, Knopf, 1927-1929), I, pp. 197,
198-199. (Hereinafter referred to as Bemis, Secretaries.)
2

3

Corwin, French Policy, pp. 343, 323.
Morris, Peacemakers, p, 48.
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futile, because Aranda was not empowered to deal with such
4
matters in Paris,
Jay's lack of success in Spain was not his fault, ac
cording to Frank Monaghan, his biographer,

Monaghan admires

Jay's diplomacy and tenacity in dealing with the Spanish,
and makes no attempt to conceal his sentiments.

According

to Monaghan, from the beginning of Jay's stay in Spain, he
was a victim of Spanish procrastination, receiving excuses
such as the minister was ill or Gardoqui was not at the
court, when he definitely was.

Floridablanca, the Spanish

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was Jay's main prob
lem in his efforts to execute his instructions.

First, the

Spanish minister vehemently disliked republics and their
principles.

Adding to this difficulty was his resolve to

free Spain from French influence; thus, he refused to con
sider the 1778 treaty between the United States and France
as a basis for a Spanish-American agreement.

The proposal

by Floridablanca that the Spanish government would pay the
costs incurred in building ships for American merchants
within two years if the United States would immediately
supply Spain with frigates aroused Jay's indignant protests.
The Spaniard continued his questionable tactics with the
American minister, assuring Jay that Abbe Hussey and Richard
Cumberland had come to Spain on personal business, when, in
fact, they were confidential agents of the British ministry,

^Corwin, French Policy, p. 326,
^Monaghan, Jay, pp. 146, 150, 144-145,
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Ultimately, Jay recognized that no significant aid would be
forthcoming, since Spain had little money.

Congress added

to Jay's difficulty by drawing bills upon him, assuming
that he had received a loan from the Spanish when, in reality.
Jay had not even received an interview with Floridablanca to
discuss the possibility of a loan,^

Jay's awareness of

Spanish duplicity increased when he realized that his cor
respondence from the United States was intercepted and read
by the Spanish, and thus they knew of congressional plans
before he did.

Jay also suspected that the Spanish pro

crastination in meeting with him was based upon Spain's
desire to enfeeble permanently the American colonies in
order that Spain might establish firm control over the Gulf
of Mexico and the Mississippi Valley.

Monaghan believes

that it is to Jay's credit that he continued to work for an
alliance with Spain, even after he had received news of a
potential peace with Britain.

It was only after Montmorin

encouraged him to depart for Paris that Jay resigned himself
to the futility of his mission.

7

Another question arising regarding Jay's mission is
whether France sincerely supported the American cause in
Spain.

Monaghan insists that Montmorin intended to place

the United States in a position subservient to France and

^Ibid.. pp. 141, 153; see also, Henry P. Johnston, ed..
The Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay (4 vols..
New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1890), I, p. 338. (Herein
after referred to as Johnston, ed.. Jay Correspondence,)
7

Monaghan, Jay, pp. 134, 181.
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Spain.

Jay's frustration in continually being ignored by

the Spanish foreign minister led him to seek assistance
from Montmorin.

Instead of volunteering to approach

Floridablanca on behalf of the American minister, the
Frenchman reminded Jay that he represented

, , only

rising states, not firmly established or generally ac
knowledged . , ,
a letter

and urged him to write Floridablanca

. . praying an audience.'"

Monaghan continues

his account of this incident with a lengthy dialogue between
the two men in which Jay firmly stated his opinion that the
United States should never lower itself to begging for
recognition.

Jay emphasized that the French government had

been of no assistance in arranging a meeting between him
and Floridablanca, although it had promised that France
would help the Americans in Spain.

Monaghan feels that

Montmorin placed Jay in an untenable position, because he
insisted that Jay be humble in dealing with the Spanish
foreign minister.
Miller explains the relationship between the French
and Spanish with his typical clarity and conciseness.

When

France aligned herself with the United States, Spain was
outraged at such unilateral action.

So Vergennes faced the

task of appeasing Spain in order to insure her participation
in the war against England.

Therefore, Vergennes agreed

with Spain that the United States should be permanently

8

Ibid.. pp. 147-148.
Correspondence.

See also Johnston, ed.. Jay
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weakened by surrendering the Floridas and its claim to the
navigation of the Mississippi to Spain.

Also, Vergennes

had little sympathy with the United States growing into a
world power, which further insured French support of Spain's
Q
demands on America,
According to Samuel Flagg Bemis in The Diplomacy of
the American Revolution (1935), the Spanish mission was a
complete failure, but he refrains from accusing Jay of sole
responsibility.

Jay maintained that Spanish hesitency to

aid the United States was attributable to the stand Congress
had taken on the Mississippi question.

As has been dis

cussed previously, Jay opposed the idea of
the Mississippi for a Spanish alliance.'"

. bartering
Moreover, in 1781,

when Congress empowered him to recognize the

, , exclu

sive right of Spain to the navigation of the Mississippi
below 31' in return for a Spanish alliance , . .

Jay

obliged but worded the concession with "reserve and ambigu
ity."

Ultimately, it was Spain's decision to

<, , win

her own stakes without corresponding American successes , o
which signalled the futility of the mission,^®
Although Miller sympathizes with the difficulties Jay
encountered in attempting to negotiate with the Spanish
indirectly through the French or personally with Floridablanca, he criticizes Jay's diplomatic procedures.

^Miller, Triumph, pp. 386-387.
^^Bemis, Diplomacy, pp. 106-107, 111.
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confirms that no American diplomat would have been received
favorably by the Spanish,

, but John Jay settled his

fate by bringing to the Spanish court the proud, mettlesome,
and uncompromising demeanor of an American republican,"
Jay's eagerness for the Spanish alliance was not so great
that he was willing to yield the navigation of the Missis
sippi, although Congress had instructed him to do so.

His

stubbornness in regards to the Mississippi question was par
ticularly detrimental, because Floridablanca was fully
aware of Jay's instructions from Congress,

Jay's plea of

his country's poverty was no exaggeration, but Floridablanca
exhibited little sympathy for his monetary plight of the
United States, carefully explaining that Spain was hardly
in a financial position to underwrite any other nation.

In

an evaluation of Jay's contribution to American diplomacy in
Europe, Miller concludes that because of the treatment Jay
received in Spain, his international sympathies disappeared
and he became a confirmed nationalist, advocating isolation
ism,

For Jay, travel to Europe was a disastrous experience,

because he became acquainted with the ", , , deplorable
realities of European power politics.
In contrast to Miller, Donald Smith states in his col
lection of Jay's writings, John Jay, Founder of a State and
Nation (1968), that congressional instructions precluded
any agreement between the United States and Spain,

Smith

specifies that the congressional demands for recognition of

^^Miller, Triumph, pp. 568, 567, 571,
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American independence, substantial financial aid, and a
formal treaty of alliance, combined with Floridablanca*s
desire for exclusive navigation rights on the Mississippi
River were major points of disagreement.

Not only did

Spain's duplicity anger Jay, but Congress increased the
difficulty of the Spanish-American negotiations by drawing
upon funds that did not exist.

12

Both Richard W. Van Alstyne and Richard B. Morris state
that congressional irresponsibility regarding finances and
the navigation of the Mississippi River caused the main
points of contention between Jay and the Spanish.

Van Alstyne

adds that Jay's refusal to submit to Spanish demands regard
ing the Mississippi River and the Gulf of Mexico was the
13
reason Floridablanca stopped payment on Jay's bills.
Morris also considers the navigation of the Mississippi
River to be the main point of contention between Jay and
the Spanish, who also enjoyed French support.

Spain's re

fusal to recognize Jay added to his problems.

Originally,

Jay was instructed to "'. . . seek free navigation of the
Mississippi into to and from the sea, . . .'" and to secure
a free port or ports below 31® NL on the river.

In return,

America would guarantee the possession of the Floridas to
Spain if the king could wrest them from the B r i t i s h . A f t e r

l^Donald L, Smith, John Jay, Founder of a State and
Nation (New York: Teacher's College Press, 1968], pp. 7T,
76. [Hereinafter referred to as Smith, State and Nation.)
13

Van Alstyne, Empire, p. 183.

14
Morris, Peacemakers. pp. 231, 222.
ed., Jay Correspondence, pp. 248-250,

See also Johnston,

152

reconfirming this offer in 1780, Congress altered it in

1781, permitting him to recede from the Mississippi demands
o . to remove every obstacle to the accession of Spain
15

to the American alliance, , .

Montmorin informed J a y

that he was not in a position to make demands upon Spain
until he conceded on the Mississippi issues.

Both Spain

and France knew Congress had sent Jay new instructions
authorizing him to accede to Spanish demands on the Mis
sissippi issues, and Floridablanca announced that when Jay
was willing to yield on these points, he could
frankness in return, , ,
in exercising discretion by

. expect

Morris praises Jay's foresight
. . having placed a limited

duration on his offer of the Mississippi navigation as
being '"absolutely necessary to prevent this Court's con
tinuing to delay a treaty to a general peace. . . ,

Con

gress then endorsed Jay's actions, as it had begun to have
second thoughts about the way it had freely acquiesced to

Spanish demands.

X6

Morris adds that Congress contributed

to Jay's difficulties by drawing bills against money which

it assumed Jay had received from Spain.

There was justifi

cation for Jay's antipathy against Spain, because he realized
that Spain had declared war for objectives that did not inelude those of the United States,
15

17

Morris, Peacemakers, pp. 231, 222.
';?d ,, Jay Correspondence, pp, 248-2 50.

See also Johnston,

^^Morris, Peacemakers. pp. 240, 242-243, see also
Johnston, ed.. Jay Correspondence, pp, 418-419; Burlingame,
Envoy . pp. 190-191, Burlingame speaks of Jay's generous of
fer to the Spanish in relinquishing the Mississippi rights.
l^Morris, Peacemakers, pp, 227, 223-224,
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Jay's problems in Spain, both diplomatically and in
his personal associations with the French and Spanish min
isters, were not reflected in his relationships with the
other two peace commissioners, Adams and Franklin,

He was

particularly successful in gaining the friendship and
respect of John Adams, a man who was easily offended and
rarely forgave anyone who slighted his sensitive nature.
Both Monaghan and Morris cautiously approach Jay's rela
tionship with Adams, evaluating them as representatives of
the United States government,

Monaghan concludes that

fundamentally they agreed on the idea that America's future
did not include European alliances.

Both men disliked and

denounced France and Spain, although Jay's Spanish exper
ience made his objection to both France and Spain more valid
than Adams's.

Monaghan says that Adams's loathing of Frank

lin did not persuade Jay to the same opinion, despite what
other authors claim,

18

Morris emphasizes that Adams and

Jay agreed that explicit recognition of American indepen
dence was the only course to follow in the peace negotia
tions,

Adams was delighted when he observed how similar

their attitudes were on the peace proceedings.

19

Morris

hesitates throughout his book to describe any personality
clashes that might have hindered or detracted from the glori
ous role of the American peacemakers.

18
19

Thus he declines to

Monaghan, Jay, pp, 207, 186,

Morris, Peacemakers. p„ 256,
Jay Correspondence, pp, 330-331.

See also Johnston, ed,.
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mention whether Adams's dislike o£ Franklin affected Jay's
personal opinion of Franklin,
Currey rejects the idea that Jay might possibly have
condoned Franklin's activities.

According to Currey's

hostile account of Franklin's career, both Adams and Jay
reached the conclusion that Franklin was susceptible to the
French connivings during the peace negotiations,

Currey is

less vitriolic in his discussion of the attitudes of Adams
and Jay towards the career of the venerable diplomat.

20

In speaking of the relationship between Jay and Frank
lin, Morris approaches it strictly from the standpoint of
diplomatic negotiations.

Franklin possibly held some reser

vations about Jay's legal quibbling, but his admiration for
Jay allowed them to work in harmony.

Jay was successful in

persuading Franklin that separate negotiations with the
British were the only feasible solution to achieving a
peace favorable to the United States,

Together they managed

to conceal most of their diplomatic moves from Vergennes and
his entourage.

21

The idea that Jay and Franklin were not entirely com
patible is touched upon by Van Alstyne and confirmed by
Currey,

Adams and Jay were convinced that they had literally

rescued the American operation from French deception and
Franklin's servility to the French,

Fortunately, Jay per-

^'^Currey, Code #72, pp, 250, 248 ,
21

Morris, Peacemakers, pp, 339-340.

22
Van Alstyne, Empire, p, 214,
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ceived that Spain was receiving France's primary attention
and determined to defy congressional instructions, despite
Franklin's protestations.

Jay was never overly enthusiastic

about Franklin's assistance on the commission, and only
briefly commended his cooperation in promoting the final
terms on the fisheries.

23

Although Jay arrived in Paris enthusiastic over the
prospects of peace, he harbored some resentment against
France who, he thought, had influenced Spain's uncooperative
attitude^

Most historians concur that Jay objected to the

activities of Vergennes when they detracted from achieving
a peace settlement favorable to the United States,

Some

authors contend that Jay's dislike of France was intense
and was inherited from family sentiments, while more moderate
evaluations portray Jay as being objective in trying to judge
whether France actually promoted the best interests of the
United States,

E, S, Corwin's favorable appraisal of French

policy explains that Jay's attitude towards France was grate
ful but cautious.

Jay ungrudgingly acknowledged France's

generosity but realized that France would continue the war
to achieve her own objectives as well as those of the United
States.

Therefore Jay heartily resisted congressional in

structions, because they forced American ministers to

. o

receive and obey the instructions of those on whom no American minister ought to be dependent, , «

24

Jay's suspi-

22currey, Code #72, pp, 253, 259,
24

Corwin, French Policy, pp, 336-337, 346-348,

See also
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cions o£ French intentions deepened when he read JosephMatthias de Rayneval's proposal to divide part of the western
lands into two Indian protectorates under Spanish and American
jurisdiction, and then leave all the territory north o£ the
Ohio River to the British,

This controversial proposal added

to Jay's doubts that France's actions were in the best inter
ests o£ the United States,

Corwin justifies the French activ

ities by explaining that France was not trying to prolong the
war, but was only meeting her commitment to Spain, a concept
the American commissioner failed to understand.

25

Monaghan and Bemis maintain that Jay developed a dis
like for France while in Spain.

Monaghan claims that his

unfortunate relations with Montmorin led him to suspect
France of trying to keep both America and Spain under her
influence.

The secret Treaty of Aranjuez in 1779 bound

France to support Spain,

It stipulated that France would

not terminate the war or negotiate for peace until Spain
secured Gibralter, and that Spain would not recognize Amer
ican independence before Great Britain did.

Bemis also

points out that France had invoked Jay's distrust while he
was still in Spain,

Gerard had done his best to persuade

Congress that the French alliance with America did not guar
antee American territorial rights up to the Mississippi,
if to defy directly the Franco-American alliance, France

Johnston, ed,. Jay Correspondence, pp, 256-259,
Spain, Jay spoke o£ Frencn generosity.

While in

^^Corwin, French Policy, pp, 336-337, 346-348,

As
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signed the Treaty o£ Aranjuez, but its contents did not long
remain secrete

Jay became more reserved around Vergennes,

as the French foreign minister urged the American commissioners
to refrain from making extreme claims concerning boundaries
and fishing rights.

26

Miller's account of Jay's attitude towards France
denies that Jay, early in his mission, suspected French
motives.

As late as 1779, Jay was considered a strong sup

porter of France, speaking well of that country and earning
the respect of the French ambassador in Spain and Vergennes
in France.

According to Miller, Jay endeared himself to

Spain and France when he said of the Mississippi River navi
gation " . . . that it was a privilege 'which we would not
want this age. . . .

27

Unfortunately, other authors do

not comment upon Miller's interpretation of Jay's attitudes
towards France,
Jay's skepticism of French motives is developed by
Gerald Stourzh, Page Smith and Roger Burlingame, who con
clude that although Jay doubted French loyalty to the United
States, he did not harbor a vindictive hatred against her.
Jay delivered this astute appraisal of French policy, as
quoted by Stourzh,
They are interested in separating us from
Great Britain, and on that point we may, I
believe, depend upon them; but it is not
their interest that we should become a

^^Monaghan, Jay, pp. 134-135; Bemis, Diplomacy, pp. 109,
215, 241, 234.
^^Miller, Triumph, pp. 565-566,
Jay Correspondence, p, 305,

See also Johnston, ed,.
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great and formidable people, and therefore
they will not help us to become sOo^S
Vergennes supported leaving the territory north of the Ohio to
lingland and giving the southwest to Spain, He also opposed Amer
ican participation in the Newfoundland fisheries.

Page Smith

describes Jay's anti-French attitude as so extreme that it was
disconcerting to Adams, who found himself defending the
French,

29

Finally, Jay realized that the only way to coun

teract the alleged French conspiracy against American peace
efforts was to violate the Franco-American treaty, as well
as congressional instructions, and negotiate separately
with England.

•^n

Morris also agrees that Jay displayed little affection
for the French.

Raised in a circle of Huguenot refugees, he

had an inherent dislike for the French,

This sentiment influ

enced his later career and was intensified when Jay realized
that Vergennes agreed with Floridablanca's plan to defer rec
ognition of American independence until a general peace was
signed in order to prevent the Americans from dropping out of
the war before Gibraltar was secured.

Jay vigorously argued

with Franklin that, unless the congressional instructions were
violated, American honor would be nonexistent.

However, he

maintained that ignoring congressional instructions was not
synonymous with violating the treaty with France,
28

2Q

Stourzh, Franklin, Foreign Policy, p. 174,
Smith, Adams, I, pp, 540-541.

^^Burlingame, Envoy, pp. 194-195.
•^1

Morris, Peacemakers, pp, 309-310.
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The controversy involving Jay's association with France
receives attention from William Stinchcombe and Richard W,
Van Alstyne,

Both authors agree that Jay began his career

favorably inclined towards the French,

Gerard asked Con

gress to appoint Jay as the American representative at the
peace negotiations, as he was thought to be more amenable
to French policy, especially regarding the fisheries, than
Arthur Lee had been.

32

Van Alstyne states that upon Jay's

arrival in Europe, he shared Franklin's enthusiasm for the
French.

When he became aware that the French were favorably

disposed towards Spanish land claims in America, his sentiments towards them became increasingly hostile.

33

By the time Jay reached Paris, he was committed to
achieving independence from Britain through a reasonable
peace agreement.

Historians do not question his motives,

but some argue that his tactics were not indicative of his
country's honor.

E. S, Corwin mildly criticizes Jay's

activities in Paris, which included secretly dispatching
Benjamin Vaughan to England and his decision to disregard
congressional instructions to include France in the nego
tiations.

Thoroughly alarmed that France might aid Spain

in negotiating with England for possession of western lands.
Jay sent Vaughan to London

, , to combat Rayneval's

reasoning and to urge a new commission for Oswald authoriz-

Stinchcombe, French Alliance, p. 66,
Van Alstyne, Empire, pp. 213-214.
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ing him to treat with the United States of America,*"
This measure actually diminished the concessions Britain
was willing to make to the United States,

Shelburne had

realized that only by authorizing extensive concessions
to the Americans would he separate France and the United
States, but Vaughan's mission revealed that this had al
ready been accomplished.

With regard to the commissioners *s

violation of their instructions, Corwin explains that
technically they did not violate the
in the Treaty of Alliance."

, pledge given

On the other hand, they should

have warned France that " . . . the United States reserved
the right to make a separate peace, if a final peace should
be obstructed by France for reasons not covered by the
treaty of Alliance, . .

Corwin concludes that the in

dependent policies adopted by the commissioners were a
result of Jay's suspicions which, he concedes, were due
mainly to Jay's interpretation of facts, rather than the
facts themselves.
Monaghan explains Jay's evolution from the position of
refusing to consider separate negotiations to one of realiz
ing the necessity of independent negotiations with the British,
When Jay arrived from Madrid, he was indignant over his treat
ment by both France and Spain, but was further angered over
the congressional instructions.

However, he assured Frank

lin that there was no possibility of a separate peace with

34

Corwin, French Policy, pp. 339, 351, 341-342, 346.
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Britain so long as France remained faithful to the United
States,

He emphasized that he

America ruined than dishonored.'"

. . would rather see
However, Jay's sentiments

began to change when he saw that the American boundaries
proposed by the French indicated a settlement favorable to
Spain and France rather than to the United Stateso

When

Rayneval informed Jay that France would oppose both the
extension of the United States to the Mississippi and its
claims of free navigation of that river, Jay was convinced
of the necessity of negotiating separately with England.
The intercepted Barbe-Marbois message, which suggested a
means by which the Americans might be excluded from the
Newfoundland fisheries, increased Jay's suspicions of French
motives.

Jay's decision to send Vaughan to England to in

form Shelburne of the commissioners' views towards the
peace negotiations did not violate congressional instruc
tions o

Monaghan explains that Jay maintained the instruc

tions had been written under the assumption that France
would support American demands, but when she discouraged
American claims, she was no longer entitled to exclusive
35
American confidence.
Bemis says that Jay's suspicion that Vergennes attempted
, to postpone American independence until French views
and the objectives of Spain could be gratified by a
peace , .
tions.

influenced him to advocate separate negotia

In an effort to thwart French designs, he sent

^^Monaghan, J a y , p p , 1 8 8 , 1 9 5 , 201, 202-203,
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Vaughan to England with the message that it would be in the
best interests o£ France, and not England, i£ recognition
o£ American independence was postponed,

Bemis commends

Jay's decision to grant West Florida to the British, and
also indicates that it was not a crucial error for Jay to
omit Franklin's demand for Canada in his discussions with
Oswald when they formulated the first draft of the actual
treaty,

Bemis concludes that the commissioners displayed

insight when they broke away from congressional instruc
tions, taking advantage of

, European quarrels to cut

their country from them," and Congress ratified the treaty.
Like the preceding authors, Arthur Darling, in his
book. Our Rising Empire, 1765-1805 (1940), attributes Jay's
antipathy for France to the French efforts to play Britain
against the United States for the benefit of Spain and
France.

Vergennes's plan to limit the independence of the

United States and their territorial domain, along with the
Barbe-Marbois message, aroused Jay's suspicion of French
motives.

Darling credits Jay with drafting the major part

of the treaty to which England finally agreed and praises
him for insisting that the independence of the United State
be the basis of peace between the two countries,

57

Carl Van Doren agrees that French efforts to use the
quest of the United States for independence to her advan
tage prompted Jay to disregard congressional instructions,

^^Bemis, Diplomacy, pp, 210-211, 255,
^^Darling, Empire, pp. 77, 81, 85-86, 91,
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Jay believed that Vergennes intentionally delayed the peace
negotiations, because he planned to utilize them to secure
Spanish land claims in America,

Thus, Jay urged the Amer

ican commissioners to follow their own judgment rather than
their official instructions.

In addition, the intercepted

Barb^-Marbois letter confirmed his suspicions that France
opposed American independence.

Unfortunately, Jay failed

to realize that England was prepared to meet American demands, and as a result did not press hard enough for them.

38

According to Miller, Jay's patriotism inspired him to
disobey the congressional instructions, because he believed
them detrimental to American honor.

Miller labels the con

gressional instructions a victory for French diplomacy.

Al

though France had not previously sought advantages from her
association with America, her support of Spanish land claims
effectively placed her in a position opposing the United
States.

Jay distrusted France to the extent that after

France failed to secure Spanish land claims in the south
west, he maintained that France would probably favor British
claims in the region, rather than see the United States come
into power there.

Needless to say, the British were de

lighted with Jay as he unreservedly took them into his con
fidence, and Miller concludes that it is doubtful if, by
exhibiting their suspicions of France, Jay and Adams served
the cause of independence.

On the other hand. Franklin's

r Q

V a n Doren, Franklin, p p , 6 8 2 , 6 8 4 ,
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more subtle hints to the British that they would be in a
more favorable position with the United States should they
make a generous peace, proved more effective»

39

The idea foremost in Jay's mind, according to Morris,
was American independence.

Should England and France reach

any kind of secret agreement, the peacemaking efforts of
the Americans would be endangered.

Jay and Franklin agreed

on the 45th parallel as a boundary, since Franklin finally
understood that there was no real chance of securing Canada/°
Stinchcombe explains the consequences of Jay's blister
ing attack on Congress in 1781 regarding the instructions
to the peace commission, while Van Alstyne barely comments
on Jay's role in Paris.

Apparently, Jay exerted consider

able power in Congress, and his feelings about the instruc
tions were significant.

La Luzerne believed that he was

more influential in Congress than either Franklin or Adams,
However, his diatribe only revived the difficulties about
"authority and honor" among the American diplomats and made
41
an open break among them possible.

Van Alstyne remarks

that Jay overcame his "anti-French feelings sufficiently"
to support Franklin's plea for more money from the French,
More significantly, however, Jay was receptive to David Hartley's
proposal of a common citizenship between Great Britain and
^^Miller, Triumph, pp. 586, 632-633, 639, 641.
"^^Morris, Peacemakers, pp, 332, 347,
41

Stinchcombe, F r e n c h A l l i a n c e , p , 176,
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the United States, because of his desire to head off any
possibility of an agreement for mutual security between
Spain and Britain against the United States,

42

If Jay was justified in disputing congressional in
structions, that legislative body would not publicly recog
nize that his actions had been in the best interest of the
country,

Monaghan and Morris contend that Jay received an

unjust reprimand for the steps he had exercised in gaining
American independence,

Monaghan criticizes Congress for

making Jay justify his violations of its instructions after
43
peace had been declared.

Morris explains that the major

conflict developed over the secret and separate article
involving West Florida, which seemed to many delegates an
unnecessary insult to congressional honor.

Neither Jay

nor Adams forgave their critics in Congress, and Morris is
inclined to sympathize with their anger.

The American

commissioners acted on their own initiative to the annoy
ance of Congress, yet the outcome was to the advantage of
, •
44
their country.
As a diplomatic representative and a member of the
peace commission, John Jay does not inspire extreme con
troversy among historians, yet there are varying histori
cal opinions regarding his career.

From his personal papers

42
Van Alstyne, Empire, pp, 227-228o
4^

Monaghan, Jay, p, 212,

44
Morris, Peacemakers, p, 439,
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and correspondence and those o£ his colleagues, authors have
been able to in"vestigate his career and reach their own con
clusions about the success or failure of his diplomatic ef
forts,

His sole biographer, Frank Monaghan, depends largely

upon manuscript sources, congressional journals and Wharton's
edited volumes of diplomatic correspondence, and supplements
this information with several secondary sources.

This biog

raphy lends interesting insight into Jay's diplomatic career
but also covers his succeeding years as a politician and
Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

Donald Smith also deals with

his career from before the Revolution until the end of his
political activity.

His book is comprised of selections of

Jay's writings, while he inserts occasional comments.

The

book is useful from the standpoint of Smith's choice of
material, as he feels that it best represents Jay's senti
ments about the nation,

Morris also relies heavily on Jay's

personal papers for a source^

As has been stated, Morris

does an exceptional job of discussing the careers of the
peace commissioners through his emphasis on primary sources
and some secondary studies.

Neither Stinchcombe nor Van

Alst.yne consider Jay's career as important as those of
his colleagues in Paris, but their use of collections of
revolutionary records and the papers of Adams and Franklin
provides useful information.

An early historian, E, S,

Corwin, conducts his investigation from French sources,
and there is no lengthy comment about Jay,

However, Corwin

does contribute to the interpretations about Jay's attitudes
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towards the French,

Once again. Miller's monograph, with

its extensive bibliography, is valuable for its concise
analysis^

Although he does not include Jay's papers in his

bibliography, his study of the peace negotiations includes
a lengthy discussion of Jay's contributions»

Miller does

use information from the papers of European figures in
revolutionary diplomacy, among them Benjamin Vaughan, which
adds insight into Jay's activities in Paris,

Samuel Flagg

Bemis edited ten volumes about America's secretaries of
state, which includes an essay on John Jay»

This primarily

deals with his later diplomatic efforts, but does speak
briefly about his fruitless mission to Spain and his later
success in Paris,

Semis's full-length book on American

revolutionary diplomacy speaks about Jay's endeavors in
Spain and France,

With these sections, he includes infor

mation drawn from Jay's diary and public papers, and he
presents Jay as an able diplomat in Paris,

Arthur Darling

devotes an entire chapter to Jay's successes on the peace
commission based mainly upon the writings of all three com
missioners,

He presents as valuable a study of Jay's di

plomacy in negotiating for peace as any of the historians
who deal more extensively with Jay's diplomatic career,
John Jay does not receive undue criticism for his lack
of success in Spain; however, the difficulty he encountered
attempting to persuade the Spanish government to accede to
American requests is extensively discussed by historians,
Corwin and Monaghan agree that Spain's insistence on
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monopolizing the navigation rights on the Mississippi River,
and congressional indiscretion in drawing upon funds it
assumed Jay had obtained from Spain were the main problems
Jay needed to overcome to succeed at his mission,

Corwin

tends to be less sympathetic with Jay's frustrations as he
focuses upon Jay's diplomacy with Spain and its effects upon
his relations with France.

On the other hand, Monaghan

sympathetically discusses Jay's mission to Spain and extends
his praise for Jay's contributions on the peace commission.
Jay's failure in Spain was due to uncontrollable circumstances
and was not a reflection of his lack of diplomatic skill,
Monaghan's study concentrates upon Jay's diplomatic and po
litical career, while Corwin's topic demands that he deal
less with personalities.
Monaghan and Corwin also disagree over Jay's attitude
towards the French in Spain,

Monaghan believes that Mont-

morin was dishonest in pretending that he would assist Jay's
cause with the Spanish government.

According to Monaghan,

the French never had any intention of persuading Spain to
recognize the United States, while Corwin explains that Jay,
as well as other American officials, failed to comprehend
that France's first obligation was to support her old Euro
pean ally,

Bemis concurs with Monaghan's basic premise that

Jay faced insurmountable obstacles in that Spain demanded
concessions on the Mississippi River issues, which Congress
first refused to yield until assured that Spain would recog
nize American independence as France had,

Bemis's use of
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diplomatic material from the Spanish government as well as
congressional journals and Jay's correspondence lend cre
dence to his position.

Miller also agrees that Jay's prob

lems in Spain were attributable to the Spanish demands for
American concessions which were supported by France,

Yet

Miller concludes that Jay was not exactly suited to a dip
lomatic appointment because of his strong republican sentimentSo

Donald Smith's short account of Jay's contributions

to the founding of the nation, taken from Jay's personal
writings, blames Congress for the obstacles Jay encountered
in Spain, because the instructions demanded more than Spain
was willing to grant.

Van Alstyne and Morris, who are well-

respected historians, basically agree that congressional
handling of international finances and the Mississippi River
questions diminished the prospect of Jay's success in Spain,
Van Alstyne also points out that Jay's stubbornness regard
ing the Mississippi questions added to the sense of doom
which pervaded his mission.

Morris contends that congres

sional ambivalence on the Mississippi questions allowed Jay
to interpret the instructions as he chose, and Jay's anti
pathy towards Spain precluded a beneficial agreement between
the two countries.

With respect to France's influence on

Jay's diplomatic endeavors in Spain, Corwin mainly points
out that Jay failed to realize the prior commitments that
France had to Spain, and therefore mistook Montmorin's
advice as an effort to place him and the United States in
an inferior position.

Most other historians agree that the
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French minister ignored Jay's demands and supported Spanish
claims in America.
In contrast to the disputes over his experiences in
Spain, there is general agreement among historians that
Jay's role in Paris was indispensable.

Morris and Monaghan

describe how he was able to maintain harmony in the commis
sion because of his moderate temperament and friendship
with both Franklin and Adams.

Van Alstyne and Currey, how

ever, claim that he and Adams, not Franklin, initially de
cided to ignore congressional instructions, because Frank
lin was too willing to comply with French suggestions.
When Jay arrived in Paris, the hostility he harbored
against France after his experience in Spain was crucial,
according to Monaghan, Bemis, Stourzh, Smith, and Burlingame,
In contrast, Corwin and Miller imply that Jay's gratitude
for France's generosity overshadowed any ill-feeling he
might have held against France.

Monaghan, Stourzh and

Bemis concur that French designs to control the expansion
of the United States within boundaries east of the Missis
sippi infuriated Jay.

Page Smith maintains that Jay was

more anti-French than was Adams.

Burlingame defends Jay's

decision to negotiate separately with England, as does
Richard B. Morris.

Stinchcombe and Van Alstyne conclude

that Jay's dislike of the French occurred after he perceived
the dishonest treatment he had received from them in Spain.
Jay moved to Paris in 1781 and, according to some
authors, solely directed the negotiations with England.
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However, Corwin asserts that the independence Jay exercised
in sending Vaughan to England hindered the American cause,
as it assured Britain that there was a breach between France
and the United States.

Monaghan, Bemis, Darling and Van

Doren contend that French efforts to delay the peace by
playing the United States and Britain against each other
influenced Jay's decision to defy congressional instruc
tions.

Bemis and Darling are more expertly versed in

foreign policy than the other historians, and their use
of primary source material from Europe and the United States
contribute to their understanding of this delicate situation,
Monaghan and Van Doren concentrate more upon the personal
ities and not the situations which influenced Jay's decision
to negotiate separately with Britain.

Miller continues his

investigation of Jay's actions and mentions his extreme
patriotism but does not condemn Jay for defying those in
structions which would have harmed the future of the United
States.

Stinchcombe's critical opinion that Jay recognized

his influence in Congress and thus did not hesitate to attack
this congressional mandate, is not commented upon by other
authors.

Both Morris and Monaghan agree that Jay, along

with the other two commissioners, was unjustly reprimanded
by Congress for concluding a peace that would essentially
define the role of an independent United States and insure
its security in the world.
John Jay's early career in diplomacy admittedly was
doomed to failure, but he successfully proved his diplo
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matic ability in Paris for the eighteenth-century and
succeeding generations.

He struggled with adverse situa

tions in Spain, and yet according to most historians, sur
mounted his failure in Spain by directing the peace nego
tiations in Paris.

Thus, Jay was vital to the success of

early American diplomacy.

CHAPTER VII

FRANCIS DANA IN RUSSIA

The diplomacy of Francis Dana at the court of Catherine
the Great has long remained obscure in the history of Amer
ican foreign policy, although the accomplishments of Adams,
Jay and Franklin have received extensive attention from his
torians.

Francis Dana was a Boston lawyer whom Congress

appointed in 1781 to continue the tradition of militia
diplomacy.

He was instructed to seek Russian recognition

of the United States and some form of alliance.

His only

biography, published in 1930, a 1906 study in early RussianAmerican diplomatic relations, and more recently, historical
articles dealing with Russian foreign policy and the Amer
ican Revolution, reveal that his mission to Russia was more
complicated than had been formerly assumed.

When Dana

arrived in Russia, he failed to realize that the Russian
empress was primarily concerned with insuring Russian power
in Europe, and that the American Revolution only supplied
her with a convenient approach towards weakening the British
Empire.

Both he and the American Congress believed that

Count Panin's friendly attitude towards the United States
would pervade the entire system of Russian diplomacy.

How

ever, the power of the Russian foreign minister had been
eclipsed by the time Dana arrived.
173

Thus the envoy encountered
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the frustrations o£ non-recognition and was victimized byRussian deception, which continued throughout his stay in
Russia.
Given these circumstances, historians discuss, with
varying interpretations, the events of his mission, using
the information provided by the Dana papers, published
government documents from the United States and Russia, as
well as pertinent printed sources on Catherine and the
League of Armed Neutrality.

Historians differ in discuss

ing his attitudes towards relations with the Russian offi
cials.

Also, Dana's claims that the French and British

envoys in Russia worked to secure the goals of their respec
tive countries and ignored those of the United States cause
historical discussion.

Whether Dana strictly adhered to

congressional instructions while in St. Petersburg causes
debate among historians,
W, P. Cresson's biography of Dana, Francis Dana: A
Puritan Diplomat at the Court of Catherine the Great (1930),
emphasizes that the congressional instructions to Dana made
his mission to Russia especially difficult.

His instructions

assumed that the United States, although a belligerent, would
readily be admitted to the League of Armed Neutrality.

This

concept diametrically opposed any agreement that Catherine
was willing to make.

According to Cresson, Dana was in

structed to explain to the empress the

. . justice of

our cause, the nature and stability of our union. . .

and

then impress upon her the advantages that a treaty of friend

175

ship and commerce could provide for Russia.

Yet Congress

failed to provide him with reasons which might convince
Russia.^

Upon his arrival there he realized that Catherine

had assumed an attitude of impartiality, as she was hoping
to control the proposed mediation conference at Vienna,
Dana was unprepared for this reception, because Count Panin
had always been favorably disposed towards the United Statesc
Robert Livingston, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, had
assumed that Catherine would receive Dana amicably and had
been confident that Russia would agree to treaties with the
United States and invite it to join the League of Armed
Neutrality.

The tenor of the congressional instructions

changed when Livingston realized that Dana's efforts were
only languishing among the intrigues of the court, and he
began to discourage further negotiations.

A congressional

committee on foreign policy then enunciated the purposes
of the United States in European affairs:

. . The true

interests of these states require they should be as little
as possible entangled in the politics and controversies of
European Nations.'"

2

Ultimately, even before Dana was re

called, Congress abandoned its interest in his mission and
gave him no further responsibility.
The more recent articles by David M. Griffiths on
Russian-American relations are vital to a study of American
revolutionary diplomacy.

Based upon a wide array of primary

^Cresson, Puritan Diplomat, pp. 142-143,
^Ibid.. pp. 301-302.
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sources, he explains Dana's mission to Russia as part of
the efforts of the Adams-Lee faction in Congress to dis
credit the relationship Franklin enjoyed with France,
Griffiths also suggests that the Adams-Lee faction urged
that Dana's mission be immediately authorized, because
they feared that Franklin's subordination to France would
insure a French monopoly of American commerce.

In their

minds, recognition of American independence by Russia would
3
lessen the potential of control by one country.
Dana's Russian venture was excessively complicated. Al
though he received instructions from Congress, other men
attempted to exert influence over his tactics.

John C,

Hildt's Early Diplomatic Negotiations of the United States
and Russia (1906) explains that Franklin had urged that Dana
should go to St. Petersburg as a private citizen, as he op
posed sending an official minister before the United States
4
was assured of recognition.

After arriving in Russia and

establishing communications with Count Ostermann, a vicechancellor and one of the ruthless aides of Prince Potemkin,
Panin's successor, Dana suffered innumerable delays and
excuses from the Russian court.

Thus, he received an early

3

David M. Griffiths, "American Commercial Diplomacy in
Russia, 1780-1783," William and Mary Quarterly,. XXVII (July,
1970), 384. (Hereinafter referred to as Griffiths , "Commercial
Diplomacy.")
'^John C. Hildt, Early Diplomatic Negotiations of the
United States with Russia (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins ~
Press , 1906), p. ITi (Hereinafter referred to as Hildt,
Diplomatic Negotiations.)
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introduction to the problems he would face as a minister
unrecognized by the court to which he had been sent.
Cresson elaborates further on the unforeseen diffi
culties of Dana's mission caused by the capriciousness of
various individuals.

He received no support from Franklin

and Vergennes, both of whom opposed the futile efforts of
militia diplomacy.

In addition, Adams warned Dana to be

ware of the intrigues of Vergennes and Franklin who, he
claimed, would attempt to control the mission,
Dana

Adams urged

. . to let Catherine send an ambassador to the

United States . . .

and thus avoid the insidious influ

ence of Franklin and Vergennes.

However, Cresson's major

emphasis on the human obstacles confronting Dana stresses
the instability of the Russian court.

Ostermann informed

Dana that he would receive an audience only after a peace
treaty had been signed.

As time went on, Dana began to

understand that favoritism and blackmail were routine in
the Russian court.^

Catherine's prejudices and her pursuit

of personal pleasures diverted her from ever meeting with
Dana.

Time after time, he was denied diplomatic recognition

but he remained optimistic that the United States military
successes would favorably impress the empress,

Dana began

to realize that European nations hesitated to accept the
United States into the League of Armed Neutrality, because
they were waiting to see if Great Britain would recognize

^Cresson, P u r i t a n D i p l o m a t , p p . 1 4 8 , 222,
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American independence.

According to Dana, the nations in

volved in the League might risk the loss of commercial
benefits tendered by the United States if they waited too
long.

Dana remained convinced that future relations with

Russia would be based upon commerce.^
Samuel Flagg Bemis states that the whole mission was
"ill-considered" from its inception.

The original idea

of the United States joining the League of Armed Neutrality,
even if Russia had recognized her, was incomprehensible to
Russia, according to Bemis, because she was a belligerent.
In addition, Catherine was maneuvering for acceptance of
her mediation policy through which " . . . Great Britain
could negotiate with the revolted colonies separately and
independently and at the same time negotiate a European
peace without recognizing their independence."

Russian

recognition of American independence could have proven
disastrous for Catherine's diplomacy.

7

Griffiths maintains that Catherine and Russian commer
cial policy were responsible for Dana's failure.

His article,

"Nikita Panin, Russian Diplomacy and the American Revolution"
(1969), points out that Dana's frustrations were a result of
Catherine's fickleness towards her own ministers and the
O
subsequent removal of Panin from power, his later article

^Ibid., pp. 220, 245.
7

Bemis, Diplomacy, p. 165.

O
David M. Griffiths, "Nikita Panin, Russian Diplomacy
and the American Revolution," Slavic Review, American Quar-
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on Russian-American commercial policy states that a commer
cial problem was a basic cause of the failure of his mis
sion,

Dana's major task was to counter Russian fears that

American trade in Europe would compete with Russia's,

Dana

supplied sound arguments to Russian advisors, insisting that
the importance of American commerce to Russia was
yond all question . .

, be

which met little or no response,

Catherine was not openly hostile to the American proposals
for an alliance based upon Russian recognition of indepen
dence but regarded the benefits of trade with the United
States as being of little significance in relation to the
magnitude of European commerce.
Not only did Dana have to contend with Catherine's
unpredictable and vacillating diplomatic and political
activities, but he also was countered by the French and
British representatives at the Russian court.

They were

seeking to secure political and diplomatic advantages for
their own countries from the titular head of the Russian
Empire.

Historians argue over the relationship between

Britain and Russia, and J. C. Hildt, F. A. Golder and
W. P. Cresson basically agree that Catherine hoped to use
the American Revolution to effectively weaken British influ
ence in Europe,

Hildt explains that Catherine was sympathetic

terly of Soviet and East European Studies, XXVII (March,
1969), 19"i
(Hereinafter referred to as Griffiths , "Russian
Diplomacy.")
^Griffiths, " C o m m e r c i a l Diplomacy," 3 7 9 .
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to the American cause only because she hoped to frighten Brit
ain into a humiliating peace by pretending that she would sup
port the efforts of the United States for independence<,

In

reality, her only desire was to see an increase of Russian
prestigeo^^

Concurring with Hildt's premise is F, A, Golder's

article, "Catherine II and the American Revolution" (1916),
Although his thesis lacks documentation, he argues that
Catherine's only interest in the American Revolution was the
impact it would have on British and European politics,
Catherine blamed Britain for the failure of her mediation
proposals, because Britain refused to free the colonies.
And Catherine purposely informed France and Spain of British
attempts to bribe Russia into supporting the British war ef
fort in order to increase their antipathy towards Britain,
W, P. Cresson adds that Catherine came to realize that her
role as mediatrix was impeded, as well as her plans for east
ern expansion, so when Charles James Fox quit office upon the
death of the Marques of Rockingham all negotiations between

1?

Great Britain and Russia were suspended, "
Griffiths also discounts the notion of a political
agreement between England and Russia.

He explains that

Russian policy divides into two distinct phases: the first
under Panin, who sought to preserve the status quo in Europe
and to secure de facto independence for the American colonies

^^Hildt, Diplomatic Negotiations, pp. 18-19.
^^Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence, I, p, 265.
12

Cresson, P u r i t a n D i p l o m a t , p . 236.
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through Russian mediation; the second began when Panin was
removed in 1781, and the empress's advisors

. . en

couraged a more aggressive foreign policy that could only be
hampered by a peaceful solution to the war. . . . "

That is,

Russia could expand her borders if she took advantage of
England's weakness.

Apparently France was the country with

which Russia felt the most kinship in the first phase.
Vergennes explicitly explained that the Franco-American
alliance contained no exclusive trade privileges for France,
and that trade between the United States and Russia would be
unimpeded.

With this assurance, he hoped to persuade Russia

to support the American cause.

Russia anticipated that free

trade and American independence would render British power
politics obsolete and contribute to the downfall of the
13
British mercantile empire.
The French activities in Russia during the Revolution
also stimulate historical discussion.

Hildt expresses the

opinion that Verac, the French ambassador in Russia, at
tempted to aid Dana's mission.

Hildt says that Verac tried

to explain Catherine's mediation policy to Dana, specifying
that the United States must negotiate first with Great
Britain, and then with other countries.

Furthermore, Verac

pointed out that Russia had no great affection for the rebels,
and it would only humiliate the United States if France unsuc
cessfully demanded that Russia recognize their independence,
Verac advised, to no avail, that Dana would facilitate his

^^Griffiths, "Russian Diplomacy," 381.
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cause if he waited until a preliminary peace treaty was
signed before asking for Russian recognition, but Dana insisted upon negotiating immediately with the Russians,

14

Both Cresson and Bemis agree that Dana was justified
if he suspected that French advice was not always in the
best interests of the United States.

Cresson claims that

Verac unintentionally misinformed Dana that the United
States be invited to participate actively in the proposed
mediation.

Dana disagreed with the congressional instruc

tions that he was to seek French advice throughout his nego
tiations, because he was sure that Sir James Harris, the
British minister in Russia, and Verac agreed that a premature
recognition of American independence was undesirable,^^
Bemis supports Dana's reasons for distrusting France.

He

claims that Vergennes had given Verac orders to ignore
Dana's diplomacy in Russia.

Vergennes realized that urging

the Czarina to recognize France's ally would only antagonize
her, as her plan of mediation would then be unacceptable to
Great Britain,
Griffiths discounts, however, any suggestion that
Britain and France connived against American interests in
Russia.

Verac understood Catherine's desire to remain in

the role of the mediatrix, because she felt that neutrality
was the only way to sustain Russia's commercial trade with

14

Hildt, Diplomatic Negotiations, pp. 17, 18, 22.

^^Cresson, Puritan Diplomat, pp, 171, 177,
^^Bemis, D i p l o m a c y , p p . 1 6 5 - 1 7 7 , 407,
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Great Britain.

Despite Verac's warning, Dana was determined

to define his own role in Russia, independent of French ad
vice.

He failed t •) understand that the major obstacles in

Russian-American diplomacy were Catherine's search for other
alliances, her efforts to partition the Ottoman Empire, and
the turmoil of her inner court.

Therefore he assumed the

same distrust for Russia that Adams directed towards the
French.

Dana promised Vergennes that he would make his

official assignment known only when formal relations were
assured, but upon his arrival, he commenced acting as though
he was an official ambassador.

Griffiths concludes that

Vergennes never opposed the mission, and desired only to
advise Dana about its potential difficulties.

17

According to Cresson, John Adams influenced Dana's
policy in Russia.

Although their relationship has not

aroused an extreme amount of controversy, it merits discus
sion.

Dana was attracted to Adams, because they shared

common diplomatic frustrations and prejudices.

Adams was

convinced that the same methods of firm diplomacy he used
in Holland could be applied in Russia.

But this approach

proved unsuccessful in Russia, and it was only Adams's suc
cess in Holland which, in a measure, vindicated these proj
18
cedures,

Cresson and Griffiths state opposing viewpoints in

^^Griffiths, "Commercial Diplomacy," 391, 400-401,
18

Cresson, P u r i t a n Diplomat, p . 229,

184

evaluating Dana's diplomatic career.

Cresson explains that

Congress had relinquished too much o£ its power to the
French, which frusvrated Dana's efforts to negotiate
directly with Russia.

When Dana realized that Russia

expected a substantial monetary payment from the United
States if a coramercial treaty was agreed upon, he dis
approved of further American involvement in Europe»

Thus,

according to Cresson, Dana formulated a pattern of peaceful
isolationism, which was the policy the new United States
government would adopt in regard to Europe.

Both Dana and

Adams were disillusioned with European affairs, and they
exerted their influence towards securing a complete with
drawal from European alliances.

Their experiences in

European courts convinced them that the sovereigns were
manipulating the American Revolution in an effort to place
their own countries in positions of power and to satisfy
their own vanities.

Following the Peace of Paris, Dana

also abandoned any hopes of establishing commercial con19
nections with Catherine's court.

In contrast to Cresson,

Griffiths labels Dana's mission a glaring failure, caused
by his inability to understand the basis of Russian diplo
macy, which was based upon commerce.

For Russia, England

was more prominent and infinitely more valuable to Russian
commerce than were American ports.

Russian authorities

were not convinced of the value of American trade, and this

^ ^ I b i d o . p p . 272, 299-300.
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sentiment became more acute after Panin was forced from
office.

Dana chose to blame the French for many of the

difficulties which confronted him in Russia, assuming that
they wanted to subordinate American interests to their
own.

20

As the most recent author dealing with Dana and RussianAmerican diplomacy, Griffiths is critical of both Cresson
and Bemis for their ineffective and unscholarly analyses
of Dana's mission.

The source material for Griffiths's

articles includes extensive use of Russian official and
private correspondence and archival material, as well as
Dana's papers and secondary material pertinent to the topic»
He dismisses Cresson's biography, claiming that he has in
vestigated only one source remotely associated with Russia,
that of an emigre Pole.

Cresson, however, clearly states

in his bibliographical note that his investigation is
limited to Dana's private correspondence and other manu
scripts and printed sources dealing with Dana's diplomatic
career as well as his later political life.

Admittedly, he

was deficient in his use of Russian sources, but he is
competent in his interpretation of the American primary
sources.

Bemis incurs Griffiths's criticism for his mis

taken emphasis on Catherine's vanity as the basis of Russian
policy.

Griffiths also chastises Bemis for stating that

Russian foreign policy was governed by favoritism and

^^Griffiths, "Commercial Diplomacy," 399-400o
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blackmail.
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Although Bemis has used mainly American gov

ernment documents and correspondence, he also cites informa
tion from the State Archives at Leningrad, which is avail
able in the Library of Congress.

Griffiths does not comment

about Hildt's early investigation of Russian-American rela
tions »

Admittedly documentation is lacking in Hildt's book,

but his work does provide another viewpoint about a rather
obscure man in American diplomatic history.
In discussing the issues relating to Dana's mission to
Russia, Cresson defends his lack of accomplishment, explain
ing that the congressional instructions and Panin's sudden
dismissal from power combined to make any significant diplo
matic achievement impossible.

In addition, Catherine de

cided to assume the role of mediatrix and was reluctant to
commit herself to the American cause.

Griffiths explains

that Dana was dispatched to Russia to assure the Adams-Lee
faction in Congress that Franklin would not secure for
France monopoly of American trade.

Dana failed to compre

hend that Russian commercial trade depended more upon
Britain's ports than those of the United States,
Dana's status as an unofficial diplomat also presented
problems both domestically and abroad.

Hildt explains that

Franklin's consistent opposition to militia diplomacy
prompted him to urge Dana to travel to St, Petersburg as
a private citizen.

Then upon his arrival in Russia, Dana

^^Griffiths, "Russian Diplomacy," 23.
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realized that the Russian officials would not immediately
acknowledge his official status, and thus he was treated as
an unrecognized minister.

Cresson also comments that Frank

lin and Vergennes failed to offer Dana any support, and
that the Russian court chose to ignore him for various
political and personal reasons.

Bemis contends that the

mission was ill-fated from its inception, because Congress
assumed that the United States, although a belligerent,
would be accepted into the League of Armed Neutrality.
Moreover, Russian recognition of American independence
would have been disastrous to Catherine's policy of media
tion.
Historians also mention the influence exerted in Russia
by France and England.

J. C. Hildt, F. A. Colder, and W, P,

Cresson explain that Catherine's policy aimed at weakening
the British Empire by extending the American Revolution and
mediating a peace.

Griffiths also discounts any idea that

England and Russia enjoyed a political friendship, stating
that Russia placed her self-interest foremost.

He continues

his explanation of Russia's relationships with other Euro
pean countries, noting that Vergennes urged Panin to recog
nize American independence, and assured Russia that the
Franco-American alliance contained no exclusive trade agree
ments for France.

However, Dana developed a distrust for

French advice, similar to that held by Adams,

Hildt main

tains that the French ambassador in Russia attempted to
aid the American cause, but Dana's insistence on proceeding
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without a preliminary peace and Russian antipathy towards
Republican rebellion contributed to Dana's failure.

In

contrast, Cresson and Bemis argue that Dana's distrust of
French motives were justified, because France had a pre
dilection for placing her national interests first.
Although Dana's diplomatic achievements in Russia were
negligible, his mission merits study in an investigation of
revolutionary diplomacy.

Because of his frustrating exper

iences in Russia, and perhaps his inability to comprehend
the intricacies of European diplomacy, he developed a fixa
tion for peaceful isolation that was to influence American
foreign policy in the first crucial years of its develop
ment.

Thus, Francis Dana contributed his thoughts on

diplomacy to a nation struggling to formulate a successful
foreign policy.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

fThe books written about revolutionary diplomacy, or
dealing to. some ^degree witli _this„_aspect o£ the Revolution,
provide both laymen and specialists in the field of diplo
mat i^Jlist or y_ with useful information.,.

Although there are

variations in interpretations, there is a certain amount of
credibility to be found in most of the books.

However,

there are instancesjwhere an author misinterprets evidence
to substantia^e his sjub-iectlve ideas.
Admittedly Silas Deane's diplomatic career was not
distinguished, as he became embroiled in numerous problems
which, most historians agree, detract from his achievements.
With the exception of Currey, whose object in writing his
book is somewhere beyond the realm of historical investiga
tion, historians concede, however, that Silas Deane did
contribute to the success of revolutionary diplomacy,
Currey accuses Deane of joining with Beaumarchais in di
verting congressional funds for private use, but Auger,
James and Van Alstyne refute this notion of a secret part
nership.

Deane, being only human, was not a criminal if

he indulged in some personal financial ventures, as Fergu
son points out.

Helen Auger devotes her entire book to

the privateering and commercialism that was conducted with
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both official and unofficial authorization.

In general,

historians agree that Deane directed his efforts towards
achieving the independence of the United States by securing
aid from the French through Beaumarchais.

Van Alstyne

points out, however, that the French had been dispatching
aid to America before Deane and Beaumarchais began their
business dealings.
Another aspect of Deane's career which has caused
debate among historians is his association with Edward
Bancroft.

Most authors agree that they were acquainted,

but Currey and Boyd, although distinctly different in style
and scholarship, explain that Deane provided Bancroft with
information which the British then used.

Boyd decides that

Deane was victimized by a more clever man, while Currey
states that Deane's dishonesty equalled that of Bancroft's.
More benignly, Bemis, Auger, James and Miller claim that
Deane was innocent of any crime and was misled by Bancroft.
Van Alstyne insists that there was never an organized net
work of British spies.
As for the feud which developed between Deane and
Arthur Lee, Abernethy and Corwin are the proponents of
Arthur Lee's side of the argument.

Traditionally, as Bemis,

James, Auger and Ferguson demonstrate, historians agree that
Lee was overzealous in his condemnation of Deane.

On the

other hand, Deane and Franklin enjoyed a rather harmonious
association, according to Hale and James.

Once again,

Currey's dissenting voice states that they were partners
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in crime.

Allegations such as this emphasize the question

able scholarship o£ his book.
Although no historian defends Silas Deane's final defec
tion to the British, James, Ferguson and Morris explain that
the congressional investigation was badly conducted and con
tributed to his bitterness against the United States,

On

the other hand, Henderson and Currey imply that Congress
was correct in recalling and investigating Deane.
Although the career of Benjamin Franklin in Europe
promotes little of the same type of controversy among his
torians as do Silas Deane's activities, Franklin's diplomacy
poses some dilemmas for those historians who have discovered
in their investigations that Franklin also made some errors
in his negotiations.

Due to the questions raised by Aber-

nethy and possibly Currey, the career of Benjamin Franklin
is not completely free from dispute.
Franklin's concept of diplomacy emphasized independence
for the United States but, according to Gilbert, Stourzh
and James, he believed that alliances with Europe would also
benefit the United States commercially.

Stourzh, although

one of Franklin's confirmed supporters, concludes that
Franklin was not essential to the success of the alliance,
because France had determined to establish it, regardless
of who represented the United States.

However, as Bemis and

Miller state, and as Morris agrees. Franklin exerted his own
unique pressure on Vergennes to insure continued French sup
port of the United States,
According to Richard Henry Lee, Franklin's financial
interests interfered with his official duties, and Abernethy,
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Currey and Morris agree with this assertion.

Fundamentally,

according to the majority of reputable authors, like Fay,
Auger, James, Van Doren, and Burlingame, there is little
substance to Lee's accusations.

Continuing the criticisms

of Franklin by his contemporaries, John Adams was often
contemptuous of Franklin's activities»

However, even

Adams's biographer, Page Smith, admits that Adams was jeal
ous and suspicious of Franklin.
Benjamin Franklin also arouses controversy because of
his determination while on the peace commission to obey
the instructions of Congress and consult France on all
negotiations with England.

However, Bemis, Darling and

Miller conclude that independence was Franklin's first
consideration, and thus he eventually agreed to exclude
France from the peace negotiations.

Stourzh's study of

Franklin's diplomacy defends Franklin against those who
maintain that Franklin advocated reconciliation with Great
Britain.

Never, according to Stourzh, did Franklin con

sider such a step, as was evidenced by his commitment to
independence,
The controversies concerning the Lee brothers, espe
cially Arthur, have been mentioned in summarizing the dis
cussions among historians about Deane and Franklin.

The

activities of the Lees have been defended by a small mi
nority of writers.

Although Miller and Auger dismiss

Arthur's role in Paris as insignificant, Currey praises
him as the only member of the first commission who dis
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played integrity.

Richard Henry Lee, Bemis, Currey and

even James agree that Lee was a patriot in the purest
sense of the term but, unfortunately, he was unable to
direct his patriotism in a constructive manner for his
country.
this.

His missions to Spain and Prussia demonstrated

In addition, his brother's diplomatic endeavors

were equally futile.
In Arthur's defense, Abernethy carefully explains that
Lee's accusations against Franklin and Deane have been dis
missed although they merited more investigation.

Because

of Abernethy's article, Currey's support of Lee seems more
believable.
John Jay gained more fame later in his political life,
but he was also active in the diplomacy of the Revolution,
The commission to Spain introduced him to the difficulties
of negotiating with another nation.

His biographer, Frank

Monaghan, sympathizes with Jay's frustrations in dealing
with members of the Spanish court.

In addition, Bemis,

Monaghan, Morris and Van Alstyne agree that Congress was
not considerate in demanding large sums of money from Spain
through Jay, nor did its vacillation on the Mississippi
River question abet his cause.

Unfortunately, Jay believed

that France sincerely meant to persuade Spain to support
the United States bid for independence, and Monaghan and
Corwin agree that he was mistaken.

However, Corwin ex

plains that Jay was ignorant of France's previous political
obligation to Spain.

Because of Jay's strong republican
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spirit, both Monaghan and Miller imply- that Jay might not
have been ideally suited to diplomatic negotiations which
required flexibility =,
In contrast to his failure in Spain, historians gen
erally agree that Jay was an asset on the peace commission,
although his experiences in Spain intensified his skepticism
of France,

He still thought of France as having deceived

him in her failure to secure Spanish acceptance of an alli
ance with the United States, according to Monaghan, Bemis,
Stourzh, Smith and Burlingame.

Then he realized that France

desired to see the borders of the United States curtailed,
which increased his distrust of France,

This influenced

his decision to advocate separate negotiations with England^
which Monaghan, Morris and Burlingame deem a wise choice.
The three best accounts of Jay's peace negotiations, by
Miller, Darling and Bemis, also explain that French efforts
to delay the negotiations and play the United States and
Great Britain against one another added to Jay's antipathy
against France,

Because of his contributions to the peace

efforts, Morris and Monaghan agree that the congressional
reprimand was unjust,
John Adams, also a member of the Paris peace commission,
began his diplomatic career as a replacement for Silas
Deane.

There is no doubt that Adams was a sincere patriot,

and Morse concludes that his patriotism helped American
independence.

However, Monaghan, Miller, Morris, Rossiter

and Bailyn point out that his blunt manner and sensitivity
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to personal slights detracted from his diplomatic abili
ties,

Honesty remained foremost in Adams's concept of duty,

and Henderson remarks that Congress exonerated Adams from
the dubious dealings of the first commission^
The activities of John Adams in Paris have aroused
historical debate,

Adams's unreasonableness was a negative

factor in his initial diplomatic mission to France, accord
ing to Cresson and Corwin,

However, Hale, Bemis and Miller

contend that Adams agreed to an alliance with France, be
cause it seemed the only practical way for the United States
to gain independence.

On the other hand, Morris and Stinch-

combe conclude that Vergennes was unnecessarily rude to
Adams and rather deserved Adams's dislike.

Page Smith also

defends Adams's skeptical attitude towards the French,
If Adams encountered difficulties in France, Smith
emphasizes that he was successful in Holland and back in
Paris on the peace commission.

Darling and Morris also com

mend his work on the peace commission and state that the
congressional rebuke of the efforts of the commissioners
was unjustified.

Smith is convinced that Adams and Jay

were responsible for the success of the commission, despite
Franklin's unavailing insistence that France be included in
all the negotiations.

Most historians accept the contention

between Franklin and Adams as a reflection of the differ
ences in their temperaments.
In considering the career of Francis Dana, only a few
historians have devoted significant research to his mission
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to Russia.

Because Dana achieved nothing concrete there,

many historians have ignored him, but W. P, Cresson attrib
utes his lack o£ accomplishment to Catherine 's mysterious
and unpredictable court habits and to the impractical de•aands set forth in the congressional instructions.

On the

other hand, Griffiths criticizes Dana 's inability to under
stand that the United States could not offer Russia suffic
ient commercial advantages to make an alliance worthwhile.
Dana was also disappointed in the diplomatic support
which both France and Great Britain extended to Russia,
Cresson and Berais argue that once again France placed her
own interests foremost.

J. C. Hildt also explains that

Dana made the situation more difficult by pressuring an
unwilling Russian court to recognize American independence.
Eventually, Cresson concludes, Dana became a firm proponent
of isolationism because of his experience in Russia,
For research on American revolutionary diplomacy,
there are primary materials, published and unpublished, and
numerous secondary works to document an interesting studyo
The authors dealing with American revolutionary diplomacy
use essentially the same primary documents, but certain
historians have made more scholarly studies than others,
Samuel Flagg Bemis set a precedent for twentieth-century
historians to follow regarding research and writing that
few have been able to emulate.

However, Gerald Stourzh

has challenged Bemis's style and scholarship.

Fortunately,

their topics were sufficiently different to avoid a con
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flict, and both of their books are valuable for this study.
Although Bemis and Stourzh have ably followed the
canons of historical writing, other authors have contributed
competently to the literature of early American diplomatic
history,

Corwin's study on the French alliance provides a

needed explanation for one of the major problems of the
Revolution.

In a span of four years, Morris, Stinchcombe

and Van Alstyne published their books, which thoroughly re
searched the primary materials pertinent to their topics,
Morris has made the men on the peace commission very real
characters without submerging his scholarship in shallow
analyses of personalities.

Stinchcombe and Van Alstyne

also realize the importance that diplomatic negotiations
played in gaining the alliance with France and independence
from England.
From a biographical standpoint, the books by Van Doren,
Cresson, Monaghan, and Page Smith are necessary to this study.
Without their lucid explanations of the motivations and
biases of the early diplomats, it would be difficult to
evaluate their foreign policies.

There is no startling new

material in these biographies, but then none has been re
vealed in the collections of documents relevant to these
American diplomats.
From the many articles that have been published on
diplomacy and the men of the Revolution, those by Abernethy,
Boyd, Bemis, Ferguson, Gilbert and Griffiths are outstand
ing.

Both Abernethy and Boyd distinguish themselves by
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drawing scholarly and new interpretations from evidence
that has been available to many historians,

Griffiths

delves into sources on an obscure topic to reveal valuable
information about Russian-American diplomacy.
tion, to date, remains unchallenged.

His posi

Ferguson's explana

tion of the commercial tendencies of American diplomats
defends them from the scorn that other authors attach to
their commercial interests.

Gilbert's examination of the

attitudes of Franklin, Adams and the French philosophers
of the eighteenth century towards diplomacy lends an inter
esting perspective to this thesis.
For historians writing about the diplomacy of the Amer
ican Revolution, there are not the major difficulties in
obtaining primary source material that historians dealing
with more obscure or recent topics might encounter.

How

ever, there is still the problem of writing without includ
ing a personal bias which might taint the use made of the
sources.

This, of course, is an obstacle which almost all

historians face, and only a few surmount.
It would seem that the subject of early American dip
lomats and their policies has been well researched, but
there might still be additional material in the archives
in Spain, Holland and Russia, which has not been revealed.
Yet recent articles like the ones on Dana by Griffiths
indicate that perhaps there are other men who have been
slighted in revolutionary history.

However, an author must

carefully avoid the hazard of inventing dramatic or unusual
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topics based upon material from the Revolution,

Books and

articles relying upon sensationalism are irrelevant to his
torical research, but they do add an interesting dimension
to historiography.

Unfortunately, an historiographical

analysis should also dismiss such writings as almost use
less o
Criticism of the diplomacy of the American Revolution
must be executed with great tact, because the Revolution
itself is revered in our society, and an iconoclast would
hardly be appreciated.

Therefore, historians are somewhat

limited by societal restrictions in their approaches to
revolutionary diplomacy and the men who conducted it.

As

a young nation, we still do not have the perspective of an
older or perhaps fallen empire with which to evaluate the
success of our early foreign policy.

However, the careers

of early American diplomats provided the bases for American
foreign policy in the years succeeding the Revolution,

S E L E C T E D

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Materials

Journals and Letters
Butterfield, L. H,, ed. Diary and Autobiography of John
Adams. Volume Four: 1777-1780. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: The Belknap Press, 1961,
The combination of Adams's diary and letters
is very useful in a study of Adams's political
career, and the editing is excellent.
Hale, Edward E. and Hale, Jr., Edward E. Franklin in
France. Two volumes. Boston: Roberts Brothers,
1888.
These volumes of Franklin's writings with
editorial remarks are not as revealing as his
Autobiography, since they only emphasize his
contributions to the Paris commission,
Johnston, Henry P., ed. The Correspondence and Public
Papers of John Jay. Volume One: 1763-1825, New
York: G, P. Putnam's Sons, 1890.
Jay was not prolific in his writings about
his diplomatic missions.
Massachusetts Historical Society, Collections of the
Massachusetts Historical Society, Warren Papers,
Volume Four. Boston: The Massachusetts Historical Society, 1878,
This candid exchange of letters between
Mercy Warren and Adams reveals criticisms of
Adams and his defense against them.
Van Doren, Carl, ed. Benjamin Franklin's Autobiographical
Writings, New York: The Viking Press, 1945,
This particular collection of Franklin's
writings is very useful and skillfully edited.

200

201

Wharton, Francis, ed. The Revolutionary Diplomatic
Correspondence of the United States^
Six
volumes, Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1889.
These volumes, six in number, are neces
sary to any study of revolutionary diplomacy.

Memoirs
Lee, Richard H. The Life of Arthur Lee, Two volumes,
Boston: Wells and Lilly, Court Street, 1829»
Although biased, it is the only account
of Arthur Lee's life, and is compiled from his
personal writings.

Secondary Materials--Published

General, Topical and Monographic Works
Auger, Helen. The Secret VJar of Independence,
Little, Brown and Company, 19 5 5,

Boston:

Auger presents an interesting and welldocumented study of the privateering and commer
cial ventures of the Revolution which took place
in Europe. She admires the men who directed
these activities.
Bemis, Samuel Flagg. The Diplomacy of the American Revolution, Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1935,
Bemis deals not only with American diplomacy
in the Revolution but also the attitudes and ac
tions of European countries involved in Armed
Neutrality and the mediation efforts. He ex
plains both the American and the European sides
of the negotiations for alliances and peace.
The American Secretaries of State and
Their Diplomacy, Volume One, New York; Alfred
A. Knopf, 1929,
The section concerning John Jay was informa
tive but was of little use for the study of his
diplomatic efforts in the Revolution,

202

Burlingame, Roger, Benjamin Franklin: Envoy Extraordinary„
New York: Coward-McCann, Inc,, 1967„
Burlingame considers
ing in eighteenth-century
because of his ability to
situations. Although not
arly work, it is useful,

Franklin to be outstand
diplomatic negotiations,
understand people and
an exceptionally schol

Clark, George L. Silas Deane^ A Connecticut Leader in
the American Revolution. New York and London:
Go P. Putnam's Sons, 1913o
The bias in favor of Deane dominates the
book, which is undocumented. From the standpoint
of historical content, the study is valueless,
Corwin, Edward S. French Policy and the American Alli
ance of 1778. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1916.
Corwin has written a valuable account of the
international politics which resulted in the sign
ing of the Franco-American alliance. He also has
studied the problems arising from the American
commitment to France during the peace negotia
tions.
Cresson, W. P. Francis Dana: A Puritan Diplomat at the
Court of Catherine the GreatT
New York: The Dial
Press, 1930.
Cresson presents an honest picture of the
diplomacy of the Russian court along with his
realization that Dana's mission was futile from
its inception. Cresson points out how Dana's
attitude towards diplomacy affected the United
States national policy.
Currey, Cecil B. Code #72. Ben Franklin: Patriot or Spy?
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc,,
1972.
Currey strongly suspects Franklin's role in
the diplomatic activity in Paris, associating him
with men accused of being British spies. The
bias is overriding to the point of careless and
circumstantial speculation.
Darling, Arthur Burr,
Our Rising Empire. 1765-1801,
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940,

203

The first four chapters of this book deal
exclusively with the negotiations with England
for a treaty of peace, which are very useful
for a study in revolutionary diplomacy.
Fay, Bernard. Franklin, The Apostle of Modern Times,
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1929.
Fay's treatment of diplomatic incidents and
Franklin in Europe is minimal, as this book is
concerned mainly with the many diversions in
Franklin's life and his philosophical view of
life.
Hildt, John G. Early Diplomatic Negotiations of the
U. S. With Russia. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
Press, May-June, 1906.
Hildt does not delve into personalities and
character studies but is concerned with the dip
lomatic procedures. The section dealing with
Russia is useful but lacks sources from Russia,
Lopez, Claude-Anne. Mon Cher Papa. Franklin and the
Ladies of Paris. New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1967.
This volume is useful in explaining Frank
lin's social and intellectual activities and his
personal relations in France but is almost mean
ingless for the study of Franklin's diplomacy.
Miller, John C. Triumph of Freedom.
Brown and Company, 1948.

Boston: Little,

This in-depth study of the American Revolu
tion is beneficial from many aspects, as Miller
deals with the English points of view towards
the Revolution, as well as the American, The
diplomacy of the Revolution is placed in the
perspective of the entire event, including
military campaigns and political debates.
Monaghan, Frank. John Jay, Defender of Liberty against
Kings and Peoples. New York. Indianapolis: The
Bobbs Merrill Company, 1935.
Monaghan points out that Jay's failure in
Spain was no discredit to him, but that his per
sonality might not have been ideally suited to
diplomacy. He credits Jay with directing the
success of the peace commission, however.

204

Morris, Richard B. The Peacemakers, the Great Powers
and American~Independence. New York: Harper
and Row, 1965.
The road to peace involved many varied per
sonalities and events which Morris presents in
an interesting and well-documented narrative.
He also speaks ably o£ European influences on
American affairs,
Morse, John T,, Jr. John Adams. Boston: Houghton,
Mifflin and Company, 1894.
Although biased and not well-documented,
his account of Adams's life in politics is
interesting.
Smith, Donald L. John Jay. Founder of a State and
Nation. New York: Teacher's College Press,
1968.
This short volume is composed of Jay's
writings with Smith's editorial remarks which
present Jay in a favorable frame of reference.
Smith, Page. John Adams, 1755-1784. Two volumes.
Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company,
Inc., 1962.
Smith portrays Adams as a very real charac
ter, subject to the pitfalls of vanity, temper
and sensitivity, yet still to his country's
success. This study of Adams's life is excel
lent but needs to be balanced with other works
dealing with Adams, because it is based too
narrowly on Adams's correspondence,
Stinchcombe, William C. The American Revolution and
the French Alliance. Syracuse: University
Press, 1969,
This explanation of French activities in
France and the United States in order to gain
support for the alliance, and America's response
to them, is interesting and worthwhile. This
is a part of the Revolution that merits histori
cal study.
Stourzh, Gerald, Benjamin Franklin and American Foreign
Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1954,

205

For a study o£ Franklin's philosophy towards
foreign policy, this is most enlightening. It
also contains valuable comments on other works
written about Franklin.
Van Alstyne, Richard W. Empire and Independence.
York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965.

New

The rise o£ American independence through
the American reaction to British legislation is
the framework in which this book is set. He
treats American foreign policy from the stand
point of the European influences upon it.
Van Doren, Carl. Benjamin Franklin. New York: Garden
City Publishing Company, Inc., 1941,
Van Doren's book covers Franklin's entire
life, and his trips to Europe are well explained.
Van Doren admires Franklin's diplomatic abilities
yet does not overwhelm the reader with his bias
for Franklin.
. Secret History of the American Revolution.
New York: The Viking Press, 1941.
Although this book concentrates more on the
secrecy of the military aspects of the Revolution,
Van Doren does mention the shady dealings of
Deane in France. However, Benedict Arnold is
the main character in this study.

Articles
Abernethy, Thomas Perkins, "Commercial Activities of
Silas Deane in France." American Historical
Review. XXXIX (April, 1934), 477-485.
Abernethy is convinced that evidence from
British government documents leads to the con
clusion that Deane was the profiteer Lee had
accused him of being. This viewpoint is not
generally accepted, and thus the article is
requisite for gaining a fuller understanding
of the conflict between Silas Deane and
Arthur Lee,
"The Origin of the Franklin-Lee Imbroglio,"
The North Carolina Historical Review, XV [January, 1958), 415-452.

206

This defense of both Lee borthers for their
accusations against Franklin and Deane differs
from the traditional approach of histori-ms, It
should be considered as a valid study, useful
for those who have always maintained that the
Lees were wrong on their attacks on Deane and
Franklin.
Bemis, Samuel Flaggo
"British Secret Service and the
Franco-American Alliance," American Historical
Review. XXIX (April, 1924), 474-495,
The author brings out the attachment be
tween British agents and the American diplomatic
representatives, especially Franklin and Deane»
He demonstrates that this association affected
the outcome of the Revolution very little,
Bailyn, Bernard. "Butterfield's Adams: Notes for a
Sketch." William and Mary Quarterly. XIX (April,
1962), 238-256.
This article lends excellent insight into
the character of John Adams, which was surpris
ingly complex. It does not contribute vastly
to an understanding of his diplomatic policy,
however.
Beloff, Max, "Benjamin Franklin: International States
man," Memoirs and Proceedings of the Manchester
Literary and Philosophical Societys, XCVII (1955-^
56), 13-30,
This article considers the formation of
Franklin's attitudes towards imperial expansion,
his conversion to American independence, and
the diplomatic tasks of winning the French alli
ance and concluding the treaty of peace with
Great Britain,
It is informative, although not
unique in its opinions.
Boyd, Julian P, "Silas Deane: Death by a Kindly Teacher
of Treason," William and Mary Quarterly. XVI
(April, July, Qctober, 1959), 165-187; 319-342;
515-550.
For background on Silas Deane's initial
contact with Edward Bancroft, their eventual
friendship, and its outcome, this is an excel
Boyd is skillful in relating the
lent study,
facts and implications of their relationship.

207

Corwin, Edward S. "The French Objectives in the American
Revolution." ^erican Historical Review, XXI
COctober, 19157"^ 33-61.
This article reveals the primary motives
of Vergennes in his efforts to secure the FrancoAmerican alliance. It is good for background
information while studying American diplomacy
during the period,
Ferguson, E. James. "Business, Government and the Con
gressional Investigation in the Revolution,"
William and Mary Quarterly, XVI (July, 1959),
293-319.
Ferguson presents the Revolution as an op
portunity for men interested in commercial advan
tages. From his viewpoint, it is fortunate that
men like Adams and Jay represented the country,
as their motives were not as pecuniary as Deane's.
This is a good presentation of rather complicated
material.
Gilbert, Felix. "The New Diplomacy of the 18th Century,"
World Politics, IV (October, 1951), 1-38,
This article explains the French philosophical
approach towards diplomacy, as well as including
the diplomatic attitudes of Franklin and Adams,
which is a unique and useful combination.
Colder, F. A. "Catherine II and the American Revolution,"
American Historical Review, XXI COctober, 1915) ,
92-96.
This explanation of Catherine's manipulation
of the American Revolution to insure Russian
power in Europe is not essential to the study
of American diplomacy. It does give helpful
background, however, on the obstacles that Dana
had to surmount if he were to gain Russian recog
nition of American independence.
Henderson, H. James. "Congressional Factionalism and the
Attempt to Recall Benjamin Franklin."
William
and Mary Quarterly, XXVII (April, 1970), 246-267,
Henderson's analytical approach to the con
gressional factionalism resulting from the DeaneLee imbroglio, and the political alignments that
formed, is more worthwhile for a study of the
American political tradition.

208

Van Tyne, Claude H. "French Aid Before the Alliance of
1778." American Historical Review. XXXI (Octo
ber, 1925), 20-40.
This article commends France for the support
she offered America, even before a formal agree
ment was reached. It deals only minimally with
American diplomats.

Secondary Materials--Unpublished

James, Coy Hilton. "The Revolutionary Career of Silas
Deane." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan
State University, 1956.
As one of the works dealing with Deane, it
makes good use of primary material to reveal
obscure information about one of the unheralded
and overlooked men of the Revolution. He does
not avoid the problems that Deane faced while in
Paris.

